Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Marko Tubic, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient in explaining how after-the-fact conduct evidence justified a murder conviction over manslaughter, and that the trial judge erred by referring to an unconstitutional objective standard of fault ('ought to have known') under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the appellant, particularly regarding inconsistencies in testimony, and the assessment of the complainant's reliability, including the relevance of her failure to call for assistance during the incidents.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's elaborations were deliberate embellishments and that the complainant's failure to call for help was irrelevant to her credibility in the circumstances.

The appellant, William Joles, appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on the use of bad character evidence and by failing to provide guidance to the jury on permissible inferences from after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no real risk that the jury would misuse the bad character evidence and that the jury had a functional understanding of the permissible inferences from the after-the-fact conduct, especially given the clear submissions by counsel and the single live issue of intention.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition to the United States on the offence of fraud.

He argued the hearing judge erred in finding evidence linking him to the alias 'Marc Richards' and linking that alias to the fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence in the record, including emails and a passport photo, linking the appellant to the alias and the fraudulent scheme.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and break and enter, arguing the trial judge erred in finding his video statement to police was voluntary.

He alleged an officer induced the statement by suggesting he would be released after they talked.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that no such inducement was made and that the statement was voluntary, noting the trial judge was entitled to make findings based on the evidence and context despite the lack of police notes for a brief interaction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for threatening death, assault, sexual assault, and breach of probation against his former intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge imposed a sentence substantially higher than the Crown's suggested range without providing reasons or an opportunity for submissions.

The global sentence was reduced from 6 years to 3 years and 8.5 months.

The appellant brought a motion to reinstate his appeal against conviction and sentence for sexual offences, which he had previously abandoned in 2003.

A prior motion to reopen the appeal was dismissed in 2005 after the appellant failed to file a factum.

In the current motion, the appellant argued the appeal should be reopened because the Crown fraudulently concealed relevant case law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the allegations of concealment and no error by the trial judge that would justify granting the relief.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a vessel causing death.

The trial judge excluded breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) due to delays in making and facilitating an approved screening device demand, and acquitted the accused.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding the accused was detained before the demand was made and in his application of the s. 24(2) Grant framework.

The Court concluded that the admission of the breath test evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for importing 4.1 kg of cocaine.

The trial judge found that the appellant organized the importation and was in a superior position to the 19-year-old vulnerable courier.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's role and the multi-kilo quantity of cocaine.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying proceedings against the respondent for impaired driving charges due to an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The delay primarily stemmed from the defence's successful motion to quash the initial information on the scheduled trial date, which required the Crown to relay the charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay resulting from the defence's tactical decision to bring the motion to quash should be attributed to the defence or considered neutral.

Consequently, the overall delay did not violate s. 11(b).

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property over $5,000 after being found in possession of stolen specialty refrigerators.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding the refrigerators were delivered and paid for in the middle of the night, when evidence suggested delivery occurred during regular business hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's misapprehension of the delivery time was material to his reasoning process and met the stringent test for a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give instructions on post-offence conduct, a Vetrovec warning, the defence of accident, the elements of manslaughter, causation, and the victim's reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that the defence counsel at trial had not requested the omitted instructions or objected to the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a statement made during a traffic stop should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 8 violation.

The Court of Appeal applied the Grant framework and upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence.

The court found that the police conduct was not egregious, the state of the law was uncertain at the time, and the reliable evidence was essential to the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, primarily challenging the length of the custodial term.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had already served the jail sentence.

Given the appellant's record and the serious nature of the offences, the court declined to reduce the driving prohibition and found the five-year probation period to be entirely appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a minimum secure unit.

He argued the Board erred by admitting reports referencing stayed charges, that the six-month delay in issuing reasons was unreasonable, and that the refusal to grant a conditional discharge was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reliance on risk assessment tools appropriate, declining to grant a remedy for the delayed reasons despite urging promptness, and upholding the detention order as necessary for public protection given the appellant's lack of insight and history of non-compliance.

The appellant was convicted of incest against his developmentally challenged daughter.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in handling the issue of the complainant's motive to fabricate and that Crown counsel engaged in misconduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined witnesses on the complainant's motive to fabricate, made inflammatory comments in closing, and improperly injected personal opinion.

The trial judge failed to provide necessary corrective instructions.

The cumulative effect of these errors undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent pleaded guilty to manslaughter after abandoning her two-year-old child for several days, resulting in the child's death from dehydration.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of three years in the penitentiary.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was manifestly inadequate and failed to reflect the respondent's moral blameworthiness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was at the very bottom of the acceptable range, the trial judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not clearly unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for pointing a firearm, robbery, and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The convictions were largely based on a videotaped KGB statement given by a witness who claimed no memory of the events or the statement at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the statement, finding it met the necessity and reliability requirements, and concluded the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant, a Nigerian citizen, was committed for extradition to the United States for breach of supervised release conditions.

He appealed the committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the committal appeal but granted the application for judicial review.

The Court found that the Minister failed to consult with the Minister responsible for immigration regarding the appellant's refugee claim, failed to consider the lengthy time spent in Canadian custody, and failed to address the appellant's claim that he left the United States at the direction of immigration authorities.

The matter was remitted to the Minister for redetermination.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of an unregistered handgun.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by combining a custodial sentence and a conditional sentence where the resulting total effectively amounted to a penitentiary sentence exceeding two years less one day.

However, the court also held that blended custodial and conditional sentences are legally permissible for multiple offences where the total sentence does not exceed two years less one day and the statutory preconditions in s. 742.1(b) are met.

In light of fresh evidence showing successful rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated, the court reduced the conditional sentence on the drug offence to sixteen months less one day and left the remaining terms intact.