Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, A.I.B., appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault, and the dismissal of his application to re-open the trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis and the refusal to re-open the trial based on new legal developments and alleged inconsistencies in the victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or the application of the Palmer test for re-opening the trial.

The applicant, James Jahkyn Grant, sought release pending his appeal from a conviction for importing cocaine.

The Crown opposed on grounds of the proposed appeal's lack of merit, the applicant's likelihood of not surrendering into custody, and public interest considerations.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender into custody, or that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court noted the seriousness of the offence and the applicant's history of non-compliance and challenging court authority.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching.

He argued the trial judge erred in evaluating credibility, treating the case as a credibility contest, finding a neighbour's evidence corroborative, and rendering inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on a second sexual touching count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The appellant, Beverley Bernard, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

She claimed she was unaware of the drugs concealed in jars in her suitcase, which a stranger had asked her to bring to Canada.

Her appeal was based on four grounds: the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire regarding a Jamaican Patois interpreter, misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider the third branch of W(D), and misapplication of R. v. Villaroman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the voir dire issue was not pursued at trial, any misapprehension of evidence was immaterial to the ultimate findings, W(D) was correctly applied, and the trial judge's reasoning, when read as a whole, correctly applied Villaroman by concluding the appellant's evidence defied common sense and supported a finding of deliberate ignorance.

The appellant, Michael Lights, appealed convictions for dangerous driving and criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and his sentence.

The convictions stemmed from a high-speed red light violation causing a serious accident, where his passenger had been shot.

The appeal grounds included the unreasonableness of the driver identification, the trial judge's failure to address the necessity defence, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's identification of the driver was reasonable, there was no air of reality to the necessity defence, and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a detention order rather than granting a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued that the Board made a palpable and overriding factual error regarding his propensity to decompensate and that the Board failed to adequately consider alternative mechanisms for readmission to hospital.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding that the Board's findings were supported by evidence and that the detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available given the appellant's risk to public safety.

An appeal from the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing a conditional discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant argued that the Board's conclusion that he remained a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable, particularly given his 17-year history without violent behaviour while subject to Board jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it fell within the range of reasonable outcomes based on evidence including the appellant's serious index offences, lack of insight into his mental illness, resistance to treatment, high risk assessment scores, and the unanimous opinion of his treatment team that he remained a significant risk.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a conditional discharge while finding he remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible of aggravated assault and related offences involving a near lethal knife attack.

He argued the Board erred in failing to grant an absolute discharge, contending the evidence demonstrated he no longer posed a significant threat and that the Board reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion fell within a range of reasonable outcomes based on positive evidence, including the appellant's insufficient concern about his threat when psychotic, initial reluctance to accept case management, and refusal to switch to long-acting injectable antipsychotic medication.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder and committing an indignity to a human body, applied for the appointment of publicly-funded appellate counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked means to retain private counsel.

The court found the applicant had arguable grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's pre-trial rulings on the admissibility of evidence regarding the applicant's cannibalistic ideation, including statements to a psychiatric nurse and rap lyrics.

The court determined the applicant could not effectively argue the complex appeal without counsel assistance.

The appointment was granted on a limited basis, restricted to addressing the effects of the pre-trial rulings on trial fairness, excluding issues of post-offence conduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by failing to strictly comply with s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code when taking his election for mode of trial while he was unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding of substantial compliance, noting the appellant had prior legal representation and co-accused who elected.

The Court also found no loss of jurisdiction due to s. 536(4.2), which mandates a preliminary inquiry for all co-accused if one requests it.

The appellant sought to initiate a private prosecution against Hydro One Networks.

After a Justice of the Peace declined to permit the prosecution, a Superior Court judge converted the appeal to an application for mandamus but declined to grant relief.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and brought a motion seeking an interim order requiring Hydro One Networks to deliver hydro bills, an order under s. 683 of the Criminal Code for witnesses to testify, and other procedural relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis for the interim order and no basis established for the s. 683 order, but provided directions on time limits for oral submissions on the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a $4 million mortgage scheme and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and $250,000 in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by conducting his own handwriting analysis, failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following unlawful arrest and search, and imposing an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, reasonably assessed the handwriting, and correctly held that conditional sentences are inappropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual abuse by another individual under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, failing to provide limiting instructions regarding prior consistent statements and extrinsic misconduct, improperly characterizing a defence witness's evidence as potentially 'scripted', and inadequately answering a jury question on the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing his full criminal record before the jury and by finding the arresting officer did not use excessive force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's detailed reasons or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was abandoned and also dismissed.

The appellant was sought for extradition by the United States to face charges of conspiracy, wire fraud, and securities fraud.

He appealed his committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

On the committal appeal, the appellant argued the extradition judge failed to weigh the evidence as required by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence; the Court of Appeal held that a limited weighing of the evidence would not have changed the result.

On the judicial review, the appellant argued the Minister lacked jurisdiction to order surrender due to a 'misalignment' between the foreign charges, the committal order, and the alleged conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, finding that the Extradition Act, the applicable treaty, and the principle of double criminality require only that the alleged conduct constitute an offence in Canada, not that it precisely mirror the foreign charges.

Both the appeal and the application for judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, as well as her sentence of a four-month conditional sentence and two years' probation.

She argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of eyewitness identification and by comparing handwriting without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably relied on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's possession of false identification.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision to impose a sentence resulting in a criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife and appealed his conviction.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior discreditable conduct with his wife and similar fact evidence from his former common law wife.

The Court of Appeal held the prior discreditable conduct was admissible to provide context, show motive, and explain the complainant's delay in reporting.

While the trial judge erred in the basis for admitting the similar fact evidence, the Court applied the Handy framework and found the evidence was properly admissible as its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a ruling by Justice Archie G. Campbell.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that the error in question was within jurisdiction and therefore not subject to certiorari.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

However, the Court agreed that the trial judge erred by considering the appellant's roadside statements when assessing his credibility regarding 'evidence to the contrary'.

Finding the curative proviso inapplicable, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge failed to separate evidence between the counts and that there was insufficient evidence the weapon used was a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The court held that while mandatory minimums applied, imposing consecutive minimum sentences resulted in an unduly long total sentence.

The sentence was reduced from eight years to six years.