OCA 2015

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside his guilty plea to aggravated assault, arguing the plea was not unequivocal and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge had found the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that trial counsel was effective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge and finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice arising from his trial counsel's conduct.

The appellants were convicted of administering a stupefying thing to enable sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two complainants.

They appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on evidence of the complainants' out-of-character conduct, misapprehended toxicological evidence, and improperly used post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and three years' probation imposed on a 20-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a dwelling house.

The offender set fire to a carport over a drug debt, which spread to an attached home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred a causal link between the offender's mental health issues and the offence, and correctly weighed mitigating factors including his youth, guilty plea, and rehabilitation prospects.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, assault with a weapon, uttering a threat, and failure to comply with probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and erred in assessing identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the eyewitness identification alongside strong circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's post-offence conduct of hurriedly shaving his head to disguise his identity.

The court concluded the verdicts were supported by the evidence and were not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that acquitted a police officer of assault.

The trial judge had convicted the officer after finding that kicking a non-aggressive suspect twice constituted excessive force.

The appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the trial judge improperly required aggressive action as a pre-condition for police use of force.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly considered the suspect's lack of aggression as a contextual factor, not a pre-condition, and that the appeal judge failed to consider proportionality.

The conviction was restored and a conditional discharge was imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a restricted firearm, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to set aside his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.

He claimed he lacked the cognitive capacity to understand the pleas due to medical issues and that he received ineffective assistance from both his original trial counsel and the counsel who brought the application to set aside the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the 'limited cognitive capacity' test and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Crown appealed the refusal of a trial judge to make a DNA data bank order pursuant to s. 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code against a young person.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and issued the order sought by the Crown.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to make an explicit finding on the actus reus for the alleged assault, specifically whether the encounter with his father was non-consensual.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made no explicit finding that the fight was non-consensual, and the SCAC judge erred in concluding otherwise.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had objectively reasonable grounds for his arrest and in failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police had received a tip and observed the appellant making a series of short stops over two days.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the pattern of conduct, combined with the tip, removed the possibility of innocent coincidence and provided a credibly based probability of drug trafficking.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was terminated for cause after making violent threats to fellow employees.

He appealed, arguing his conduct was influenced by a mental disability and his termination violated the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer was unaware of the disability at the time of termination and fired him solely for workplace violence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the termination for just cause was upheld.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's analysis that the claim was utterly unmeritorious and found no error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to each appearing respondent.

The plaintiff was injured in a skiing accident and underwent a vocational assessment.

The defendant sought an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a further assessment by a vocational assessor of its choosing.

The motion judge granted the order, and the Divisional Court upheld it.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act does not occupy the field, and the Superior Court retains inherent jurisdiction to order an assessment by someone who is not a 'health practitioner' to ensure fairness and justice between the parties.

The appellant was convicted of a multi-million dollar fraud arising from an investment scheme.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a forensic accountant employed by the OSC should have been disqualified from testifying due to bias, and that his pre-trial Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was improperly dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's evidence was primarily factual tracing and his prior involvement did not automatically disqualify him.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the Rowbotham application, as the appellant had failed to be transparent about his financial resources.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in 1971 for the death of his common-law wife and served over three years in prison.

Decades later, fresh medical evidence from multiple pathologists concluded the deceased died of natural causes following a fall, contradicting the trial evidence of blunt force trauma.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the case to the Court of Appeal.

On a joint submission with the Crown, the Court admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the appellant was wrongly convicted.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting and using similar fact evidence by relying too heavily on generic similarities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly relied on specific similarities and correctly applied the law regarding the admissibility and use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The trial judge's discretionary determination was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's receipt being found in the complainant's stolen purse and the complainant's wallet being found near the appellant's residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational inference was the appellant's guilt.

The appellant applied for a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a private laneway behind its property.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the 20-year use was by licence rather than as of right.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no evidence to support the finding of permission.

The court held that the continuous, open, and uninterrupted vehicular use of the laneway for over 20 years raised an inference of acquiescence by the servient owner, shifting the evidentiary burden to the respondent to prove permission.

As no such evidence was adduced, the appeal was allowed and the easement declared.

The appellant creditor sought a declaration that the bankrupt's judgment debt survived his discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the bankrupt owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant, even though he had breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 178(1)(d) applies only if the bankrupt owed a fiduciary duty directly to the creditor seeking the declaration.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral reasons released on April 24, 2015, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

On consent of counsel, the Court added a declaration that the appellant is the sole surviving spouse of the deceased and is entitled to receive all surviving spouse pension benefits from the respondent benefit administrators corporation.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order requiring a private corporation to disclose documents to a bankruptcy trustee and requiring two directors to submit to oral examinations under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trustee required the information to value the bankrupt's shares in the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no prima facie merit to the argument that the trustee's powers under s. 164 did not extend to such disclosure, and concluding that an appeal would unduly hinder the progress of the bankruptcy proceedings.