Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

John Doe brought a motion to extend the time to serve and file a Notice of Appeal from a lower court order that denied his standing to appear as an anonymous party and make submissions on an Anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that Doe did not form a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant period, his delay was a result of a failed litigation strategy, and granting the extension would cause significant prejudice to the responding parties.

The court also found the proposed appeal lacked merit, rejecting the novel argument that Anti-SLAPP provisions protect anonymity in litigation.

The appellant sought to enforce a $300,000 promissory note and personal guarantees against the respondents after their family company went bankrupt.

The trial judge found the family members were not liable based on the defence of non est factum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed this finding, holding that the family members were careless in signing the guarantee without reading it and that there was no misrepresentation.

The respondents' cross-appeal alleging lack of consideration was dismissed.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was granted against the family members.

The appellants purchased a commercial property that was later discovered to be contaminated.

They sued the vendor for failing to disclose the contamination and their real estate lawyer for negligence.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding that the purchaser actually knew about the contamination before waiving the environmental condition and closing the transaction, and had instructed the lawyer not to order further reports.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and findings of fact.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed the dismissal of its application for a civil forfeiture order regarding a property used for a marijuana grow operation.

The application judge found that the property was an instrument of unlawful activity, but declined to order forfeiture under the 'clearly not in the interests of justice' exception in s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The judge found that during the respondent's criminal proceedings, the federal Crown made representations that led the respondent to reasonably believe his home would not be forfeited if he pled guilty.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of a residential property under s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The property owner's son had used the property for a marijuana grow operation and drug trafficking.

The application judge dismissed the forfeiture, finding an unexplained six-year delay by the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in his findings on delay and by ignoring the lack of a limitation period under s. 8(5).

However, conducting a fresh analysis, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that forfeiture would clearly not be in the interests of justice because the owner was not complicit, did not profit from the crimes, and had made significant efforts to help his son overcome his drug addiction.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal resolved the matter on consent, directing it to proceed as per the signed order, noting that no other agreements had been reached regarding the property.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding implied consent for his son to drive his vehicle.

The motions judge had drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for failing to make efforts to provide his son's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred by drawing the adverse inference without first assessing the credibility of the appellant's own evidence, which strongly suggested a lack of consent.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The respondents moved to strike or quash portions of the appellants' Notice of Appeal, specifically a request for a declaration and a ground of appeal relating to justiciability and standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, deferring the jurisdictional issue to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellants' cross-motion to have the appeal case-managed was granted, with costs of the motion awarded to the appellants.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action mistakenly named the wrong emergency room doctor in their statement of claim due to confusing hospital records.

Years later, after discovering the treating doctor's true identity, the plaintiffs moved to amend the statement of claim to substitute the correct doctor's name.

The motion judge granted the amendment, finding it was a case of misnomer because the treating doctor and her representatives would have known she was the intended defendant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the motion judge did not err in finding a misnomer and properly exercised his discretion to allow the correction despite the delay.

The appellant appealed a decision granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision and concluding that the appellant had already put its best foot forward on the issues identified.

The respondent landlord leased commercial premises to a corporate tenant within the Brick enterprise.

The lease was subsequently assigned and sublet to other entities within the enterprise.

When the sub-tenant vacated the premises early and stopped paying rent, the landlord sued the parent corporation, arguing it was liable under a Consent and Acknowledgement agreement and the oppression remedy.

The trial judge found liability under the oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parent corporation was directly liable to the landlord for the unpaid rent under the terms of the Consent and Acknowledgement agreement, making it unnecessary to rely on the oppression remedy.

Following an appeal, the successful appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded partial indemnity costs to the appellants for both the motion and the appeal.

The costs awarded to two of the appellants were made payable only upon their satisfaction of a prior judgment, while the costs awarded to the third appellant were made payable within thirty days.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their claim of economic duress and effectively dismissing their entire action against the respondent banks.

The motion judge had found that past dealings between the parties could not constitute economic duress to vitiate a restructuring agreement and release.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the 'plain and obvious' test for striking pleadings under Rule 21.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that a claim of economic duress based on past dealings would inevitably fail, and ordered the appellants to file a new, focused statement of claim.

The appellant mortgage broker appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its action against the respondents for unpaid commissions.

The appellant argued the respondents should be liable for breach of contract, oppression, or as principals by piercing the corporate veil.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to award them costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to pierce the corporate veil or find oppression in what was an ordinary breach of contract by the corporate defendant.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's decision to deprive the successful respondents of costs due to their borderline dishonest conduct was justified.

The appellant appealed an order staying his Ontario contract action against the respondents on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and Florida was the most convenient forum.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by relying on a privileged letter, finding the agreement contained a Florida arbitration provision, and failing to consider the risk of a multiplicity of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the Muscutt test, the letter was not privileged, and the factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to determine if the trial judge applied the correct test for liability because the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant failed to prove its damages due to a volatile market.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs order against the guiding mind and principal shareholder of the appellant.

The respondents, Quebec residents, were injured in an Ontario motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver.

They obtained a judgment in Ontario, but the respondent Katia's claim under Quebec's no-fault scheme was denied.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund appealed an order requiring it to pay the Ontario judgment, arguing that s. 25(2) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act precluded payment because no amount was payable under Quebec law.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 25(2) only requires the foreign jurisdiction to provide substantially similar recourse and does not require a fact-specific determination of entitlement under foreign law.

The appeal was dismissed regarding Katia's claim but allowed regarding Michel's Family Law Act claim, as Quebec law provides no corresponding right.

The appellant was injured in a collision between his all-terrain vehicle and the respondent's pickup truck on a gravel road.

A jury found the appellant 100% liable and assessed damages at $566,634.

The appellant appealed the liability finding, and the respondent cross-appealed the damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal found the jury's verdict on liability unreasonable, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed the respondent failed to leave one-half of the road clear, creating a prima facie case of negligence.

The court ordered a new trial on liability only and dismissed the cross-appeal regarding damages.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $24,882.30, representing the return of a deposit paid for a baling system machine.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the partnership, rather than the corporation, was a party to the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions regarding the parties to the contract, the breach of contract, and the dismissal of the counterclaim based on credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.