Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and accessing child pornography, arguing that evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant should have been excluded due to breaches of his Charter rights, specifically the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding that the appellant was not detained prior to his formal arrest, applying the R. v. Grant factors.

The court determined that the appellant was psychologically detained from the moment police entered his home, and his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court found the Charter breach serious, the impact on the appellant significant, and society's interest in the administration of justice favoured exclusion.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of accessing and possessing child pornography contrary to sections 163.1(4.1) and 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant claimed the defence under section 163.1(6), arguing he accessed and possessed the material as research for a book he was writing.

The trial judge found that while the appellant may have initially had a legitimate purpose related to art, he subsequently accessed and possessed the material to satisfy his fascination and morbid curiosity.

The trial judge also found no objectively verifiable connection between the appellant's conduct and his stated purpose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding dual purpose, credibility findings, and objective connection.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences arising from incidents alleged to have occurred 33 years prior, when the appellant was 14 years old and babysat the complainant, who was nearly 6 years old at the time.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence over the appellant's denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the principle from R. v. J.J.R.D. by failing to provide a "considered and reasoned" analysis of the complainant's evidence.

Although the trial judge identified the need for confirmatory evidence, he failed to identify any independent evidence supporting the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to intimidate contrary to section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and two counts of breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant on all counts.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's purpose in attempting to intimidate the complainant was to compel the complainant to abstain from proceeding in public without fear.

The trial judge's findings that the appellant's actions did not make the complainant fearful and the prior friendly relationship between the parties supported an alternative inference that the appellant's purpose was merely to vex, disquiet, or annoy the complainant.

The court also questioned whether "proceeding in public without fear" constitutes a lawful right within the meaning of section 423(1)(b), but declined to address this issue of statutory interpretation as the appeal was disposed of on other grounds.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving while disqualified and assault, as well as his sentence.

The appellant admitted he was disqualified from driving, and the trial judge found he operated a motor vehicle in a residential driveway.

However, the Court of Appeal found there was no evidence that the driveway constituted a street, road, highway, or other public place within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The appeal from the driving conviction was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appeal against the assault conviction was dismissed as it was supported by ample evidence.

The sentence appeal regarding a probation condition was dismissed, with the court noting it should be addressed by application to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a single act of sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old by a person in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal noted that the upper end of the range for this type of offence is more than five years.

The court concluded that while the sentence imposed was high, it was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen who previously held refugee status, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering her surrender for extradition to the Czech Republic.

She argued that under the Supreme Court's decision in Németh, her prior refugee status required the Minister to refuse surrender unless circumstances had changed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that Németh did not apply because the applicant's refugee status ceased when she acquired Canadian citizenship.

The Court also rejected arguments that her extradition violated her Charter mobility or equality rights, and found the Minister's decision regarding her health to be reasonable.

The appellant, a dual Canadian and Hungarian citizen with no refugee status, was committed for extradition to Hungary on fraud charges.

The Minister of Justice ordered his unconditional surrender.

The appellant appealed the committal and sought judicial review of the surrender order, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Németh altered the burden of proof under section 44(1) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, holding that Németh applies only to individuals with refugee status and does not alter the burden of proof for non-refugees.

The Court found no error in the committal order or the Minister's conclusion that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a cautionary charge regarding his flight from the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of flight was relevant to link the appellant to the apartment, and the risk of it being used for consciousness of guilt did not require a caution.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was entirely warranted on the facts.

The young person appealed their custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the young person had done well in school and had good prospects, supported by caring grandparents.

The Court allowed the appeal and commuted the balance of the custodial sentence to deferred custody, leaving the probation order intact.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board misunderstood the joint submission of the parties and inadvertently imposed a more restrictive condition than intended.

The appeal was allowed to correct the error by substituting the jointly submitted condition regarding community accommodations.

The appellant appealed her convictions on three charges of fraud, seeking to withdraw her guilty pleas.

She argued that she had a potential defence of duress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the transcripts of the guilty pleas offered no support for withdrawal and that her alleged duress did not meet the requirements of section 17 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance, as well as his global sentence of 44 months.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge on identification evidence, restricted cross-examination on the Sophonow report, misdirected the jury on inferences from a cell phone call, and failed to grant two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court also upheld the sentencing judge's discretionary decision to deny two-for-one credit based on the appellant's history of disobeying court orders.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for defrauding a financing company of approximately $90,000 using an altered invoice for non-existent forestry equipment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the equipment did not exist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, and concluding the combination of the false invoice and non-existent equipment was sufficient to found a conviction for fraud.

The appellant appealed the 10-year length of a prohibition order and sought a variation to permit him to attend proscribed public places in the company of an adult.

The Crown consented to the variation but opposed reducing the length of the order.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, adding the exception for being accompanied by an adult over 18, but deferred to the sentencing judge's discretion regarding the 10-year duration given the serious nature of the offence.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay from arrest to trial was 44 months.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing two periods of delay as neutral rather than institutional or Crown delay, particularly a 7.25-month adjournment sought by the Crown to rejoin the appellant's trial with a co-accused after previously agreeing to a severance.

The Court concluded that 25.25 months of the delay were unjustified, violating the Morin guidelines.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for crack-cocaine trafficking and failure to comply with recognizance.

He argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and that the trial judge failed to consider his medical condition and the impact of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the nature of the offence and the appellant's role.

However, the court varied the sentences for failure to comply with recognizance to time served, as the original sentences exceeded the maximum available.

The Crown appealed a 9-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually molesting his stepdaughter over a three-year period.

The victim was between nine and twelve years old.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit given the intrusive nature of the conduct and the blatant breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to two years less a day in custody, followed by the probation order imposed at trial.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin after customs officers found over a kilogram of the drug in his shoes upon his return from Ghana.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to introduce evidence of his receipt of Employment Insurance benefits to establish a financial motive, claiming it amounted to propensity reasoning based on poverty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the financial evidence was properly admitted to show financial pressure rather than propensity, and that a flawed jury instruction on evaluating evidence did not mislead the jury.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's role as a courier as an aggravating factor.

The sentence was reduced to seven years and three and one-half months.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for possession of child pornography and a concurrent 6-month sentence for breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended a joint submission, improperly punished him for past lenient sentences, and sought to introduce a psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no joint submission existed regarding the sentence range, the trial judge properly applied the jump principle for repeat offenders, and the proposed fresh evidence failed the Palmer test for admissibility.