Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Adriel Cyrus, sought to bifurcate his conviction and sentence appeals after being convicted of two counts of sexual assault and one count of uttering a threat, and being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, per George J.A., dismissed the motion, finding no compelling reason to separate the appeals.

The court emphasized the efficiency and consistency of hearing both appeals together, referencing prior authority and the inefficiency of duplicating review of the trial record.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review a motion judge's decision dismissing his request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal for convictions in 2020 and 2022.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for an extension of time, noting the lack of evidence of an intention to appeal within the timeline and the lack of an adequate explanation for the delay.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable because no cocaine was seized during the transactions and the substance could have been methamphetamine.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting intercepted communications without a Carter ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, police surveillance, and physical evidence found upon arrest, overwhelmingly established the substance was cocaine.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to make a Carter ruling, the error was harmless given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that the only reasonable inference from the cumulative effect of the evidence was the appellant's guilt.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing the appellant's role and failing to give weight to his rehabilitation, despite a positive presentence report.

Considering all circumstances, including fresh evidence, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 18 months, recommending consideration for the temporary absence program.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal was fact-driven, raised no important legal issues, and lacked strong merits.

The applicant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the disposition had been overtaken by a subsequent disposition of the Board.

The court found no pressing issue of law to justify proceeding with the appeal.

On a ministerial reference concerning a 1972 murder conviction, the court considered whether previously undisclosed police information about a potentially exculpatory alibi and witness statements, and new expert reports about false confessions, were admissible as fresh evidence.

The majority held that the alibi-related material and related witness information were admissible under the Palmer framework because they could reasonably have affected the verdict, although the Crown's non-disclosure did not render the 1972 trial unfair under the disclosure standards then prevailing.

The majority rejected the recent expert reports as not truly fresh, finding that their substance had already been before the jury through trial experts.

Treating the matter as an appeal, the majority quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial; one judge dissented on the first question and would have refused admission of the fresh evidence.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving 'over 80'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that the appeal judge erred in finding that an officer could not form the requisite suspicion for a roadside breath demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code based on the smell of alcohol on a driver's breath, affirming R. v. Lindsay.

Furthermore, the trial judge correctly applied the W.D. test by concluding that the accused's 'evidence to the contrary' did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the requisite intent for murder by reason of mental disorder falling short of insanity, and by leaving the defence of insanity to the jury over the objections of both counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and that there was an air of reality to the insanity defence given the appellant's own doctor raised the issue.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (less 3 months for pre-trial custody) and a DNA order for assault and threatening offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence and DNA order amply justified given the appellant's lengthy criminal record, which included break and enter and criminal harassment.

The court held that the sentence did not offend the jump principle and that specific deterrence was of special significance.

The text of this decision was removed by the publisher due to a Supreme Court of Canada order prohibiting the broadcast or publication of evidence taken at the preliminary inquiry pursuant to section 539(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed her conviction for unlawfully importing a controlled substance.

The Crown conceded that the cross-examination of the appellant at trial was improper and impaired her right to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for importing a controlled substance, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant abandoned her appeals regarding other charges to which she had pleaded guilty.

The appellants appealed their sentences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in finding their actions constituted premeditated, planned criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an insufficient basis on the record to support this aggravating circumstance.

Without this finding, the original sentence of a short, sharp term of imprisonment was deemed excessive.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences were varied to time served (9 days) plus probation.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by a summary conviction appeal court judge, who had overturned the respondent's conviction for 'over 80' while having care or control of a motor vehicle.

The respondent had driven her vehicle into a ditch and subsequently consumed more alcohol before police arrived.

The trial judge rejected her evidence of post-offence drinking and found she had care or control of the operable vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by substituting his own findings of fact regarding care or control and credibility, and by faulting the trial judge's application of the W.D. test.

The conviction and sentence were restored.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine, extortion, threatening death, and breach of probation, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliance on the Crown witnesses' evidence.

However, the Crown conceded that the threatening counts should have been stayed as they were subsumed in the extortion count.

The threatening counts were stayed, but the appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the total sentence was upheld.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

One appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence, while the other argued the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding his control of the weapons and role in the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge's findings were not inconsistent and that the convictions were supported by the totality of the circumstantial and identification evidence.

The appellant appealed sentence from a three-year penitentiary term.

The court agreed that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the nature of the offence, but held that the circumstances of the offence and the offender did not justify a penitentiary term.

Significant weight was given to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, the immediate context of the offence, genuine remorse, and fresh evidence showing meaningful rehabilitative progress.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day followed by 18 months' probation, together with a 10-year weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a fraud conviction and an 18-month custodial sentence arising from an undisclosed conflict of interest.

The court held that the jury instruction on deprivation was correct and consistent with governing fraud authorities, so the conviction appeal failed.

On sentence, the court declined to substitute a conditional sentence, emphasizing the amount involved, the prolonged conduct, and the breach of trust.

However, the court found inadequate recognition of sentencing disparity with the co-accused and reduced the custodial term to 9 months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related weapons offences following a jury trial.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the charge to the jury regarding the complainant’s credibility, the burden of proof, a corrective instruction addressing an improper defence comment, and a comment on identification evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly and adequately presented the defence theory and did not mislead the jury on burden of proof.

The trial judge’s comments were either proper or adequately qualified.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.