Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

This is an appeal concerning an insurer's duty to defend.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for an assault due to a psychotic episode, sought coverage under his homeowner's policy.

The insurer denied coverage based on an exclusion for bodily harm arising from intentional or criminal acts.

The application judge found the negligence claim derivative of an intentional tort and that the exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the true nature of the claim was an intentional act, despite the appellant's mental state, thus affirming the applicability of the exclusion clause.

This is a remand from the Supreme Court of Canada to the Ontario Court of Appeal concerning the award of incentive plan-related damages in a wrongful dismissal action.

The Supreme Court remanded the case for disposition in accordance with Matthews v. Ocean Nutrition Canada Ltd. The majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed its original decision, finding that the employee, Mr. Manastersky, was not entitled to additional damages beyond his vested interest in the Mezzanine Carried Interest Plan (CIP) because the plan's terms did not entitle him to annual payments or future investment periods.

The court held that RBC Dominion Securities Inc. had paid Mr. Manastersky all to which he was entitled at common law.

Feldman J.A. dissented, arguing that the trial judge's original decision, which awarded additional damages, correctly applied the legal principles affirmed in Matthews, emphasizing the requirement for "absolutely clear and unambiguous" language to limit an employee's common law right to compensation.

The appellant sought to overturn a motion judge's decision to amend prior court orders, arguing that an equalization payment of $280,000 was still owed despite a subsequent settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the final settlement agreement, which divided funds from the matrimonial home sale, was intended to settle "all outstanding issues," including the equalization payment.

The court applied the "officious bystander test" and common sense to conclude that the equalization payment was implicitly offset by other amounts owed, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant entered into a building contract for a new home and paid a 25% deposit.

She later repudiated the contract after failing to agree on modifications to reduce costs.

The trial judge dismissed her claim for the return of the deposit, finding it was a true deposit subject to forfeiture upon repudiation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the deposit provision and in denying relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the deposit retained its character and that forfeiture was not unconscionable or disproportionate to the damages suffered by the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against the respondents.

The trial judge had found no evidence of misappropriation of funds and concluded that the respondents' involvement was financially neutral to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were amply supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

A cross-appeal regarding costs was also dismissed.

The plaintiff in a class proceeding moved to quash the appeals of the defendant and non-party franchisees, arguing the order appealed from was interlocutory.

The order in question invalidated certain opt-out coupons but granted those class members a further opportunity to opt out after a final disposition on the merits.

The Court of Appeal held the order was final because it deprived the defendant of a binding judgment against all putative class members and of a limitations defence.

The motions to quash were dismissed.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

The Master set aside the dismissal, finding the delay was inadvertent and there was no actual prejudice to the defendants.

On appeal, the Superior Court judge reinstated the dismissal, finding the Master misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider the public interest in finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the Master's order, holding that the Master's discretionary decision was entitled to significant deference and his findings were reasonable.

The appellant, a condominium unit owner, appealed an order restricting his statutory right to examine condominium records and prohibiting him from coming within 25 feet of the management office.

The application judge had found his unrelenting requests amounted to harassment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the complete elimination of his statutory right of access and the broad injunctive relief too extreme, especially since the conduct did not amount to actionable harassment.

The court set aside the injunctive components but upheld the requirements that requests be made in writing and photocopying charges be paid in advance.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting the respondent's motion to stay proceedings in Ontario.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding Ontario had no jurisdiction based on presence or a real and substantial connection.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the Muscutt factors, finding no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings or legal conclusions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants brought a motion to restore their appeal to the hearing list after failing to strictly comply with a consent order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the failure was minimal, explained, and caused no real prejudice to the respondent.

No costs were ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning a property boundary dispute.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by deciding the matter based on the equitable doctrine of rectification without allowing him to address it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice as the validity of the 1962 document was in issue and the appellant had abandoned his adverse possession claim late in the trial.

The court also upheld the awards for special damages for fence construction and punitive damages for reprehensible behaviour.

The plaintiff sought to examine the Honourable John Manley, a Member of Parliament, for discovery in a civil action.

The motion judge ordered the Member to attend no sooner than 15 days after the commencement of Parliament's summer recess, finding that parliamentary privilege against testifying only applied while Parliament was actually sitting and for 14 days after adjournment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the privilege of testimonial immunity extends throughout a parliamentary session, as well as 40 days before a session begins and 40 days after it ends.

The court concluded that any changes to this privilege must be enacted by Parliament, not the courts.

The respondent, an Ontario resident, was catastrophically injured in a single-vehicle accident in New Mexico while driving a vehicle registered and insured in New Mexico.

She sought statutory accident benefits from the Ontario Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The trial judge declared her entitled to the benefits.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that she was ordinarily resident in Ontario but allowed the appeal on the basis that the accident did not fall within the scope of Ontario's motor vehicle insurance regime.

The court held that Part VI of the Insurance Act did not apply because the vehicle was not required to be registered in Ontario and was not being operated in Ontario, meaning she had no recourse against the Fund.

The appellants sought leave to appeal a judgment for costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle to justify granting leave.

Leave to appeal was denied and the appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,500.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim that their real estate agent breached her fiduciary duty by purchasing a mobile home for herself instead of for them.

The trial judge found that the agent did not misuse confidential information and understood the appellants were financially unable to purchase the home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting they were questions of mixed fact and law entitled to deference.

The Court also held that the appellants' conduct in renting the home from the agent for over a year precluded the equitable remedy of a constructive trust.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondent insurance company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no credible issue for trial as the plain words of the insurance policy's limitation period could not be avoided.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, raising an argument for restitution that had not been tried or pleaded.

The Court of Appeal found no fault with the trial judge's analysis and findings, and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Spence of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons and conclusions of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario disposed of the appeal by issuing an order on the terms of the consent filed by the parties.

The respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following the appellant's unsuccessful appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $14,000.

The Court also adjusted the motion judge's costs award, reducing the hourly rate from $350 to $225, because the respondent's counsel had a special fee arrangement with the client that was not disclosed to the motion judge.

The Court noted that counsel operating under a special fee arrangement must disclose it, and costs cannot exceed the amounts actually charged to the client.