COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Tulloch C.J.O., Coroza and Madsen JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
K.C.
Appellant
K.C., acting in person
Sonya Shikhman, appearing as duty counsel
Kevin Rawluk, for the respondent
Heard: December 3, 2025
On appeal from the sentence imposed on November 18, 2024, by Justice Kofi N. Barnes of the Superior Court of Justice.
I. Overview
1The appellant operated a human trafficking scheme that victimized two young women aged 18 and 19.2 He manipulated the complainants into believing they were in a relationship with him. He then recruited them into the sex trade, controlled their finances and brutally assaulted them. He used coercive tactics to prevent their escape.
2The appellant was convicted of several offences, some of which were stayed pursuant to the principle in Kienapple v. R., 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.
3Ultimately, the appellant was sentenced on two counts of each of the following offences, in relation to each complainant: human trafficking (s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46); receiving a material benefit from human trafficking (s. 279.02(1)); assault with a weapon (s. 267(a)); assault causing bodily harm (s. 267(b)); utter threats (s. 264.1(1)(a)); and mischief (s. 430(4)).
4The Crown requested a global sentence of 20 years, reduced to 16 years based on the totality principle. Counsel for the appellant requested a global sentence of eight years.
5The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of 14 years. In arriving at this global sentence, the sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences of seven years for each of the human trafficking charges, to be served concurrently with the sentences for the remaining offences.3
6The appellant, with the assistance of duty counsel, seeks leave to appeal and appeals from this sentence. For the reasons that follow, I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.
II. Positions of the Parties
7The appellant’s overarching submission is that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was harsh and excessive. Duty counsel has expanded on this submission by making two related arguments.
8First, duty counsel submits that the sentencing judge underemphasized the fact that the appellant was subjected to anti-Black racism while growing up. According to duty counsel, this was a significant mitigating factor and the sentencing judge’s decision failed to give it adequate weight.
9Second, duty counsel submits that the sentencing judge’s methodology for arriving at a global 14-year sentence did not properly account for the moral blameworthiness of the appellant. Duty counsel argues that, despite social context evidence that mitigated the moral blameworthiness of the appellant, the sentencing judge still imposed consecutive sentences near the top end of the range for human trafficking offences.
10The respondent argues that the appellant has not identified any error in principle in the sentencing judge’s reasons. In the respondent’s view, the sentence imposed is fit and proportionate given the gravity of the appellant’s conduct.
III. Standard of Review
11Appellate courts must generally defer to sentencing judges’ decisions. This court may intervene to vary a sentence only if the sentence is demonstrably unfit or the sentencing judge made an error in principle. Errors in principle include errors of law, failure to consider relevant factors, and erroneous consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 26.
12An appellate court may only intervene if it is apparent from the sentencing judge’s reasons that the error in principle had an impact on the sentence: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 44. If an error in principle had no impact on the sentence, appellate intervention is justified only if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.
IV. Analysis
a. The Sentencing Judge Did Not Underemphasize the Mitigating Factor of Anti-Black Racism
13Duty counsel argues that the sentencing judge erred by underemphasizing the mitigating circumstances faced by the appellant in reaching a determination on sentence. I disagree.
14The weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to arrive at an appropriate individualized sentence is a difficult exercise. Sentencing judges, as judges of first instance, have an advantage over appellate judges in assessing and balancing these factors. For this reason, it is not enough for the appellant to argue on appeal that a mitigating factor was underemphasized or given no weight. Rather, a sentencing judge’s weighing and balancing of factors can form an error in principle only where, by overemphasizing one factor or failing to give sufficient weight to another, they exercise that discretion unreasonably: R. v. McKnight (1999), 1999 CanLII 3717 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.), at para. 35, cited in Friesen, at para. 26; see also Lacasse, at para. 49.
15I do not accept that the sentencing judge exercised his discretion unreasonably here. The sentencing judge’s reasons are detailed, sensitive and thorough. Respectfully, I see no support for duty counsel’s assertion that the sentencing judge ignored or afforded no weight to the evidence of anti-Black racism faced by the appellant.
16To the contrary, the sentencing judge referred extensively to the mitigating circumstances faced by the appellant, including that he was raised by a single mother, lacked a male role model growing up and experienced several incidents of racism in his life. The sentencing judge recognized that systemic discrimination had impacted the appellant deeply and contributed to him not graduating from high school and accruing a criminal record dating back to 1995. The sentencing judge specifically noted:
It is not shocking that in a short period, this young man did not graduate from high school and at an early age, he began to feel the impacts of systemic exclusion and unfair treatment. The constellation of factors i.e. an undirected childhood influenced by adults and criminal role models, and systemic racism manifesting itself in unfair treatment at school because of race shaped his activities including his criminal antecedents.
17After making these observations, the sentencing judge stated:
These comments do not excuse the behaviour, but it is important for the criminal justice system to recognize the link between systemic issues and certain types of criminal behaviour. This is not an excuse but an explanation of the context in which K.C. began his life.
18Significantly, the sentencing judge also described in detail the appellant’s attempts to break cycles of crime in his own life. The sentencing judge commented that the fact the appellant had shown resilience in the face of adversity “goes to show that his prospects for rehabilitation are good”.
19However, the sentencing judge was required to balance these mitigating factors against the aggravating ones, including the violent nature of these offences.
20The appellant’s treatment of these women was horrific. He beat them. He coerced them through threats, violence and property destruction. He even threatened their families. The violence was extreme. He broke the nose of one of his victims and fractured the rib of the other. These offences had significant, long-lasting effects on the complainants.
21In the end, while the sentencing judge recognized the anti-Black racism and other mitigating circumstances faced by the appellant as relevant factors to consider, he also had to contend with the seriousness of these offences and the aggravating circumstances surrounding them. He carefully balanced these considerations in reaching a determination on sentence. There is no basis to interfere with this determination. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
b. The Sentencing Judge Did Not Err in His Methodology
22Turning to the appellant’s second submission, duty counsel argues that the sentencing judge erred in his methodology by failing to properly account for the systemic racism faced by the appellant when assessing his moral blameworthiness. In making this submission, duty counsel relies on this court’s decision in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641.
23First, duty counsel argues that the sentencing judge erred by requiring the appellant to establish a connection between the offence and the systemic racism faced by the appellant. Duty counsel submits that this court in Morris explicitly stated that no such causal connection is required. Even if a nexus were required, such a connection did exist in this case.
24Second, duty counsel argues that, by imposing a sentence near the top of the relevant sentencing range, it can be inferred that the sentencing judge failed to apply Morris properly. In duty counsel’s submission, the fact that the sentencing judge identified the sentencing range for the human trafficking offences to be four to eight years, yet imposed a seven-year sentence for each human trafficking count, is clear and convincing evidence alone that the sentencing judge failed to assess the appellant’s moral blameworthiness in accordance with Morris.
25I do not accept these arguments.
26The principles outlined in Morris are clear. Social context evidence regarding the experiences of Black offenders can be an important consideration when assessing their moral blameworthiness. In turn, the offender’s moral blameworthiness must be balanced with the gravity of the offences committed by that offender.
27It is not disputed that, in Morris, this court held it an error to require a direct causal link between the commission of an offence and “the negative effects of anti-Black racism on the offender” in order for anti-Black racism to “be seen as mitigating personal responsibility”: at para. 96. However, the court also held that it is still necessary to establish “some connection between the overt and systemic racism identified in the community and the circumstances or events that are said to explain or mitigate the criminal conduct in issue”: at para. 97.
28Turning to the reasons for sentence here, I disagree that the sentencing judge erroneously imposed a requirement that the appellant establish a connection between the racism experienced by the appellant and the offences he committed, as argued by duty counsel. The sentencing judge explicitly recognized “[t]here is no need for an offender to establish a link between the experiences of racism and the offence that they have committed”.
29Moreover, reading his reasons as a whole, the sentencing judge did carefully assess the appellant’s moral blameworthiness through the Morris lens.
30At the outset of his reasons, the sentencing judge noted that the determination of a proportionate sentence is an “individualized process tailored to the gravity of the offence, the moral blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm caused by the criminal act”.
31The sentencing judge then went on to review the principles set out by this court in Morrisexhaustively and detailed the anti-Black racism personally experienced by the appellant.
32Then, at the end of his reasons, the sentencing judge explicitly blended all the sentencing objectives as part of a holistic determination on sentence. The sentencing judge ultimately rejected the Crown’s request for a 20-year sentence reduced to 16 years. Instead, the sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences of seven years on each count of human trafficking, concluding that “proportionality and totality will be satisfied by a global 14 year sentence”.
33I see no support for duty counsel’s assertion that the sentencing judge erred in his methodology. The sentencing judge’s reasons are faithful to this court’s guidance in Morris and he arrived at a sentence which, while high, was entirely fit given the seriousness of the offences committed.
34I also reject the submission that this court should read a Morris error into the sentencing judge’s reasons, based on his decision to sentence the appellant at what duty counsel submits is the high end of the range.
35Duty counsel’s submission rests on the premise that the sentencing judge was effectively capped at a sentence of eight years for human trafficking. I disagree. In my view, while the range of four to eight years was an important historical guideline for the sentencing judge to consider, sentencing ranges are not hard and fast rules.
36As recognized by the sentencing judge, “sentencing is an individualized process considering the particular circumstances of the offence and the offender”. The sentencing judge’s approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s commentary in Lacasse that sentencing ranges should serve as “guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives”, not “straightjackets”: at paras. 57-58. This is especially true considering the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in Friesen, where the court held that, as courts gain a better understanding of the impact of specific offences, sentencing ranges must be adjusted accordingly and upward departures from historical precedents may be justified: at para. 110.
37The sentence imposed in this case aligns with the recent jurisprudence of this court in human trafficking cases. For instance, in R. v. S.M., 2023 ONCA 417, leave to appeal refused, 40899 (December 14, 2023), the appellant was convicted of human trafficking and assault causing bodily harm against one complainant. The court ruled that “[t]he sentence that the trial judge imposed – five-and-a-half-years imprisonment […] – was at the lower end of the range for this type of offence”: at para. 28. Here, the appellant had two victims.
38In R. v. Burton, 2023 ONCA 44, the appellant was convicted of human trafficking and exercising control over two complainants aged 18 and 19 years old, and obstruction of justice for contacting one of the complainants after arrest. Like in this case, the appellant in Burton controlled the nature and cost of the complainants’ sexual services, the money they earned, and the food, cigarettes and alcohol they consumed. However, unlike in this case, he was not convicted of physically assaulting them.
39The appellant in Burton was sentenced to a total sentence of 10 and a half years, comprised in part of concurrent sentences of eight and a half years for each of the human trafficking convictions. The court found that this sentence “was fit and was within the range for similar offences”: at para. 15.
40The sentencing judge initially found a sentence of eight years to be appropriate for each count of human trafficking. It is the imposition of consecutive sentences that lengthened the overall sentence. However, after imposing what would have otherwise been a cumulative sentence of 16 years, the sentencing judge reduced each sentence for human trafficking to seven years, in consideration of the principles of proportionality and totality.4 This fortifies my conclusion that the cumulative sentence imposed did not exceed the culpability of the appellant, given the gravity of his offences.
41To put it bluntly, duty counsel’s fundamental argument is that the sentencing judge paid mere “lip service” to the Morrisdecision, based largely on the fact that the appellant’s sentence fell towards the upper end of the range.
42The problem with this submission is that it invites this court to reason backwards from the sentence imposed in search of an error not otherwise shown. This does not account for the deference owed to sentencing judges. It also comes perilously close to the notion that a finding of anti-Black racism in the community automatically requires a lowered sentence. The court in Morrisexplicitly rejected this proposition, at para. 97:
Absent some connection, mitigation of sentence based simply on the existence of overt or institutional racism in the community becomes a discount based on the offender’s colour. Everyone agrees there can be no such discount. [Citations omitted.]
43I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
V. Conclusion
44Sentencing judges are obliged to provide reasons that explain what they have decided and why. The reasons here disclose the path the sentencing judge took to reach his decision on sentence. The sentencing judge recognized the disadvantages faced by the appellant, including his experience with anti-Black racism and his need for rehabilitation. But, in the end, these considerations did not overtake other objectives of sentencing: denunciation and deterrence. The sentencing judge accounted for proportionality and totality and reduced the sentence accordingly. There is no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge’s careful and reasoned approach to this difficult exercise.
VI. Disposition
45For these reasons, I would grant leave to appeal sentence but dismiss the appeal. The court is indebted to Ms. Shikhman and the pro bono inmate duty counsel program for their assistance.
Released: July 30, 2026 “M.T.”
“S. Coroza J.A.”
“I agree. M. Tulloch C.J.O.”
“I agree. L. Madsen J.A.”
Footnotes
- This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
- The sentencing judge erroneously described one of the complainants as being 17 years of age at the time of the offences. She was in fact 18. This error does not affect the disposition of the appeal.
- The sentencing judge also imposed several ancillary orders which were unopposed. However, he declined to make an order under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, which was contested.
- The sentencing judge followed the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 201, at paras. 91-92.