Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies and missing journals, but still convicted.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons inadequate for failing to explain how he could believe the complainant's evidence despite these identified credibility problems.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for home invasion related offences, challenging the admissibility and reliability of fingerprint evidence due to alleged confirmation bias, and the trial judge's dismissal of an application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged Charter breaches during an altercation in custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of fingerprint evidence and upholding the trial judge's decision to deny a stay, noting the high bar for such a remedy.

The young person appellant appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge erred in assessing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and the trial judge misapprehended evidence from other witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence, and no misapprehension of the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a shooting incident in which he fired multiple shots at the victim.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions regarding the use of evidence of after-the-fact conduct, arguing the judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on permitted and prohibited uses of such evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the fundamental principle of proportionality and improperly considered intent to kill as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that despite some deficiencies in the jury instructions, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred, and that the sentence of 11 years imprisonment was fit.

The appellant was convicted of various drug offences and possession of proceeds of crime.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's decision to dismiss his application to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant, arguing that the information to obtain the warrant (ITO) was insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be found at the specified residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the information provided by confidential sources regarding the appellant's drug trafficking activities was sufficiently corroborated and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in finding reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a nine-year sentence for unlawful act manslaughter based on failing to seek medical attention for a two-year-old child who died.

The trial judge conducted a Gardiner Hearing and found the appellant had assaulted both the mother and child, though could not determine if he inflicted the fatal blow.

The appellant argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her findings and that the sentence was disproportionate to the six-year sentence imposed on the mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and the disparity in sentences did not constitute error.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on a winery corporation that pleaded guilty to discharging material into a watercourse in violation of the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The trial judge imposed a fine of $600, invoking section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to relieve the defendant from the statutory minimum fine of $25,000.

The appeal judge increased the fine to $5,000, still below the minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and imposed the minimum fine of $25,000, holding that section 59(2) must be applied with appropriate restraint to avoid undermining the deterrent purpose of minimum fines in public welfare legislation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal raised three main issues: the validity of the search warrants, the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis regarding the exclusion of evidence, and the finding that possession was for trafficking purposes.

The trial judge had found a reasonable apprehension of bias by the issuing justice due to an indirect familial connection, but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the search warrant was validly issued on the merits, the s. 24(2) analysis was appropriate, and the quantity and nature of materials seized supported the trafficking inference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The complainant testified that she would not have consented to sexual intercourse three weeks after giving birth.

However, a sexual assault questionnaire completed at the hospital on the day of the alleged assault indicated that the complainant had reported consensual intercourse two days prior to the assault.

Trial counsel failed to notice this answer in the questionnaire and did not bring a section 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on this prior sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to attempt a section 276 application constituted ineffective representation that undermined the reliability of the verdict and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of arson under sections 433 and 434 of the Criminal Code for deliberately setting fire to his two-storey building in Espanola with the intent to collect insurance proceeds.

The Crown's case relied on evidence of motive, planning, preparation, forensic evidence linking the appellant to the fire, and testimony from a disreputable witness who was likely an accomplice.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: that the trial judge improperly used neutral evidence to confirm the accomplice's account, misused the appellant's exculpatory statements as evidence of guilt, improperly excluded relevant evidence through misapplication of the collateral fact rule, and engaged in speculative reasoning inconsistent with the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made some errors, they were not material to the conviction given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and search the appellant.

The trial judge found such grounds existed based on police observations of the appellant's vehicle making three stops at different locations within 15 minutes, with interactions at each location involving known drug users.

The sentence appeal challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence provision under the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months plus two years' probation for sexual assault.

He argued that the sentencing judge applied the wrong sentencing range, contending that the appropriate range for intercourse with an unconscious complainant was 12 to 14 months to three years, rather than the 21 months to four years range for forced intercourse with a spouse.

The appellant submitted that a sentence of six to ten months was fit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the sentencing range and that the sentence imposed was fit in the circumstances.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault on his father and was sentenced to 16 months' custody followed by 3 years' probation.

He appealed his sentence, arguing he was not receiving the recommended psychiatric treatment in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision.

The court noted the appellant's refusal of a proposed variation to facilitate a transfer to a psychiatric hospital and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the probation conditions were intended to ensure he receives help upon release.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest one of the appellants, and therefore the evidence obtained during the search incident to arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable and probable grounds based on confidential information and police surveillance of a suspected drug transaction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing that the court below erred in its assessment of credibility and the risk of witness tainting.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the appeal did not raise a question of law requiring clarification and that the arguments were not sufficiently strong to warrant a second appeal.

The appellant was convicted of breaching s. 31(2) of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002.

He was fined $5,000 and ordered to pay $10,000 in restitution to the vendor of the relevant property.

The appellant appealed the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the restitution order, holding that a finding of loss is a necessary precondition to imposing a restitution order, and the evidentiary record did not establish that the vendor suffered a loss.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to release him from custody and dismissing his application to quash an information for failing to appear.

He argued the Superior Court lost jurisdiction over him under section 485(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction under section 470 and that the challenge to the information should be raised as a defence at trial.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting at an individual who had forcibly entered his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding self-defence on the attempted murder charge were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the instructions conflated the distinct issues of intent to kill and self-defence, leaving the jury with the incorrect impression that self-defence was irrelevant if intent to kill was proven.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the proceedings were invalid because he did not expressly re-elect to be tried by a judge alone under s. 473 of the Criminal Code, that his Charter rights were violated by the lack of a clear waiver of a jury trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that his consent to a judge alone trial was implicit in his guilty plea, that he waived his right to a trial by pleading guilty, and that there was no evidence to support the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.