Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Gurkirat Rai, appealed his conviction following guilty pleas to multiple driving-related offences, including dangerous operation and driving while disqualified, which resulted in a permanent licence suspension by the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued his pleas were uninformed because his counsel erroneously advised him that his licence could be reinstated after 10 years, and he was unaware of the automatic lifetime suspension under the HTA or the cumulative effect of consecutive two-year suspensions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to admit fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The court concluded that it was not credible that the appellant would have acted differently had he received accurate advice, given his primary motivation to be released from pre-trial custody quickly, his willingness to plead guilty despite knowing a lifetime Criminal Code prohibition was possible, the strong Crown case, and his subsequent conduct of re-offending.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and her four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for wilful blindness and that the evidence supported his findings.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's difficult background involving serious violence, her rehabilitative potential, and her community involvement.

The Court also found that the trial judge erroneously relied on unrelated criminal conduct as an aggravating factor.

The custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his neighbour in a rooming house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased victim to third parties, which suggested the appellant had previously assaulted and stalked her.

The Court of Appeal found that the hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and should not have been admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

Because the improperly admitted evidence was central to the Crown's case on intent and animus, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed sentence after pleading guilty to criminal harassment and multiple breaches of no-contact court orders involving his former wife.

The Court of Appeal agreed that denunciation and specific deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives, but held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the case to criticize appellate sentencing guidance rather than focusing on the offence and offender.

Accepting the Crown's trial position that the proper range was 12 to 15 months, the court fixed a 15-month sentence and reduced it to 14 months after credit for pre-trial custody.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the gas company's conduct broke the chain of causation between his tampering with a gas meter and the subsequent explosion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant altered the meter and that his actions were a substantial contributing cause of the explosion.

The court also rejected the admission of fresh evidence, finding it immaterial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was aware of the complainant's shortcomings as a witness but reasonably accepted the fundamental point of her evidence that the appellant punched her in the head.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court that had allowed the accused's appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal court judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal.

The self-represented appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant expressed frustrations regarding his institutional living conditions.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision to be reasonable and dismissed the appeal, while expressing hope that the Board would consider the appellant's concerns at his upcoming hearing.

The Crown in an Occupational Health and Safety Act prosecution came into possession of a defence investigation report protected by solicitor-client and litigation privilege.

The justice of the peace stayed the charges, finding a breach of the defendants' Charter rights.

The summary appeal judge set aside the stay, holding that excluding the report from evidence was a sufficient remedy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the stay of proceedings, holding that prejudice is presumed when the Crown obtains privileged defence documents, and the Crown failed to rebut this presumption.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of stolen property, having been acquitted of robbery and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding strong evidence that the appellant knew the machine in his possession was stolen.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in assuming a two-year floor for the offence.

The three-year sentence was deemed outside the appropriate range and reduced to two years less a day.

The respondent operated a direct mail business in Ontario that sold lottery tickets and merchandise to persons outside Canada.

He was acquitted of making false or misleading representations 'to the public' under s. 52(1) of the Competition Act because the trial judge held the phrase only applied to the Canadian public.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that 'to the public' is not restricted to the Canadian public where there is a real and substantial link to Canada.

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the trial judge's excessive interventions and cross-examination of the respondent compromised the appearance of trial fairness.

The Court also clarified that reliance on legal advice is a mistake of law, not fact, and that the post-1999 mens rea requirement for s. 52 requires proof of knowledge or recklessness regarding the misleading nature of the representations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failure to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating videotaped evidence and in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to consult counsel of choice.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable errors in the trial judge's findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter after loading a shotgun that his girlfriend subsequently used to shoot and kill the victim.

The sentencing judge imposed an effective sentence of 12.5 years, including pre-trial custody credit.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was unfit given his minimal involvement in the actual killing.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentence was outside the appropriate range, noting the lack of evidence of actual participation in the killing and the absence of a serious related criminal record.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to nine years less credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown appealed the effective 14-month sentence imposed on the respondent for aggravated assault and break and enter after she invaded a neighbour's cottage and stabbed him.

The respondent, a 60-year-old first offender with mental health issues, had already completed the custodial portion of her sentence under stringent lockdown conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the original sentence was demonstrably unfit and that a penitentiary sentence ought to have been imposed for general deterrence.

However, given fresh medical evidence of the respondent's positive progress and the fact she had already served her time, the court concluded re-incarceration would serve no useful purpose and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of breach of trust for stealing cash from his detachment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the burden of proof, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's reasons and concluding the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to give a special jury instruction on the frailties of eyewitness confidence, and that his Charter rights were violated during the seizure of blood and breath samples.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instruction was unnecessary and the evidence was lawfully obtained.

The appellant's sentence appeal seeking a conditional sentence or reduced term from his 21-month imprisonment was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was deficient because it failed to link the W.D. charge to the issue of credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the specific instruction on resolving conflicting evidence was not a model of clarity, the jury charge read as a whole left no misapprehension about the correct standard of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of an erroneous jury charge.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they had to decide whom they believed between the accused and an accomplice, and determine if the accused's version was true or could reasonably be true.

The Court of Appeal held that this instruction constituted reversible error, despite a proper W.D. charge also being given.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he had the requisite mens rea.

The appellant had consumed a significantly increased dosage of prescription medication before driving, despite experiencing recent memory loss and knowing the drug could cause drowsiness.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction, applying the test from R. v. King to find the appellant could reasonably have foreseen the impairment or was reckless.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the appeal judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of a frail, vulnerable friend and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by denying two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody based on the appellant's change of counsel, and by holding that provocation could not mitigate the sentence.

The Court held the appropriate range was 8 to 12 years due to numerous aggravating factors.

Factoring in proper pre-trial custody credit and provocation, the sentence was reduced to 9 years' imprisonment.