Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Ali Elenezi, sought leave to appeal a three-year consecutive sentence for contempt of court.

This sentence was imposed after he refused to testify at a murder trial, despite having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the same incident and affirmed an agreed statement of facts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge regarding the consideration of the appellant's youth, rehabilitative prospects, or the totality principle.

The court affirmed that denunciation is the primary principle for contempt of court, especially refusal to testify, and that significant jail terms are required to deter such behaviour.

The appellant was convicted of agreeing to offer a bribe to foreign public officials contrary to section 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

As an agent of Cryptometrics Canada, the appellant agreed with other employees to bribe Indian officials to secure a multi-million dollar Air India contract.

The appeal raised three main grounds: lack of territorial jurisdiction, misinterpretation of the word "agree" in the statute, and misapplication of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States to face fraud charges.

The applicant argued that the Minister failed to properly weigh the Cotroni factors and his section 6 Charter rights, given that he was on the verge of pleading guilty to Canadian charges before they were stayed due to the extradition request.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister properly considered the unusual factual history and reasonably concluded that the United States had a significantly greater interest in prosecuting the case.

Five appellants appealed their convictions or the dismissal of their applications for declaratory relief regarding marijuana offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They argued that the offences of possession and production of marijuana had been judicially repealed by previous constitutional decisions regarding medical marijuana.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the offences remain in full force and effect, and that dissatisfaction with the medical marijuana regulations does not excuse disobedience of the law.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 30 days' intermittent imprisonment and 11 months' probation.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for reasons set out in concurrent decisions.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, noting the appellant's uncontested medicinal use of cannabis for lumbar scoliosis and his efforts to comply with the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

With the Crown's consent, the sentence was reduced to time served and the probation order was struck out.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of importing cocaine, the second of which was committed while on judicial interim release for the first.

He was sentenced to a total of 70 months' imprisonment based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued the sentence did not sufficiently reflect his cooperation with authorities and was based on an incorrect sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with a sentence imposed following a joint submission, especially given the aggravating factor of committing the second offence while on release.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the appellant knew death was a likely consequence of the bodily harm inflicted.

The committal for second degree murder was quashed and a committal for manslaughter was substituted on consent.

The applicant sought bail pending the determination of his judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a surrender order in extradition proceedings.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing the judicial review was frivolous and citing the public interest in enforcing the surrender order after seven and a half years of delay, and alternatively sought to expedite the hearing.

The court granted bail, finding the judicial review raised new issues and the applicant's detention was not necessary in the public interest.

However, the court also granted the Crown's motion to expedite the judicial review hearing to mitigate prejudice to the extradition partner.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was evidence to sustain the Board's finding of significant risk and that the order was not unreasonable when issued.

However, noting that the appellant's regular review was overdue and that fresh evidence suggested an emerging consensus that the appellant was fit to reside in the community under supervision, the Court ordered the Board to expedite the review.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him from a medium security facility to the maximum security facility at Oak Ridge.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's decision was not unreasonable, as it was based on evidence from hospital staff that the appellant could no longer be managed in a medium secure setting.

The court noted that intervening events and further medical evidence justified the change from a previous order.

The appeal was dismissed, though the court noted the appellant could request an early review to determine if management techniques used at Oak Ridge could be applied in a medium security facility.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a particularly egregious fraud involving elderly victims.

The appellant, who was in a position of trust, deprived the victims of a substantial portion of their savings and refused to acknowledge the harm or propose a method for repayment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence, as the principles of promoting responsibility and acknowledgment of harm would not be met.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence proposed in the joint submission was not out of the range and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the appellant's age, record, and role in the offence.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in place.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction, arguing that the information specified the wrong corporate victim and that the Crown failed to prove the cheque was cashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the variance in the information and holding that the filing of a proof of claim and delivery of the cheque were sufficient to prove a risk of deprivation.

The appellant appealed a decision of a summary conviction appeal judge that set aside his acquittal for assault and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant after finding a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant intentionally applied more force than the ordinary touching that takes place with implied consent in a conjugal relationship when he took his wife's arm.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in her interpretation of the trial judge's reasons and in setting aside the acquittal.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the first appellant argued that his trial was rendered unfair because the trial judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to adduce highly prejudicial evidence of his violent disposition and bad character, ostensibly to support the co-accused's defence that he lied to police out of fear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the propensity evidence lacked sufficient probative value to justify its severe prejudicial effect on the right to a fair trial.

The first appellant's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The co-accused's appeal from conviction was dismissed, but his sentence for attempted murder was varied to correct an illegal period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity in 1981, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision refusing him an absolute discharge.

The Board had concluded he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to concerns about alcohol abuse and personality disorder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable as it was contrary to the evidence of his treatment team and unsupported by the record.

The court set aside the Board's order and granted the appellant an absolute discharge.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings for charges arising from incidents in 1990 and 1991.

The complainant and police had initially decided not to pursue an investigation in 1992, and charges were not laid until 2000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to grant the stay.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sex and drug offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the sentencing judge and trial counsel were misinformed about the length of a prior sentence, the sentencing judge properly anchored the sentence in a careful assessment of the totality principle.

The sentence imposed was deemed appropriate given the unique and difficult circumstances of the offence.

The RCMP intercepted a package containing over six kilograms of heroin, removed all but one gram, and performed a controlled delivery.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued that possession of one gram was insufficient for the offence and that attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking is not an offence known to law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the quantity of a controlled substance is not part of the actus reus of the offence, and that the appellant's mistaken belief about the quantity did not alter his mens rea.

The court also confirmed that attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking is a valid offence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.