Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to four years in custody.

On sentence appeal, he argued that the sentencing judge improperly treated his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor related to his decision to appeal rather than plead guilty, incorrectly relied on a case involving a younger victim, and unfairly considered his failure to participate in programs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error.

The sentencing judge expressly stated he did not treat the absence of a guilty plea as aggravating; lack of remorse was properly considered with respect to future rehabilitative prospects.

The four-year sentence falls squarely within the established three-to-five-year range for penetrative sexual assaults and appropriately reflects the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the serious aggravating factors, including a decades-long criminal record involving violence against women.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching against a 14-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to disclose the second part of a jury note asking for a rest day, failing to give a cross-count reasoning instruction, and failing to give a prior consistent statement instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the jury note, which did not indicate rushed deliberations or prejudice.

The court also found that the additional jury instructions were not necessary, as there was no risk of cross-count reasoning and the Crown did not rely on prior consistent statements to bolster credibility.

The appellant, Shafaq Joya, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision to continue his conditional discharge and deny his Charter application for an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and refusal to grant an absolute discharge were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also found no Charter breach, as the Board’s decision was based on public safety, not resource limitations.

Michael Katz appealed the two-year sentence imposed after pleading guilty to several offences, including possession of a loaded firearm, assaulting a police officer with a weapon, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s approach or conclusions.

The court also substituted a three-year driving prohibition, to commence from the date of sentencing, in place of the original 18-month prohibition, in accordance with the Criminal Code and relevant case law.

The appellant, Clayton Williams, appealed his conviction and indeterminate sentence for offences arising from two break and enters, one involving the sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the verdict was unreasonable, that the search warrant was invalid, and that a determinate sentence with long-term supervision was more appropriate.

The court found the trial judge’s factual findings and risk assessment reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of importing a controlled substance (cocaine) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude a prior exculpatory statement under the Edgar exception, the application of the W.(D.) analysis, or the treatment of circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the trial judge's imposition of a sentence at the low end of the established range for cocaine importation, and clarified the reconciliation of the Cunningham sentencing range with the proportionality principles emphasized in Parranto.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a young woman with an intellectual disability.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the majority held that the trial judge's reasons were deficient in several respects: the trial judge failed to adequately address the complainant's reliability, particularly her heightened suggestibility as established by expert evidence; the trial judge appeared to find the complainant's evidence self-corroborating when it was not; and the trial judge failed to explain why the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The majority concluded these deficiencies, taken together, foreclosed meaningful appellate review and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The dissent argued the trial judge's reasons were adequate and that the trial judge was clearly alive to the reliability issues.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal of his conviction for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault against his minor daughters.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in applying the public confidence test from R. v. Oland and that her decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Chief Justice dismissed the application, finding no material errors of fact or law and that the bail judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offences, the merits of the appeal, and the likelihood of parole were all reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellants brought a motion to raise new issues on appeal regarding the eligibility of a juror who was a former auxiliary police officer.

They sought to argue that the juror was ineligible under the Juries Act and, alternatively, under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal permitted the appellants to advance the statutory interpretation argument but denied permission to advance the Charter argument, with full reasons to follow in the appeal judgment.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud and use of a forged document.

The charges arose from her cashing Canada Savings Bonds in her sister's name using an allegedly forged power of attorney.

The appellant claimed the funds were hers and placed in her sister's name to hide them during a marital breakdown.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding that even if the funds were hers, cashing bonds in her sister's name constituted fraud, and placed the onus on the appellant to prove the power of attorney was valid.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law on the elements of fraud, improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding the power of attorney, and failed to meaningfully analyze the complainant's evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated September 15, 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis that it was moot.

The appellant appealed four orders of the Superior Court of Justice that struck his applications and dismissed a motion for contempt against Crown counsel.

The applications sought to set aside prior criminal convictions, direct the Attorney General and the court to cease discriminatory practices, and have a judge withdraw from a proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the lower court decisions that the applications constituted improper collateral attacks on final criminal orders and required leave under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The young person appealed the decision of the application judge refusing a transfer to Youth Court pursuant to s. 16(9) of the Young Offenders Act.

The application judge found that the young person constituted a danger to the public based on a risk assessment, personal history, and involvement in a serious offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's evaluation and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the global sentence of ten years (less four years pre-trial custody) imposed on the respondent for aggravated sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm against his six-year-old stepdaughter, and aggravated assault against his five-week-old biological son.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly inadequate, noting the trial judge over-emphasized the principle of totality and failed to adequately reflect the gravity of the offences, deterrence, denunciation, and the need to separate the respondent from society.

The global sentence was increased to sixteen years (less four years pre-trial custody).

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that overturned the accused's conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in admitting the certificate of a qualified technician, applying the criminal standard of proof to whether the accused received a true copy under s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of proof for admissibility under s. 258(7) is a balance of probabilities.

The arresting officer's evidence that he read through the copy to ensure it matched the original was sufficient to support the trial judge's finding.

The conviction and sentence were restored.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation.

The central issue was whether the trial judge provided adequate jury instructions regarding evidence of the appellant's discreditable conduct, including alleged physical abuse and sexual misconduct outside the indictment period.

The Court of Appeal found the instructions inadequate, noting they failed to caution the jury against using the evidence to infer the appellant was the type of person to commit the offences or to conclude he was deserving of punishment.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for a violent offence committed by an offender with a prior record for violence, addictions, and mental health concerns.

The court accepted that the offender had posed a significant danger at the time of the offence, but emphasized the substantial rehabilitation achieved before and after sentencing.

The sentencing judge had carefully considered the authorities and tailored a conditional sentence to minimize the risk of reoffending while preserving rehabilitation prospects and community protection.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

Criminal appeal arising from a conviction for criminal negligence causing death following a police shooting during a land claim protest.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge was required to hold a voir dire before permitting cross-examination on statements allegedly made by the accused to a superior officer, including whether that superior was a person in authority and whether the statements were voluntary.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, holding that the inquiry obligation was triggered and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the absence of a voir dire caused no substantial wrong and did not affect the verdict; the mistrial appeal, fresh evidence motion, and Crown sentence appeal were also dismissed.