Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, brought a motion for state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The applicant argued the trial judge erred by relying on myths and stereotypes and misapplying the W.(D.) principles in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the proposed grounds of appeal lacked sufficient merit and the applicant was capable of advancing the arguments without appointed counsel.

The appellant was convicted of 10 sexual abuse offences against his former partner's daughter.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence related to pornography and his surveillance of the victim's grandmother's house, as well as the Crown's cross-examination of its own witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned evidence was relevant and properly used for material issues or credibility, and that the procedure for refreshing witness memories was appropriate given the lack of objection at trial and absence of prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of child luring under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for sending sexually explicit messages and images to a 15-year-old girl who was a friend of his twin daughters.

The trial judge found that the appellant believed the complainant was under 16 years of age.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: (1) the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge found only that the appellant would have known the complainant's "approximate age" rather than that he subjectively believed she was under 16; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant regarding Charter issues; (3) the trial judge erred in dismissing the s. 8 Charter application; and (4) the sentence was influenced by a mandatory minimum that was subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge failed to make a finding of causation regarding whether the complainant's wounds were caused during a swarming in a parking lot or by flying glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the inescapable inference from the trial judge's reasons was that the wounds were caused during the parking lot assault, consistent with the Crown's theory and the complainant's accepted testimony.

The young person appealed a Superior Court judgment granting the Crown's application for certiorari and mandamus, which quashed a preliminary inquiry discharge on first degree murder and directed committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences regarding the knowledge of the likelihood of death.

The Court affirmed that mandamus was appropriate because committal for the full offence was legally inevitable given the evidence.

The appellant sought to appeal a forfeiture order regarding Hell's Angels paraphernalia seized from his residence.

During his sentencing, the appellant disavowed any interest in the property, claiming it belonged to the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Corporation.

He chose not to participate in the subsequent forfeiture proceedings.

After the Corporation's appeal of the forfeiture order was dismissed as abandoned, the appellant attempted to appeal the order himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be an abuse of process to allow the appellant to challenge an order made in proceedings he deliberately chose to ignore.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury.

The principal defence was that the appellant accidentally hit the victim, relying on his almost complete blindness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that blindness was only relevant to the foreseeability of bodily harm and not to the issue of accident.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after his vehicle went off the road, killing his passenger.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting the Crown accident reconstructionist's opinion on speed and impairment, and in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding 'bolus drinking'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert was properly qualified to give the impugned opinions and the jury was entitled to infer from the evidence and common sense that the appellant had not engaged in bolus drinking.

The appellant's appeal was dismissed as abandoned after he failed to appear at purge court and failed to provide the required transcripts.

The appellant subsequently appeared and requested that the matter be listed for a further hearing to consider rescinding the dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal heard submissions from the appellant's counsel but found no basis to rescind the order, noting the missed deadline for providing the transcript.

The appeal remained dismissed as abandoned.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed the respondent's conviction.

The respondent had confronted intruders on his rural farm at 4:00 a.m. and removed the keys from their vehicle, leading him to fear for his safety as the intruders could not leave without retrieving the keys.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the trial judge erred in finding the respondent lacked reasonable grounds to apprehend imminent danger, as his belief was based on objectively verifiable facts.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was implicit in the trial judge's reasons, having rejected the appellant's evidence, that the appellant had the requisite intent to commit the offence.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a medium secure hospital unit.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety and that detention was the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's risk assessment and disposition were reasonable given the appellant's untreated schizoaffective disorder and history of threatening behaviour.

The Court also rejected arguments that the participation of amicus curiae rendered the hearing unfair.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying the respondent's second-degree murder trial for abuse of process and unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found over 150 Charter breaches by police and Crown counsel.

On appeal, the respondent conceded the trial judge's findings were unsupportable but argued the stay should be upheld because her trial counsel's incompetence caused the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no evidence the respondent was unaware of her counsel's strategy, and set aside the stay of proceedings and costs order, directing a new trial.

The appellants appealed an order granting a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and dismissing their applications to set aside search warrants and evidence-gathering orders.

The investigation related to alleged price-fixing and output restriction in the sulfuric acid industry contrary to the United States Sherman Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrants and orders were valid, the informations provided sufficient grounds, and the Sherman Act offences qualified as offences under the Act and Treaty.

The court also found that section 8(1) of the Act does not contain a reciprocal offence requirement and upheld the refusal to continue a sealing order.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that trial counsel failed to call evidence that could have explained inaccuracies in the appellant's police statement.

The trial judge had used the statement to undermine the appellant's credibility.

The Court found that the ineffective assistance occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, while on probation in Ontario, travelled to Cuba and assaulted his companion.

He was charged in Ontario with breach of probation.

The trial judge convicted him, and the summary conviction appeal court upheld the conviction.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that probation orders bind the conduct of probationers both at home and abroad.

Applying the real and substantial link test, the Court found that Ontario had jurisdiction to try the offence because the probation order was made in Ontario and prosecuting the breach did not offend international comity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant's conviction for attempted murder was previously substituted with a conviction for aggravated assault by the Court of Appeal.

The court received written submissions on sentencing.

The Crown sought to uphold the original three-year penitentiary term, while the appellant sought a conditional sentence of 12 to 18 months.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence given the deliberate nature of the vehicular assault and the severe injuries caused.

The court imposed a sentence of 20 months' imprisonment, factoring in a two-for-one credit for two months of pre-sentence custody.

The accused pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his common-law spouse.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought a life sentence based on the 'Hill principle', attempting to introduce evidence of untried and uncharged violent acts against the victim and a former spouse to demonstrate a pattern of violence.

The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible and, based on a joint submission, imposed an eight-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while evidence of untried offences can be admitted to show background and character, it cannot be used to increase a sentence beyond what is proportionate to the convicted offence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the evidence or the sentence imposed, particularly given the Crown's position at trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for second degree murder following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on intent and on the cumulative effect of intoxication, provocation, and excessive force in self-defence.

The charge improperly compartmentalized the defences and referred to them as alternative defences, creating a risk that the jury would not appreciate their combined effect.

The court was not satisfied that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

A young person appealed the dismissal of a habeas corpus application challenging repeated administrative renewals of a transfer from open custody to secure custody under the Young Offenders Act.

The majority held that, in Ontario, where custody level is judicially determined, the Provincial Director's authority under s. 24.2(9) permits only a temporary 15-day interference unless the young person is returned to open custody and fresh grounds arising there justify a new transfer.

Continuous renewals while the young person remained in secure custody were found to impermissibly subvert the original judicial order for open custody.

The appeal was allowed notwithstanding mootness concerns because the disposition had already been served.