Administrative Law - OCA

The appellant lawyer was found guilty of professional misconduct by a Law Society Hearing Panel for sexually harassing a client and an employee.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the appellant denying all allegations.

The Hearing Panel's decision was overturned by the Appeal Panel but reinstated by the Divisional Court.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Hearing Panel's reasons were so inadequate as to foreclose meaningful appellate review.

The reasons consisted of generic generalities, unexplained conclusory observations, and failed to articulate any analysis of the appellant's evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision quashing a by-law that authorized a licence agreement for a jet boat tour operator to use a municipal dock.

The application judge had found the by-law contravened the Planning Act because the use did not conform to the Official Plan's 'Conservation' designation and was not a legal non-conforming use.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jet boat operation was a legal non-complying use under the Official Plan, as it was lawfully established by a prior by-law before the Plan was adopted.

The Court also found the licence agreement was not an unlawful disposition of land and did not create an illegal monopoly.

The Minister assessed the respondent for unremitted retail sales tax on the basis that she was a director of her brother's company.

The respondent was never a director and had no involvement with the company, but missed the time limits to object to the assessment under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

She obtained a declaration from the Superior Court that she was not a director and not liable for the tax.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the respondent could have raised a due diligence defence under the Act and that disputes concerning the validity of an assessment must be resolved within the statutory framework, not through an application for declaratory relief.

The appellant taxpayer obtained a declaratory judgment that it was not required to pay retail sales tax on rented wooden pallets because they did not fall within the definition of 'returnable container' under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

In response, the legislature retroactively amended the Act to broaden the definition.

The Minister successfully moved for a determination that the retroactive amendment applied to the appellant's outstanding tax assessment appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, holding that there is no exception to the general application of valid retroactive legislation for 'adjudicated rights' where the prior declaration merely interpreted the former law.

The appellant applied to amend a municipal by-law schedule to permit a second adult entertainment parlour location.

The City refused the application because the proposed location abutted a residential property, contrary to the by-law.

The appellant appealed, alleging bad faith, misinterpretation of 'residence', and procedural unfairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no bad faith, agreeing the abutting property was a residence despite being unoccupied during renovations, and concluding a full hearing would not have changed the outcome.

The appellants, landlords in Oshawa, appealed a judgment ordering them to cease using their properties as lodging houses.

They argued their properties operated as single dwelling establishments for groups of tenants, primarily students.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the properties were rented on a room-by-room, short-term basis, functioning as lodging houses rather than single housekeeping establishments.

The court also rejected the argument that s. 35(2) of the Planning Act precluded considering the relationship among renters.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for a declaration that the City of Toronto was deemed to have consented to the demolition of three heritage buildings because it failed to decide the application within the 90-day period under s. 34(2) of the Ontario Heritage Act.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the parties had agreed to extend the time period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's conclusion was reasonable and entitled to deference, as the appellant's communications indicated a willingness to wait for the City's decision.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus regarding a prison transfer.

He argued that the Warden's reasons for ordering the transfer were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that, although the reasons could have been better, the appellant knew he was being transferred due to security concerns triggered by an altercation with his cell mate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents sought to be registered as Indians under s. 6(1)(a) of the Indian Act, arguing that the 1952 Order-in-Council enfranchising their ancestor was obtained by fraud.

The Registrar refused the application, registering the ancestor under s. 6(1)(d) instead, which precluded the descendants from registration.

The Superior Court allowed the respondents' appeal, finding the Registrar could look behind the Order-in-Council.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Registrar and the Superior Court lack jurisdiction to invalidate or look behind a subsisting Order-in-Council, as exclusive jurisdiction to review such federal orders rests with the Federal Court.

The appellants were convicted of four offences under the Building Code Act related to constructing a building without a permit and ignoring stop-work orders.

They appealed, arguing a permit had been issued and never revoked, and that the fourth conviction violated the rule against multiple convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a permit was issued, the municipality effectively revoked it under s. 8(10) of the Act when it returned the application due to non-payment.

The court also held the fourth conviction was based on continued construction on a different date, so the rule against multiple convictions did not apply.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition on charges of receiving secret commissions and fraud, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to Hong Kong.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence that he failed to disclose the commissions to his employer or that they were paid in consideration for any act.

He also argued that the delay in commencing extradition proceedings prejudiced his right to a fair trial and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding sufficient evidence to support the committal and concluding that the Minister's decision was reasonable.

A journalist made a freedom of information request for anonymized data from police databases to investigate racial profiling.

The police refused, arguing that extracting the data required creating a new algorithm, which meant the requested information was not a 'record' under s. 2(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The adjudicator ordered the police to respond to the request, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the adjudicator's order, holding that where requested information can be produced from an institution's existing computer software by means of technical expertise normally used by it, it constitutes a record under the Act.

The Ontario Review Board appealed a costs order made against it by an application judge following a successful application by the respondent to quash an adjournment order made by the ORB.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the application judge applied the wrong test.

The Court held that the test for awarding costs against the ORB should be at least as stringent as the test for awarding costs against the Crown in criminal matters, requiring a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards, which was not met in this case.

The respondent campground owner challenged the inclusion of third-party owned, seasonally-used trailers in its property tax assessment.

The application judge held that the trailers did not form part of the 'current value' of the land because they were not part of the fee simple.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the term 'fee simple' in the definition of 'current value' does not limit assessment to interests owned by the freehold owner, and that the trailers were properly assessed as land.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal, finding the tax was direct and constitutionally valid.

The appellant appealed from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board holding that he continued to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not ordering a further review within six months and by keeping him in a medium secure unit despite his progress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the treating psychiatrist did not definitively recommend a six-month review and the Board's decision to maintain medium security was reasonable given ongoing concerns about elopement and potential reoffending.

The Maitland Valley Conservation Authority and the Attorney General for Ontario sought leave to appeal a Provincial Court decision dismissing a prosecution against the respondents for constructing a building on a swamp without written permission.

The respondents had obtained a building permit from the municipality, and the Provincial Court judge found they could successfully assert the defence of officially induced error.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the legal effect of a building permit as a defence to prosecution under another Act raises a question of law of broad public significance.

The appellant teachers' union appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an arbitrator's award regarding the interpretation of a wage freeze provision under the Social Contract Act.

The Divisional Court had held that the arbitrator was bound by a previous Court of Appeal decision that upheld a different arbitrator's conflicting interpretation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that its previous decision only determined that the prior arbitrator's interpretation was not patently unreasonable, not that it was the only correct interpretation.

The Court found that the current arbitrator's interpretation was also not patently unreasonable and reinstated the award.

The appeal concerned whether a municipality widening a road and installing a continuous centre median was required under s. 298(1) of the Municipal Act to provide another means of access to a commercial property whose direct left-turn access was restricted but not entirely eliminated.

The court held that s. 298(1) applies only where the effect of the by-law is to deprive the landowner of the only means of ingress and egress to the highway.

A mere limitation on access, even if commercially significant, does not trigger the statutory right to alternate access.

The respondents' remedy was confined to compensation for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act.

The appeal was allowed and the declaratory relief was set aside.

The appellants, two psychiatrists, appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside a Consent and Capacity Board finding.

The Board had found the respondent, who suffers from bipolar affective disorder, incapable of making his own treatment decisions regarding psychiatric medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was capable of understanding the relevant information and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The Court emphasized that the respondent's refusal was based on a rational evaluation of the medication's negative impact on his scientific research, and that his decision, even if against his best interests, was protected by the Health Care Consent Act and section 7 of the Charter.

The appellants sought a stay of a declaration that their restaurant and lounge violated the City's zoning by-law, pending their appeal of that decision.

The effect of the stay would be to adjourn an expedited trial on remedy issues (whether to permanently enjoin the operation).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the appellants failed to establish a serious issue to be adjudicated or irreparable harm, as their business operations had not changed and any harm would be purely economic.

The balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the expedited trial so all issues could be heard in a single appeal.