COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Thorburn J.A. (Motion Judge)
BETWEEN
Hua Sui
Plaintiff (Appellant/Moving Party)
and
Attorney General of Ontario
Defendant (Respondent/Responding Party)
Hua Sui, acting in person
David Westcott and Taskeen Ahluwalia, for the respondent, Attorney General of Ontario
Heard: May 20, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION
BACKGROUND
1On December 1, 2025, Mr. Sui was convicted of an offence under the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 (“POA”), by a Justice of the Peace. On January 28, 2026, the appeal of his POA conviction (“the POA appeal”) was dismissed.
2On February 25, 2026, he brought a motion in the Superior Court seeking leave to commence an application to compel the Clerk of the Ontario Court of Justice to file his Notice of Appeal and prohibit any further steps to enforce the order under appeal until his Notice of Appeal of the POA Appeal was filed.
3His motion was denied on the basis that the Superior Court has no jurisdiction to issue such an order. No formal order was provided.
4Mr. Sui then served a Notice of Appeal of the Superior Court order to this Court. Because Mr. Sui was advised by the Superior Court that no formal order would be provided, he has been unable to perfect his appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT AND THE RESPONDENT’S POSITION
a. Relief Sought by Mr. Sui
5On this motion, Mr. Sui seeks an extension of time to perfect his appeal and an order dispensing with the requirement to file an issued and entered order, given that his request for a formal order was refused.
6He also seeks to validate service of the Notice of Appeal and his Certificate Respecting Evidence and dispense with the need for a transcript of the Civil Practice Court attendance before Myers J. on April 30, 2024.
b. The Attorney General’s response
7The respondent, the Attorney General of Ontario (“Ontario”), opposes Mr. Sui’s motion. Ontario submits that:
i. Mr. Sui’s proposed appeal is without merit; and
ii. is barred by s. 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, the provision that deals with vexatious litigant orders. Section 140(4)(e) expressly provides that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave such that Mr. Sui is not entitled to bring this appeal.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
a. There is no merit to the proposed appeal
8The test for an extension of time under rule 3.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, is whether the justice of the case requires that an extension be given. Likewise, rules 1.04(1) and 2.03 permit the court, where necessary in the interests of justice, to dispense with compliance with procedural requirements to secure the just determination of the proceeding on its merits.
9The relevant factors include the length and reason for the delay, prejudice to the responding party, the good faith intention to appeal, and the merits of the proposed appeal. Lack of merit alone is sufficient to deny the requested extension of time: Dale v. Toronto Real Estate Board, 2025 ONCA 476, at paras. 16-18, citing Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, 114 O.R. (3d) 636, at para. 15.
10Mr. Sui’s POA appeal was dismissed by the Ontario Court of Justice. He has not appealed that decision.
11Instead, he initiated a new proceeding in the Superior Court to compel the Clerk of the Ontario Court of Justice to file his Notice of Appeal nunc pro tunc and disallow her from taking further steps until the Notice of Appeal is filed from the conviction and dismissal of his appeal. It is the Superior Court order denying his request that he now seeks to appeal.
12There is no legal basis for the order Mr. Sui sought from the Superior Court, nor has any been articulated on this motion.
13For this reason alone, I would deny the motion for an extension of time to perfect the appeal and the related relief sought.
b. The effect of Mr. Sui having been declared a vexatious litigant
14Mr. Sui has twice been declared a vexatious litigant.
15On October 13, 2022, Mr. Sui was declared a vexatious litigant in the Divisional Court by Corbett J.
16On April 30, 2024, Mr. Sui was declared a vexatious litigant in the Superior Court by Myers J. In his endorsement, Myers J. held that:
I am very concerned that Mr. Sui uses serial proceedings to roll forward his issues in a new claim when stopped on a prior effort. This is classic vexatious litigant behaviour. If not stopped, Mr. Sui will continue this process ad nauseum as he reserves to himself the right to decide which orders he thinks are valid or not. This is much the same as the reason that led the Divisional Court to impose limits on his access to that court.
Like the Divisional Court I therefore, I order that Mr Sui may not commence or continue any civil proceedings in the Superior Court or obtain a fee waiver in respect to any matter in Superior Court, without prior permission from a triage judge of the Superior Court, Civil Team, or her designate. Such permission shall be sought by way of an email which, when printed on letter-sized paper in ordinary font, with ordinary margins, is no longer than ten pages, including attachments (but not including hyperlinked references to legal authorities). [Emphasis added.]
17The orders require Mr. Sui to obtain permission before commencing any proceedings in the Divisional Court or Superior Court.
18Mr. Sui has not appealed either of the two underlying decisions declaring him a vexatious litigant. Moreover, the steps Mr. Sui has taken are similar to those Myers J. described in declaring him a vexatious litigant: “Mr. Sui uses serial proceedings to roll forward his issues in a new claim when stopped on a prior effort. This is classic vexatious litigant behaviour.”
19Mr. Sui must seek leave before initiating a new proceeding, leave was denied, and no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave. This is a bar to any appeal from a refusal to grant leave: Hart v. Fullerton, 2021 ONCA 438, at para. 15, citing Chavali v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2007 ONCA 482, at paras. 4-5, leave to appeal refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 465.
20The two orders declaring Mr. Sui a vexatious litigant were made before the new rule 2.2 under O. Reg. 322/24 came into effect in October 2024.
21The new rule 2.2 enables a judge to issue a vexatious litigant order against a party in an ongoing proceeding on the judge’s own initiative and provides a comprehensive framework including a process to receive submissions from the potential subject of a vexatious litigant order.
22Because the orders were made before rule 2.2 came into effect, they were not made pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act nor did they follow the formal procedure allowing a judge to undertake the orders as set out in rule 2.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
23In these circumstances, there is some question as to whether s. 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act, which bars an appeal of a refusal of leave, applies or renders Mr. Sui’s proposed appeal meritless.
24In my view, whether the statutory bar to appealing technically applies or not, this appeal should be the subject of a review process by a panel of this court, pursuant to the rule 2.1, to consider whether this appeal should be dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. It appears, on its face, to constitute a continued effort by Mr. Sui to continue a vexatious proceeding.
25In this court, a determination under rule 2.1 to “stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court” must be done by a panel of this court: Damallie v. Ping, 2016 ONCA 603, at para. 17.
26I therefore direct the Registrar of this court to give notice in Form 2.1A to commence the rule 2.1 review process pursuant to which Mr. Sui will be permitted to file submissions to explain why his appeal should not be dismissed.
“Thorburn J.A.”