Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault against his nieces and great-nieces, appealed his convictions.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred by admitting similar fact evidence without properly considering collusion among complainants and by applying a different standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of collusion, credibility, or the application of similar fact principles.

The appellant, A.J.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving a child complainant.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge erred in foreclosing re-examination on the appellant's intellectual disability, and whether the trial judge and Crown improperly relied on the complainant's undisclosed diary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his treatment of re-examination, as the defence was permitted to raise the issue and the judge reasonably exercised discretion in not considering it further due to lack of supporting evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's use of the diary, which was treated as narrative evidence, and concluded that any improper use by the Crown did not affect the trial's outcome or overall fairness.

The appellant, Adel Arnaout, appealed from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed after a second dangerous offender hearing.

He sought to set aside the designation and substitute a determinant sentence with a long-term supervision order, or alternatively, a fresh hearing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's findings that a pattern of behaviour was established by the letter bomb incidents alone, that the conduct satisfied the brutality requirement under the Criminal Code, and that it was not reasonably possible to control the appellant's behaviour in the community, deferring to the sentencing judge's preference for expert psychiatric evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for firearm offences, which arose from an incident where he intended to commit suicide with a sawed-off shotgun.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on denunciation and deterrence without adequately considering the appellant's suicidal intent and the attenuated danger to the public.

The court also found an error in failing to consider the causal link between the appellant's mental health issues and addiction and his criminal conduct.

Given the appellant's significant rehabilitation efforts, the court substituted the custodial sentence with a conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court order staying charges against three respondents (two brothers and their mother) due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had calculated the delay at 32 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by including the period from the end of evidence and argument until the stay decision in the Jordan ceiling calculation, based on the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.G.K. Correcting this error reduced the net delay to 29.25 months, falling below the ceiling.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's characterization of other delay periods and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable, even if below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge to release the verdict.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of impaired driving causing death and one count of impaired driving causing bodily harm after a high-speed crash.

He was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in his parity analysis by concluding without explanation that the appellant's conduct was more egregious than offenders in similar cases.

The Court substituted a sentence of seven years, noting the appellant's youth and severe injuries as mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house following a seven-day trial.

He received a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment and two years of probation.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding serious deficiencies in the appellant's bail compliance history, material omissions in his affidavits regarding outstanding breach charges, and insufficient grounds of appeal to overcome public interest considerations.

The trial judge's findings regarding the victim's incapacity to consent due to extreme intoxication were well-grounded in evidence and revealed no obvious error.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering that the appellant remain subject to a conditional discharge.

The appellant, a 62-year-old woman with schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible for assaulting a five-year-old child in 2011.

The Board concluded she remained a significant threat to public safety based on her history of non-compliance with medication and the risk of decompensation if she ceased treatment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion unreasonable and speculative.

The court held that the evidence did not meet the onerous standard required under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code for maintaining restraints on an NCR accused's liberty, and ordered an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 20-month sentence for possession and distribution of child pornography.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test to his defence of innocent possession, misapprehended evidence regarding deleted files, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law and relied on compelling evidence of knowledge, including the sophisticated organization of the files.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 20-month term was within the appropriate range and the trial judge made no errors in assessing aggravating factors.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, was convicted of domestic violence offences and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months.

The trial judge awarded pre-disposition custody credit at a ratio of 1.25:1.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent, varying the pre-disposition custody credit to a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the effective sentence from 60 months to 52 months.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that revoked his transfer to a less secure hospital and maintained him at a secure facility.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's surprise attack on a co-patient, which changed his risk profile.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion reasonably supported the revocation and that maintaining the appellant at the secure facility was the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred in concluding he continues to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable based on all the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of credit card fraud-related offences after police found skimming equipment, encoded gift cards, and a USB key during a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the searches of his person, vehicle, and USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights and the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the pat-down search was lawful, and while the vehicle and USB key searches breached s. 8, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also affirmed that a conviction for possessing credit card data under s. 342(3) does not require proof that the data could successfully defraud an issuer.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision, arguing the trial judge committed a Harper error by failing to consider evidence suggesting his daughter was present during the alleged offences.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no compelling basis to conclude the daughter was present, as both the appellant and the complainant agreed she was not.

The court held that the trial judge's failure to review every piece of evidence pointing to a different conclusion did not constitute a reversible error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that he was unlawfully detained prior to a consent search that revealed crack cocaine, and that he was prejudiced by improper cross-examination and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings precluded a finding of detention, and that any potential prejudice from the Crown's improper cross-examination was sufficiently offset by the jury charge.

The applicant, convicted of murder and assault in the death of his infant son, brought an application seeking production of Crown materials regarding the competency and objectivity of the Crown's paediatric pathology expert, Dr. Smith, in other criminal cases.

The applicant intended to use this material to adduce fresh evidence on his pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown's disclosure obligations continue post-conviction, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the requested material could assist in the appeal and be received as fresh evidence.

The application was dismissed because the applicant offered no evidence to doubt the specific medical opinions given by the expert in this case, meaning evidence of the expert's conduct in other cases could not reasonably be expected to affect the verdict.

The appellant, a young person represented by counsel, sought to waive the reading of charges at his first appearance in youth court.

The justice of the peace refused the waiver and read the charges, asserting a residual discretion to do so.

The appellant's application for certiorari was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that while a represented young person may waive the reading of charges under s. 12(2) of the Young Offenders Act, the presiding judicial officer retains a residual discretion to order the charges read to ensure the young person understands them and to control the court's process.

The appellant challenged a sexual offence conviction and sought leave to appeal a four-year penitentiary sentence.

The court held that extrinsic evidence to contradict the complainant about prior sexual conduct and alleged abuse was irrelevant to any live issue other than credibility and was therefore inadmissible under the collateral fact rule, apart from s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly compartmentalized the defence evidence, erred in relying on flight as consciousness of guilt, or mishandled credibility findings.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and although leave to appeal sentence was granted, the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying historic sexual offence charges on the basis that the respondent could not make full answer and defence because key potential defence witnesses were dead or unavailable after several decades.

The court reviewed the trial judge's application of the abuse of process and fundamental justice framework under ss. 7, 11(d), and 24(1) of the Charter.

It held that the trial judge properly assessed the affidavit evidence concerning missing Children's Aid Society and foster home personnel and committed no error in law.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay remained in place.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence arising from a criminal matter in which he asserted self-defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the rock throwing was a separate act of punishment rather than an act necessitated by self-defence, and that the law of self-defence under s. 34 was properly applied.

The court rejected the submission that the trial judge failed to consider the subjective elements of self-defence.

The court also upheld sentence, finding this was not a proper case for a conditional sentence.