COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Huscroft, Gomery and Rahman JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Abdulrahman Abouzid
Appellant
Jeff Marshman, for the appellant
Stephanie A. Lewis, for the respondent
Heard: August 24, 2026
On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Martha Cook of the Superior Court of Justice, on February 26, 2025.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant appeals his conviction for sexual interference. We dismissed the appeal after hearing the appellant’s oral submissions. These are our reasons.
[2] The appellant did not testify at trial but his statement to police was tendered into evidence on consent. In the statement, the appellant denied that he and the complainant ever engaged in any sexual activity. He also claimed that the complainant told him she was 17 years old. She was in fact 13 years old.
[3] The trial judge rejected the appellant’s statement as internally inconsistent and contradicted by other reliable evidence. Although the trial judge described the complainant as an “accomplished and experienced liar” whose evidence could not be given much weight, she found that the appellant had engaged in sexual activity with the complainant on March 29, 2022 based on DNA and eyewitness evidence.
[4] The trial judge accepted the testimony of the complainant’s sister and mother that they each twice contacted the appellant before March 29 and each told him during one of these conversations that the complainant was 13 years old. She found that the Crown had proven that the appellant believed that the complainant was not at least 16 years of age or he was willfully blind to the information that he received as to the complainant’s age.
[5] The appellant contends that the trial judge erroneously said that the mother and sister’s evidence had “gone unchallenged” by him and that she was obliged, in her reasons, to explain why she found their testimony reliable and credible, despite other evidence supporting the mistake of age defence.
[6] We do not find the trial judge’s reasons inaccurate or deficient.
[7] The trial judge accurately characterized the mother and sister’s evidence about their conversations with the appellant. No evidence, or at least no reliable evidence, challenged it. In his statement to the police, the appellant did not directly deny that the conversations had occurred. His evidence was in any event found to be implausible. The mother and sister’s testimony about their phone calls to the appellant was not shaken in cross-examination. The complainant testified that she was present during one of the phone calls by her mother to the appellant and that her age was not mentioned. The mother testified, however, that she had two phone conversations with the appellant and mentioned the complainant’s age during only one of them. The complainant’s evidence, even if it had been accepted, did not contradict the mother’s evidence that she told the appellant the complainant’s age.
[8] The trial judge was not required to explain every minor inconsistency in the evidence nor respond to every argument raised. She was clearly alive to credibility issues. Her reasons focused on them. She reviewed the caselaw on point and explained why she found the appellant and complainant’s testimony generally untrustworthy.
[9] In the circumstances of this case, the trial judge was not obliged to give detailed reasons for finding the mother and sister’s evidence reliable. The defence made brief submissions in closing arguments that the sister was generally unworthy of belief based on alleged inconsistencies in her testimony on other issues. The trial judge was entitled to reject this argument without explanation. Given her earlier finding that the complainant was not a credible witness, she was likewise entitled to simply accept the mother’s evidence about the conversation witnessed by the complainant.
[10] The trial judge’s conclusion that the mother and sister’s evidence regarding the phone calls was reliable was a complete response to the defence submission that the appellant reasonably believed the complainant was 17 years old.
[11] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“S. Gomery J.A.”
“M. Rahman J.A.”
1This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.