Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Roger Guppy, brought an appeal from convictions.

Despite being offered assistance by duty counsel, the appellant declined and remained silent when asked for submissions.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to the appellant's continued silence and failure to make submissions.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, sought court-appointed counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist with his application for leave to appeal and subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

Legal Aid Ontario had denied coverage due to insufficient merit.

The Crown opposed the appointment of counsel and requested that the court decide and refuse the leave application at the motion hearing.

The court found the applicant lacked sufficient means but was not persuaded that appointing counsel was in the interests of justice, noting the issues were relatively straightforward.

The court also declined the Crown's request to decide the leave application prematurely, adhering to the court's Criminal Appeals Practice Direction.

Both the applicant's motion for counsel and the Crown's request were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of procuring and advertising sexual services.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in applying the actus reus for procuring by failing to consider the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, as required by the interpretation of "control, direction or influence" under s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

Additionally, the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant for advertising on a theory of party liability that the Crown had disavowed, without providing the defence notice and an opportunity to respond.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered on both counts.

The appellant was convicted of multiple weapons offences based entirely on circumstantial evidence after a police officer witnessed a single gunshot and briefly chased the fleeing suspect.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant's DNA found on the recovered handgun, a fleeting description by the officer, and grainy surveillance videos showing the appellant in the vicinity over an hour prior.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's verdict unreasonable, concluding that the totality of the evidence was too generic to establish the appellant's identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant pled guilty to robbery and using an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles, failed to consider rehabilitation, and that the sentence should be reconsidered due to the Sharma decision and COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge appropriately applied Gladue principles, considered rehabilitation, and already accounted for COVID-19 hardships.

A conditional sentence was unavailable as the sentence was not less than two years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the timeline of events and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the timeline discrepancy went only to the reliability of time estimates rather than core credibility, and that the trial judge had ample corroborating evidence to support his findings.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for six offences committed during a shooting incident in Hamilton.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of five years imprisonment before pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed material legal errors: (1) improperly reducing the sentence based on time served for related but distinct Thunder Bay offences; (2) imposing a concurrent rather than consecutive sentence for possession of a firearm while prohibited; and (3) considering irrelevant mitigating factors.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of seven years for the discharging offence and one year consecutive for the firearm prohibition offence, resulting in a total sentence of eight years imprisonment.

The appellant hospital appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an individual found not criminally responsible for first degree murder.

The Board had previously adjourned the hearing to obtain an independent psychiatric assessment regarding the individual's past criminal involvement.

Despite the assessment failing to resolve these concerns, the Board's majority granted the absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to an unexplained gap in its reasoning regarding the relevance of the past criminal conduct and its failure to address inadequacies in the proposed treatment plan for monitoring medication compliance.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and assault with a weapon.

The respondent had argued that the complainants consented to the activities, except for one assault with a hammer which he claimed was accidental.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to address whether the apparent consent was vitiated by the respondent's exercise of authority or the complainants' fear of violence, as required by s. 265(3) of the Criminal Code.

A new trial was ordered for the charges where consent was in issue.

The acquittal for the hammer assault was upheld as the trial judge's assessment of the injury was open to him.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the complainant's credibility and by stating that penetration was not relevant to establish sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury would have understood the evidence relevant to the complainant's credibility and that the trial judge was correct in law regarding penetration.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not outside the appropriate range.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and advised of her right to counsel at the roadside, including the right to free legal advice 'right now'.

She declined to call a lawyer and was not re-advised of her rights upon arriving at the police station.

The trial judge convicted her, but the summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal, finding the roadside caution misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the use of the word 'now' properly conveys the immediacy of the right to counsel and does not require the officer to specify that the call will be made from the police station.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by ignoring what amounted to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing position was not a joint submission as there was no prior discussion or reliance by the accused when entering his plea.

The sentence was within the appropriate range and fit given the appellant's serious record for similar offences.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and assault causing bodily harm following a violent attack in a convenience store parking lot.

The sole issue at trial was eyewitness identification.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held the verdict was not unreasonable, but allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to properly instruct himself and analyze the inherent frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judgment that upheld her conviction.

She argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, ignored the requirements of R. v. W.(D.), and improperly relied on prior discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided an adequate analysis of the evidence, applied the proper burden of proof, and did not rely on prior discreditable conduct in his assessment.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault by a judge and jury.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his W.(D.) instruction to the jury and by restricting cross-examination of the complainant regarding an incorrect in-court identification.

One appellant also argued the trial judge erred by revoking his bail mid-trial without hearing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the jury instructions were appropriate in context, the cross-examination was properly restricted as collateral, and the bail revocation, while procedurally flawed initially, was corrected without prejudicing the fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the complainant was unable to testify due to her fear of the appellant.

The trial judge admitted her videotaped statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that while the necessity requirement was met, the trial judge erred in finding threshold reliability.

The statement lacked an oath or warning about the consequences of lying, there was no evidence explaining how the statement came to be given, and the complainant expressed a strong motive to fabricate.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the driving offences, finding no error by the summary conviction appeal judge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the assault charge, holding that the appellant's act of pulling his arm away to disengage from police officers did not constitute an assault in law, though it likely amounted to an offence under s. 129 of the Criminal Code.

The conviction for assault resisting arrest was set aside.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, relying on the complainant's equivocal conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to consider a crucial interchange between the parties when assessing whether the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for extortion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant assaulted and threatened the complainant to obtain money owed.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence of three years and four months disproportionate despite the appellant's prior extortion conviction.

The sentence was varied to two years.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for a sophisticated fraud committed while on probation for another crime of dishonesty.

The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating circumstances, including the appellant's prior record and lack of remorse.

Laskin J.A. dissented, finding the sentence unfit based on recent sentencing decisions.