Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellants, John Disher and Reana Weaver, appealed their sentences for drug trafficking offences involving fentanyl and carfentanil.

Disher was originally sentenced to 12 years and Weaver to 7 years.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider Disher's rehabilitative prospects and by failing to properly apply the principles of restraint and rehabilitation for Weaver, a youthful, first-time Indigenous offender.

The appeals were allowed, and the sentences were reduced to 8 years for Disher and 4 years for Weaver.

The appellants appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The application judge declined to consider the issue of proportionality in relation to forfeiture.

The Crown argued that the factual findings made forfeiture the only available result.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the application judge was required to consider proportionality in accordance with s. 19.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined it was not in a position to conduct its own proportionality analysis given the multiple factors required to be considered under R. v. Craig.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing on forfeiture was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of pointing a firearm, possession of a firearm contrary to prohibition, possession of a firearm knowingly unauthorized, and operating a motor vehicle disqualified.

He received nine months' incarceration (after credit for pre-trial custody) and three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: inadequate consideration of inconsistencies in complainant evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding whether the meeting was accidental or pre-arranged, erroneous reliance on precedent regarding firearm possession, and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant sought judicial interim release pending the hearing of her sentence appeal challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for weapons trafficking under section 99(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the appeal had arguable merit, it did not have sufficient merit to warrant release under section 679(4)(a), and that the appellant had not established that her detention was not necessary in the public interest under section 679(4)(c).

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the appellant's testimony that the sexual activity was consensual.

On appeal, the appellant raised six grounds of appeal challenging the conviction.

While the Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds (misapplication of burden of proof, improper use of silence, and improper use of lack of embellishment), it allowed the appeal on three remaining grounds: the trial judge's failure to inspect the complainant's shirt despite defence counsel's reasonable expectation that he would do so; the trial judge's erroneous admission and use of reply evidence from the appellant's roommate to establish a collusion theory without proper foundation; and most significantly, the trial judge's application of markedly different levels of scrutiny to the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court found that cumulatively, these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant was committed on charges of fraud and possession of property obtained by crime related to his management of a pharmaceutical business that sold drugs to U.S. doctors and clinics without complying with American regulatory requirements.

The Minister surrendered the appellant on charges of conspiracy and unlicensed distribution of prescription drugs rather than fraud.

The appellant challenged the process as unfair, arguing he lacked opportunity to respond to conspiracy allegations and that there was insufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the committal judge lacked jurisdiction to compel disclosure of anonymous witness identities, the evidence supported the possession charge satisfying double criminality requirements, and the Minister had broad discretion under the Extradition Act to describe the offence as the Minister saw fit.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that detained him at the Secure Forensic Service of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences with restricted privileges.

The appellant advanced two grounds of appeal: that the Board's finding of significant threat to public safety was unreasonable, and that the Board erred in law by failing to apply section 14 of the Evidence Act regarding corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding ample evidence supported the significant threat threshold and that section 14 of the Evidence Act does not apply to Review Board proceedings as they fall under federal jurisdiction.

The appellant's collateral Charter application regarding medication was also dismissed as not cognizable on appeal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for driving a taxi from which a youth shot and killed the deceased.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from two witnesses: the front-seat passenger who testified that the appellant knew of the plan to kill the deceased, and the shooter himself who testified that the appellant had no knowledge of his plan.

The trial judge made numerous interventions during the shooter's testimony, expressing disparaging views about his credibility and reliability.

The trial judge also gave a Vetrovec instruction regarding the shooter's evidence, permitted re-examination of the passenger on prior consistent statements, and instructed the jury on the standard of proof.

The appellant appealed on five grounds.

The respondent, who operated a body rub parlour licensed by the City of Vaughan, was charged with contravening a municipal by-law governing the hours of operation of body rub parlours.

He challenged the constitutionality of the by-law, arguing it was ultra vires the municipality because it constituted criminal law.

A justice of the peace and the Ontario Court of Justice agreed, finding the provisions were criminal in pith and substance and invaded federal authority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pith and substance of the hours of operation provision was business licensing, falling within provincial authority over property and civil rights and licensing.

The court found the lower courts erred by focusing exclusively on extrinsic evidence while ignoring intrinsic evidence, and by failing to recognize that municipalities may legislate to suppress conditions conducive to crime when anchored in a valid provincial head of power.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and failing to comply with a recognizance, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the complainant's evidence, which was corroborated by medical findings and DNA evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W. (R.) regarding assessment of child witness testimony.

On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider Gladue factors and section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, proper application of the legal principles, and that Gladue considerations would not have altered the dangerous offender designation given the appellant's incurable personality disorder and paraphilias.

The applicant sought leave to reopen his sentence appeal on sexual assault and voyeurism convictions, arguing that a subsequent overturning of related domestic assault convictions constituted a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration.

The applicant sought credit for pre-sentence custody previously applied to the now-quashed domestic assault conviction and argued the sentencing judge had improperly considered the domestic assault conviction as an aggravating factor.

The court dismissed the application, holding it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal already decided on its merits and that, even if jurisdiction existed, the interests of justice would not support reopening.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug offences committed while on probation for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error with the global sentence given the appellant's record and the nature of the drugs.

However, the court agreed that the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for pre-sentence custody.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence on count 6 was reduced to 22 months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for public mischief and theft over, as well as his total sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework and failed to apply a Vetrovec caution to the accomplice's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant sought a conditional sentence or a reduced custodial term, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle given the accomplice's six-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, noting the appellant was in a position of trust, whereas the accomplice pleaded guilty early, showed remorse, and assisted police.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of an imitation weapon, as well as her 36-month custodial sentence.

She argued her arrest was unlawful and challenged the admission of evidence obtained from her cell phone post-arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on informant tips and surveillance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offences were part of a commercial enterprise and the sentence properly reflected denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed a forfeiture order, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the preparation of a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's finding that the note was likely prepared after the seizure of the money was not supported by the evidence.

However, the Court held that this erroneous finding did not taint the trial judge's conclusion, as the forfeiture order was otherwise amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of a certiorari application to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of the proceeds of crime, and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the order refusing to quash the committal and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in her understanding of his employment history and failed to reference his lengthy compliance with bail conditions when denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred regarding the employment history, it did not play a significant role in her decision.

The failure to reference bail compliance was not an error in principle given the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after it was found in her luggage at Pearson Airport.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge made errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found two errors: the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that they could only draw inferences from evidence they accepted as fact, which shifted the burden of proof, and improperly instructed them that there was no evidence the cocaine was part of someone else's project, which undermined the core of the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of eight years for assault causing bodily harm, robbery, extortion, forcible confinement, aggravated assault, and theft over.

The charges arose from a vicious beating and robbery where the appellant was identified by eyewitnesses and ATM surveillance footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to exclude the appellant's criminal record under Corbett, the admission of evidence regarding a child witness's identification, or the handling of a Crown interruption during closing arguments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his co-accused's was justified by the appellant's role as the instigator and his prior record.