OCA 2026

The appellant developer sought a declaration that a COVID-19 emergency regulation extending limitation periods also extended the 36-month deadline in a City of Toronto by-law for submitting a building permit application after receiving a demolition permit, which would have entitled the appellant to a development charge reduction of $6.7 million.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the by-law deadline was not a limitation period within the meaning of the regulation.

The Court of Appeal found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal of his appeal from convictions under the Highway Traffic Act after failing to pursue the appeal for many years.

He argued that the delay resulted from the court’s failure to produce a transcript he claimed to have ordered when filing his notice of appeal.

The appellate court accepted for purposes of the appeal that the transcript may have been ordered but held that the appellant nevertheless bore the responsibility to pursue the appeal with due diligence.

A delay of approximately 17 years without steps to follow up on the transcript did not meet the due diligence requirement.

The court found no error in the appeal judge’s decision dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his two-year sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He introduced fresh evidence detailing exceptionally harsh custodial conditions, including prolonged triple-bunking and extended lockdowns, which exacerbated his mental health vulnerabilities.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence fit but admitted the fresh evidence, concluding that the cumulative impact of the custodial conditions materially increased the punitive effect of the sentence.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was varied to time served followed by a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of his wife, arguing that bad character evidence was improperly admitted and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to it.

The impugned evidence included a 'list of lies' the appellant wrote regarding his affair and an internet bookmark about compulsive lying.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the evidence should not have been admitted, the trial judge's strong limiting instructions prevented any miscarriage of justice.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that trial counsel made reasonable tactical decisions and that the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of planning and deliberation.

Four organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the certification of a class action against the Province of Ontario and 49 Children's Aid Societies regarding the use of 'Birth Alerts'.

The appeal engages the continued application of the Ragoonanan principle, which requires a representative plaintiff to have a cause of action against each defendant.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to the Class Action Clinic and Women of Class, and granted leave on limited issues to the Ontario Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, finding their perspectives would be useful to the court.

The appellant purchasers appealed a judgment enforcing a limitation of liability clause in a pre-construction condominium agreement of purchase and sale that restricted their damages for the respondent developer's breach to the return of deposits with interest.

The appellants argued the clause was unconscionable, contrary to the consumer protections of the Tarion Addendum, and that the respondent should have brought it to their attention.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the appellants were sophisticated purchasers represented by counsel who negotiated significant changes to the agreement, and that the Tercon analysis provided an effective safeguard against abuse of limitation clauses.

The appellant challenged a decision declining to enforce a pre‑marriage agreement and ordering an equalization payment following the parties’ separation.

The application judge concluded the document did not qualify as a valid domestic agreement under the Family Law Act and, in any event, should be set aside under s. 56(4).

The agreement was found to be unclear, failing to identify the property to which it applied or address equalization, and the respondent did not understand its nature and consequences.

The Court of Appeal held these findings were open to the application judge on the evidentiary record and were supported by credibility assessments.

No error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding factual error was established.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for firearm and drug-related offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the impact of incarceration on his relationship with his children and resulting family separation.

The appellant requested a modest three‑month reduction from the imposed four‑year sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge was aware of the appellant’s parental status and the inevitable interruption to family relationships caused by incarceration.

The court found no error in principle and concluded that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed a Family Court order compelling compliance with prior security-for-costs and costs orders in ongoing family proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction because the order was a final Family Court order made only under provincial legislation, engaging s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court emphasized that such appeals lie to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

It also noted procedural options to avoid delay where jurisdictional transfer issues arise, including consent transfer orders or motions to quash.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons by failing to adequately resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficiently demonstrated he had seized the substance of the issue and properly assessed the core events.

However, on consent of the Crown, the Court stayed the sexual assault conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle due to its factual and legal nexus with the sexual interference conviction.

On a motion concerning appellate jurisdiction, the court held that paragraph one of an order dated June 20, 2025 was interlocutory and did not prevent the respondents from relying on prior findings made in related proceedings.

Because the order was interlocutory, the appeal could not proceed and was quashed.

The court awarded costs of the motion to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.01 order dismissing his action concerning the respondent's mortgage.

The court held the action raised no valid issue and found the motion judge's reasons were thorough.

No error warranting appellate intervention was established.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed to the respondent.

The proposed intervener brought a motion for leave to intervene in a criminal appeal concerning the use of facial recognition technology and the taking of a photograph by police in a public place.

The Crown did not oppose intervener status but sought to limit the scope of the intervention.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene, permitting submissions on section 8 of the Charter and facial recognition technology, but restricted the intervener from introducing academic literature as evidence or advancing arguments about racial bias that were not part of the trial record.

The appeal concerned a dispute over interpretation of a will and administration of testamentary trusts.

The appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation and sought appellate intervention on factual, legal, and discretionary grounds.

The court found no palpable and overriding error, no error of law, and no error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

On costs, the court directed that one trust absorb the corporate respondent's costs and the appellant's personal costs on a full indemnity basis without recoupment from the appellant personally due to an arguable ambiguity in the will.

The appellant sought to reduce a global nine-year sentence for armed robbery-related offences by relying on fresh evidence of pre-sentence custody lockdowns and triple bunking.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but held that harsh-custody mitigation required evidence of actual impact, which was not provided.

Applying the governing approach to custody conditions as a mitigating factor within overall fitness analysis, the panel found no error in principle and no demonstrable unfitness.

Given the appellant’s extensive robbery record, parole status at the time of the offences, and the already low-end fit sentence for armed robbery, a reduction would have made the sentence unfit.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion, arguing the respondent's claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 rather than the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court held the claim, as pleaded, sought recovery of an interest in land or damages in lieu of that interest and therefore fell under the 10-year limitation period in the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court rejected new appellate arguments about contractual performance because those issues were not raised on the summary judgment motion.

It confirmed that an appeal from a failed summary judgment motion is not a vehicle for advancing fresh issues.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awards to both responding parties and costs to the appellant on the stay motion.

In a conviction appeal, the appellant sought production of a post-Hason Crown communication, plus a list of cases reviewed by the prosecution service concerning a forensic psychiatric expert and reasons for selection.

The court applied the two-step appellate production framework requiring a reasonable possibility the materials could assist a fresh-evidence motion and a reasonable possibility of eventual admissibility as fresh evidence.

It held the request was speculative, case-specific concerns from prior proceedings did not establish relevance in this record, and the requested internal review rationale was privileged.

The court further held that any standalone direction, divorced from justification, would not satisfy the relevance threshold.

The production motion was dismissed.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.