Administrative Law - OCA

The appellants, rural landowners whose lands formed part of a natural gas storage pool, brought an action against the respondent gas company for breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and nuisance.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Ontario Energy Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the substance of the claims fell within the ambit of section 38 of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, which grants the Board exclusive jurisdiction to determine just and equitable compensation for gas storage rights and related damages.

The Minister assessed the respondent for unremitted retail sales tax on the basis that she was a director of her brother's company.

The respondent was never a director and had no involvement with the company, but missed the time limits to object to the assessment under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

She obtained a declaration from the Superior Court that she was not a director and not liable for the tax.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the respondent could have raised a due diligence defence under the Act and that disputes concerning the validity of an assessment must be resolved within the statutory framework, not through an application for declaratory relief.

The appellant taxpayer obtained a declaratory judgment that it was not required to pay retail sales tax on rented wooden pallets because they did not fall within the definition of 'returnable container' under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

In response, the legislature retroactively amended the Act to broaden the definition.

The Minister successfully moved for a determination that the retroactive amendment applied to the appellant's outstanding tax assessment appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, holding that there is no exception to the general application of valid retroactive legislation for 'adjudicated rights' where the prior declaration merely interpreted the former law.

The appellant applied to amend a municipal by-law schedule to permit a second adult entertainment parlour location.

The City refused the application because the proposed location abutted a residential property, contrary to the by-law.

The appellant appealed, alleging bad faith, misinterpretation of 'residence', and procedural unfairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no bad faith, agreeing the abutting property was a residence despite being unoccupied during renovations, and concluding a full hearing would not have changed the outcome.

The appellants were convicted of four offences under the Building Code Act related to constructing a building without a permit and ignoring stop-work orders.

They appealed, arguing a permit had been issued and never revoked, and that the fourth conviction violated the rule against multiple convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a permit was issued, the municipality effectively revoked it under s. 8(10) of the Act when it returned the application due to non-payment.

The court also held the fourth conviction was based on continued construction on a different date, so the rule against multiple convictions did not apply.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition on charges of receiving secret commissions and fraud, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to Hong Kong.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence that he failed to disclose the commissions to his employer or that they were paid in consideration for any act.

He also argued that the delay in commencing extradition proceedings prejudiced his right to a fair trial and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding sufficient evidence to support the committal and concluding that the Minister's decision was reasonable.

The Ontario Review Board appealed a costs order made against it by an application judge following a successful application by the respondent to quash an adjournment order made by the ORB.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the application judge applied the wrong test.

The Court held that the test for awarding costs against the ORB should be at least as stringent as the test for awarding costs against the Crown in criminal matters, requiring a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards, which was not met in this case.

The union appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board certification order and remitted the matter for reconsideration.

The Divisional Court had found the Board erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the employer's late-filed response.

Before the appeal was heard, the Board reconsidered the matter, accepted the late response, and revoked the certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the union's appeal as moot, finding no live controversy remained and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case on the merits.

The applicant, a status Indian and member of Couchiching First Nation, sought leave to appeal his convictions under the Public Lands Act for building a cabin without a work permit and contrary to a stop work order.

He argued the cabin was built in furtherance of his treaty right to hunt and fish, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the justice of the peace's relationship with a Ministry of Natural Resources manager.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the determination of treaty rights is a question of law, the applicant failed to prove the cabin was reasonably incidental to his rights, he could not challenge the regulatory regime without establishing a right, and the high threshold for disqualifying bias was not met.

The respondent campground owner challenged the inclusion of third-party owned, seasonally-used trailers in its property tax assessment.

The application judge held that the trailers did not form part of the 'current value' of the land because they were not part of the fee simple.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the term 'fee simple' in the definition of 'current value' does not limit assessment to interests owned by the freehold owner, and that the trailers were properly assessed as land.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal, finding the tax was direct and constitutionally valid.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing her application for judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decisions.

The Commission had declined to deal with her sexual harassment and discrimination complaints under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code, stating they were more appropriately dealt with under the Labour Relations Act through her union grievance.

The Court of Appeal found the Commission's decision patently unreasonable because the arbitrator had not actually dealt with the human rights issues, and the Commission failed to assess appropriateness on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also found the Commission misunderstood its reconsideration power under s. 37 by requiring new facts.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Commission.

Appeal from dismissal of an application for judicial review challenging a university board resolution authorizing closure and sale of two downtown colleges as part of a capital development and financial restructuring strategy.

The majority held that the impugned decision concerned management, property, revenues, expenditures, and facilities within the Board's authority under the Trent University Act, and did not amount to educational policy requiring Senate concurrence.

The majority also held the faculty-member appellants lacked standing to seek judicial review, rejecting both personal and public interest standing arguments.

The appeal on the merits was dismissed, but the costs order below was varied to permit assessment of the party-and-party costs awarded by the Divisional Court if the appellants elected that course.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the closure decision engaged educational policy and required Senate approval.

The appellant appealed an order of the Divisional Court.

The appeal was heard together with a companion appeal involving the City of Toronto and the Canadian Union of Public Employees.

For the reasons provided in the companion appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed this appeal with costs.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its third party claim against residential owners and occupants after a pedestrian allegedly slipped on a snow-covered public sidewalk.

The court held that the summary judgment motion was not premature because the third party respondents were entitled to challenge the legal sufficiency of the pleadings at the outset.

Applying the common law duty analysis and the framework governing statutory breach, the court held that owners of property adjacent to public sidewalks owe no common law duty to clear snow and ice absent special circumstances such as assumed control over the sidewalk or hazards emanating from their property.

The municipal by-law requiring snow clearing did not impose civil liability or displace the municipality's statutory duty under the Municipal Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a municipality's road-closing by-laws and related dealings with an adjoining landowner near Lake Ontario.

He alleged the segmented by-laws were used to avoid ministerial approval for closing a road leading to a lake and argued that a perpetual grading easement was effectively a sale that had to be offered to him as the abutting owner.

The court rejected both arguments, finding no evidentiary foundation for allegations of bad faith and holding that the easement did not trigger statutory sale rights.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondents to the motion sought to quash an appeal on the basis that an order transferring a statutory proceeding under the Mining Act to the Superior Court of Justice was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that the transfer order finally disposed of the application brought under s. 107 of the Mining Act and was therefore a final order within s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the reasoning in Buck Bros. and the Hendrickson line of authority, the court concluded that the real matter in dispute in the court proceeding was whether the statutory proceeding should be transferred.

The motion to quash was dismissed with costs.

The appellant dentist appealed an order striking his statement of claim against counsel retained by the professional regulator in disciplinary proceedings.

The Court of Appeal majority held that novelty was not a basis to strike a malicious prosecution claim at the pleading stage and that the pleaded civil conspiracy claim should also stand.

Although the pleadings were poorly drafted, the majority concluded the matter should proceed to trial, leaving the trial judge to assess the various claims on the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and the motion to strike was dismissed with costs to the appellant here and below.

The appellant province appealed a judgment concerning the designation of First Nations bands as delivery agents under the Ontario Works Act.

The Court of Appeal resolved the dispute narrowly by declaring that, in light of the 1965 Welfare Agreement, the minister's powers under s. 38 had to be exercised with the consent of the band.

The court set aside the judgment below, established a process by which bands could indicate non-consent and obtain immediate revocation of designation, and left existing designations temporarily in place pending that choice.

The court expressly declined to determine the broader constitutional issues addressed below.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law amending the designated area for adult entertainment parlours, arguing that the amendment was unlawful because the substituted area was not zoned to permit the use.

The court held that while the municipality could amend its licensing by-law to abrogate existing rights, it could not do so in a manner that effectively prohibited the licensed activity throughout the municipality.

The court rejected the argument that adult entertainment was an accessory use to a restaurant and held that the availability of rezoning, or the fact that another property had been rezoned, did not cure an otherwise prohibitory by-law.

The appeal was allowed, the injunction was set aside, and the by-law was declared void to the extent it changed area designations in a prohibitory manner.

No costs were awarded here or below.

In a complex Indigenous land claim involving multiple summary judgment motions and overlapping appeals, the moving party sought to quash an appeal by one Crown respondent and a cross-appeal by another.

The court held that, because the motions below were heard together on a single record and the issues were interrelated, the provincial Crown had standing to appeal despite not bringing its own motion below.

The court also held that the federal Crown had standing to cross-appeal and that any complaint that it was advancing a new argument went to the merits, not to the validity of the cross-appeal.

Both motions to quash were dismissed with costs.