OCA 2015

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents for damages related to his HIV infection, which he alleged was linked to a sponsorship undertaking given to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding exceptions to the limitation period raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidence establishing a causal link between the government's actions and the appellant's infection.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepsister and sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility, evaluating the reliability of the complainant's evidence, and treating the evidence of the complainant's mother.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that despite the conduct being at the lower end of the range, the blatant breach of trust and multiple assaults justified the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury, arguing that the Crown made an inappropriate comment during closing submissions and that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that there is a presumption in law that a witness comes to court to tell their honest recollections.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Crown's comment was inappropriate, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court also held that the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice the appellant, as both the appellant and the complainant testified, and the jury was properly instructed on the factors for assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that a specific incident occurred later than the trial judge had found.

Because the trial judge had relied on the erroneous chronology to distinguish the count on which he convicted from those on which he acquitted, the distinction disappeared.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions and nine-year sentence for drug trafficking and forgery arising from a prescription fraud scheme.

The Crown conceded she should be acquitted of two trafficking counts, and the court stayed two forgery counts under the Kienapple principle.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the jointly submitted nine-year sentence manifestly unfit despite the seriousness of the offence, citing the appellant's youth, lack of record, cooperation with police, and the fact that a more culpable co-accused received the same sentence.

The sentence was reduced to six years.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that directed a conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred by focusing on whether the arresting officer actually knew a test result was reliable, rather than whether the officer's belief was reasonable.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the appropriate remedy was a new trial, not a directed conviction, because a trial judge could conclude the officer's belief was unreasonable given his reliance on a rookie officer whose training was unknown.

The appeal was allowed in part, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the youth's acquittals for human trafficking and living on the avails of prostitution, while the youth cross-appealed his convictions for assault and breach of an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred by applying a subjective standard to the definition of exploitation and by concluding a single act could not constitute prostitution.

The youth's cross-appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's credibility findings and verdicts were reasonable.

A new trial was ordered on the trafficking and prostitution charges.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against a law firm and its partner, as well as the associated costs order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the pleadings did not properly allege conspiracy against the respondents and that the respondents owed no duty of care to the appellants, who were non-clients and opponents in litigation.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred in principle by awarding partial indemnity costs equal to the full amount of actual costs paid, and reduced the costs award by one third.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his failure to negotiate a curve and the testimony of witnesses in a trailing vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interpretation of the expert data was open to him and that he provided detailed, accurate reasons for rejecting the witness testimony as unreliable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own motion to quash and that there was no prejudice to the appellant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The applicants sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and leave to appeal from an order refusing to grant a charging order for a solicitor's lien and a salvage lien against a bankrupt's estate.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding a bona fide intention to appeal and no prejudice.

The Court also granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, finding that the proposed appeal raised issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice and was prima facie meritorious.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order terminating child and spousal support and requiring her to reimburse the respondent for overpayments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the termination of spousal support, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant had achieved self-sufficiency following an inheritance.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by failing to increase spousal support for the period after child support ended, and made several calculation errors regarding child support overpayments.

The appeal was allowed in part, adjusting the amounts owed between the parties.

The appellant was convicted in Jordan of murdering his ex-wife in the United States and served six and a half years of a 15-year sentence before being released under a general amnesty.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition from Canada to stand trial for the same murder.

The extradition judge committed the appellant, finding he lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant's double jeopardy claim, and the Minister of Justice ordered his surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review application, holding that the committal judge correctly identified the limits of his jurisdiction and that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable, as the United States did not participate in the Jordanian prosecution and the potential sentence of life without parole did not shock the conscience.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 4 years and 3 months for armed robbery, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's determination that a 5-year global sentence was appropriate given the significant planning and aggravating factors.

However, the Court found errors in the calculation of pre-disposition custody credit, specifically regarding a 3-week period prior to release and a 13-month period spent in custody on unrelated charges that were ultimately stayed.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced by 7 months to 3 years and 8 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for firearm offences.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made one factual error, it was not material to the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the Court agreed that the sentence for unauthorized possession should be concurrent, not consecutive, to the sentence for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The Court upheld the trial judge's calculation of presentence custody credit, noting the appellant's poor conduct in custody negated the quantitative rationale for enhanced credit.

The total sentence was reduced from six to five years.

The appellant was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon against his aunt and daughter, and sentenced to nine months' incarceration.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias by relying on cultural stereotypes, misapprehended evidence, and erred in relying on his daughter's KGB statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary findings.

While the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the Court upheld the nine-month sentence as fit.

Following the release of its decision on the appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the specific terms for the appellant's conditional sentence and probation.

The 14-month conditional sentence includes statutory conditions, a no-contact order, eight months of house arrest with exceptions, and a curfew for the remainder.

A one-year probation period follows with similar no-contact conditions.

The appellant appealed her convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and applied unbalanced scrutiny to her testimony compared to the Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while there was at least one factual error in the reasons, it did not amount to a material misapprehension of the evidence.

The sentence appeal on the obstruct police charge was deemed moot.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for arrears owing under three vehicle leases that had been assigned to the respondent.

The appellants argued that because they did not receive written notice of the lease assignments, the respondent was required to join the assignor as a party to the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the assignor perhaps should have been joined, the appellants had actual notice of the assignment and suffered no prejudice.

The Court also rejected arguments that the trial judge violated the collateral fact rule during cross-examination and erred in her credibility assessments.