Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Guled Mohamed, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the search warrant, erred in inferring guilt from circumstantial evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on standing, the application of circumstantial evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court clarified that a trial judge is not bound to accept the Crown's theory on standing if the accused presents contradictory evidence, and reiterated the standard for assessing circumstantial evidence and unreasonable verdicts.

The appellant, Rajindra Becessar, appealed his conviction for firearm possession, challenging a pre-trial ruling that admitted his statement to police.

The application judge had found breaches of the appellant's s. 8 (search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights, excluding evidence from the search but admitting the statement.

On appeal, Becessar argued the statement should have been excluded due to the cumulative effect of the breaches, specifically that it was obtained in a manner infringing his s. 8 rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that this argument was not properly raised or supported with evidence before the application judge, thus she made no error in her analysis.

The appellant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of assault.

He appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's motive to fabricate, alleged "oath helping" to bolster the complainant's credibility, and the admission of electronic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment that the mere existence of family law litigation did not establish a motive to lie, no impermissible oath helping in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting, and that the electronic evidence met the low bar for admission under the Canada Evidence Act and was not central to the credibility analysis.

The applicant, convicted of fentanyl trafficking, sought bail pending his application for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown opposed, arguing the application was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court found the proposed application for leave had low to nil chances of success, as the Court of Appeal had already thoroughly addressed the Charter issues.

The court emphasized the high public interest in enforceability, particularly given the gravity of large-scale fentanyl trafficking, which outweighed the applicant's health concerns.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellant, S.P., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his daughters, which occurred approximately 40 years prior.

The appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but this was later abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, and rejecting the ineffective assistance claim and the admission of fresh evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and indignity to human remains after confessing to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the confession was obtained through police coercion amounting to an abuse of process under the Hart framework.

He also appealed his 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the police conduct was not coercive and the appellant's will was not overborne.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was not demonstrably unfit given the horrific nature of the crimes and the aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted after a two-week jury trial of possession of a prohibited firearm without a license, possession of an over-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to nine years and three months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to provide limiting instructions to the jury regarding photographs of a firearm found on the appellant's cell phone, and in failing to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the testimony of the appellant's brother.

The Court set aside the convictions on the firearm-related counts and ordered a new trial on those counts, while upholding the drug and proceeds convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the sole issue of whether the 2013 self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code have retrospective application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that it had previously determined in R. v. Bengy that the provisions do not have retrospective effect.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man during a drug transaction.

At trial, the judge charged the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code but not under s. 35.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the unlawful assault requirement of s. 34(2) and erred by failing to leave s. 35 with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions on s. 34(2) when read as a whole, and concluding there was no air of reality to a s. 35 defence because the appellant, as the initial aggressor drawing a loaded handgun, could not claim he commenced the assault without intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of similar fact evidence across counts, the assessment of similarities and differences in the evidence, the possibility of collusion, and the assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice in the omission of an express 'bad personhood' instruction and concluding the trial judge's instructions adequately equipped the jury to perform their adjudicative function.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm against his nephew.

The appellant admitted to kicking the complainant in the head and body after the complainant fell to the ground during a physical altercation.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim of self-defence, finding the kicks were administered out of anger and a desire to inflict punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, he did not misapprehend the law of self-defence, and his reasons were adequate.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his appeal from convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure, for which he was sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the viciousness of the offences, the applicant's history of breaching court orders, and the risk he posed to public safety, particularly given outstanding charges for a similar group attack.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The applicant applied for bail pending his appeal of an order committing him for extradition to the United States on charges relating to child pornography and child luring.

The court found that the applicant was not a flight risk and that the public interest alone did not justify his continued detention.

However, the application for bail was dismissed because the applicant failed to raise an arguable ground of appeal from his committal order.

The court found the evidence was sufficient for committal and that subscriber information obtained without a warrant would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge failed to comply with s. 16.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act by not explicitly asking the child complainant to promise to tell the truth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no particular words are required to comply with the provision, and the complainant's agreement after the trial judge explained the importance of telling the truth was sufficient.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The appellant appealed convictions for production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and theft under.

He argued the circumstantial evidence did not support the inference that he had the required knowledge and control of the grow operation.

The court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence as a whole, correctly instructed herself on circumstantial evidence, and reasonably concluded that the only reasonable inference was guilt.

The court also rejected the submission that documents seized from the appellant’s home were used improperly.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assaults against three young girls.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference against the credibility of one appellant's testimony because the defence failed to cross-examine a complainant on alleged written consent documents, invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the adverse inference was a proper part of the trial judge's fact-finding and weighing of evidence, not a penalty for a tactical error.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended evidence or failed to give separate consideration to the co-appellant's case.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering the Ontario Provincial Police to release the respondent's seized firearms to his brother.

The respondent had been sentenced to probation with a condition to abstain from possessing weapons.

The Crown argued the firearms were automatically forfeited under s. 115 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the probation condition constituted a prohibition order, the respondent was not in possession of the firearms at the commencement of the order because they were in police custody.

Therefore, s. 115 did not apply, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a 2009 finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) to which she had consented.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not establish she failed to appreciate the nature and quality of her acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to adequately explain the nearly four-year delay and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as there was sufficient evidence from the psychiatric assessment and surrounding circumstances to support the NCRMD finding.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act against a general contractor and a subcontractor following a workplace fatality.

The trial judge had dismissed the counts on the basis that they were duplicitous and failed to disclose an offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge confused overlapping counts with duplicitous ones, and erred in collapsing the information.

A new trial was ordered on the dismissed counts.