Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion granted.

This decision addresses a request to coordinate two appeals arising from a single lower court decision that dismissed defamation actions under anti-SLAPP legislation.

The appellants sought separate hearings, while the respondents requested the appeals be heard together.

The appeal management judge ordered the appeals to be heard concurrently, emphasizing judicial economy and efficiency, and finding no principled reason to hear them separately despite the appellants' arguments regarding factual and legal dissimilarities between the two cases.

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion judge's decision to dismiss the appellant's action via reverse summary judgment, which sought to set aside a property transfer under power of sale due to alleged fraud and conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal granted the appellant's request, finding that despite some delay, she maintained an intention to appeal and had arguable grounds, particularly regarding the motion judge's assessment of "badges of fraud" in the context of a power of sale and the chargee's duties.

The court also clarified that a writ of possession requires a pre-existing order for possession, which the purchaser lacked.

The respondents on an appeal brought a motion for security for costs against the foreign appellant, who was appealing the dismissal of his forum non conveniens motion in an action for damages related to torture in Iran.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious under Rule 61.06(1)(a), and that there was no 'other good reason' to order security under Rule 61.06(1)(c), noting the general policy against imposing security for costs on foreign defendants forced to defend themselves in Ontario.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment for fraud in relation to a loan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for her failure to appear, failed to adequately explain her delay in moving to set aside the judgment, and failed to demonstrate an arguable defence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order imposing a $500,000 administrative monetary penalty for misleading business practices under the Competition Act.

He argued he was deprived of a fair hearing due to ineffective counsel and sought to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge had no independent obligation to adjourn the hearing to allow the appellant to adduce evidence.

The court also upheld the quantum of the penalty and refused to admit the fresh evidence, as it would not have affected the result.

The appellants obtained judgments in the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its agencies for kidnapping, detention, and torture.

They brought an action in Ontario to enforce those judgments.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that the defendants were immune from jurisdiction under the State Immunity Act.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the acts constituted commercial activity, that a common law exception applied, and that the defendants lost immunity by violating jus cogens norms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the State Immunity Act is a complete code, the acts were not commercial, and customary international law does not recognize a jus cogens exception to state immunity.

The appellants, providers of on-site sewage treatment systems, sued the Building Materials Evaluation Commission, its members, and the Crown for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for misfeasance in public office.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The Divisional Court struck the claim, finding the Commission was not a suable entity and the pleading lacked sufficient particulars of malice against the individual members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Commission lacks the legal capacity to be sued and that the bald allegations of bad faith and malice against the subcommittee members did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the production of a memorandum detailing a conversation between the defendants' former counsel and their expert witness, Dr. Grafius.

The defendants claimed the memorandum was protected by litigation privilege.

The Court of Appeal held that rule 31.06(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure must be interpreted broadly, requiring the disclosure of all foundational information for a testifying expert's report.

The court ordered the production of the memorandum, finding that litigation privilege does not protect the foundational information of an expert called to testify at trial.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision refusing to enforce its 'no pets' policy against the respondent.

The respondent had lived in her unit with her cat for over 10 years, during which time maintenance personnel had been in her unit.

The appellant only decided to step up enforcement in 2004.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it would be inequitable to grant a compliance order given the long period of non-enforcement.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal and a motion for leave to appeal from an order granting interim relief in an oppression action under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, meaning leave to appeal was required.

The Court further held that under s. 249 of the CBCA, appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Court of Appeal, not the Divisional Court.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted, but the motion to quash the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent trustee in bankruptcy on a guarantee signed by the appellants for the respondent's fees.

The motions judge had also directed a reference to the Registrar in Bankruptcy to determine the reasonable quantum of those fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the lack of independent legal advice was not a free-standing defence and there was no evidence the appellants misunderstood the guarantee.

The Court also upheld the motions judge's discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to direct a reference to the Registrar in Bankruptcy.

The appellants appealed a judgment in favour of the respondent on a claim and the dismissal of their counterclaim.

They argued the matter should have proceeded under the ordinary rules rather than the simplified rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the ordinary rules applied, the outcome would have been the same as the appellants raised no defence to the claim and the counterclaim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim based on the defence of qualified privilege.

The appellant argued the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error regarding the sequence of events and the appellant's objections to a development.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made strong credibility findings against the appellant and correctly concluded the appellant had no genuine objection, making the defence of qualified privilege available.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims for malicious prosecution and defamation against the police services board and several officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the claims were not properly pleaded until 2002 and were therefore statute-barred under the applicable limitation periods, including the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The City of Kingston moved for leave to intervene in an appeal between the City of Sudbury and Union Gas Limited regarding the interpretation of a franchise agreement and the jurisdiction of the Ontario Energy Board under s. 10 of the Municipal Franchises Act.

Kingston argued there was a common question of law with its own pending appeal involving Union Gas.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual and legal contexts of the two proceedings were significantly different and that the disadvantages of permitting the intervention outweighed the advantages.

In a long-running access road dispute, the appellant challenged an order requiring removal of gravel placed on the respondents' property.

The court held that the proposed fresh evidence did not meet the established admissibility requirements.

However, the appeal succeeded because the record was insufficient to permit summary judgment on whether the work performed complied with an earlier order governing repair and maintenance of the access road.

The order below was set aside and the underlying motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellants challenged a trial judgment holding the corporate appellant liable for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act and imposing personal liability on the sole director and shareholder under s. 13(1).

The principal issue was whether the individual appellant had the requisite knowledge that the impugned disbursements amounted to a breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence clearly supported a finding that he reasonably ought to have known the disbursements were a breach of trust.

The court also declined to interfere with the trial judge’s discretionary decision on interest.

The appeal was dismissed with costs and the cross-appeal on interest was dismissed without costs.

The appellants challenged a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of a woodcutting contract after they removed the respondent from their property.

The central issue was whether the contract required selective cutting of cedar trees or permitted clear cutting, and whether extrinsic evidence could be used to support the appellants' interpretation.

The court held that the written contract was clear, accepted evidence of trade custom as available to interpret the contract, and upheld the conclusion that selective cutting applied only to hardwood and softwood trees.

The refusal to consider parol evidence on the appellants' defences was not erroneous, the damages award was reasonable, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.