OCA 2014

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondents for losses arising from unauthorized investment trading, arguing the action was barred by the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the modified objective test for discoverability.

The respondents cross-appealed to recover capital gains taxes incurred due to the unauthorized trading.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the claim for taxes was not a new cause of action but a claim for additional damages arising from the existing cause of action, and thus not statute-barred.

The appellant settled and abandoned its appeal on liability and damages, proceeding only on the issues of costs and pre-judgment interest against two respondents.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal the trial judge's costs decisions, finding no error in principle in declining to award costs of the first trial or substantial indemnity costs of the second trial.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding pre-judgment interest, which had been inadvertently omitted below, awarding interest at 4 percent from the date of conversion.

The appellant pled guilty to eight offences related to a large-scale ephedrine exportation business, including money laundering and tax evasion, and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a custodial sentence instead of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the custodial sentence was fit for a sophisticated, large-scale fraud enterprise.

The Crown appealed from a jury verdict acquitting the accused of sexual assault.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the accused's sexual fantasies about the complainant, allowing cross-examination of the complainant regarding prior sexual activity under section 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and inadequately charging the jury on the requirement to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent under section 273.2.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were reasonable and legally sound, and noting the jury charge used the exact, legally correct language suggested by the Crown at trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

At trial, the complainant's mother, who was a police officer, testified that she used trickery to obtain an admission from the appellant.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and found the mother was acting as a police officer, but no voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statement.

The Court of Appeal held that given the trial judge's finding that the mother was acting as a person in authority, a voir dire was required.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.

The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of fraud over $5,000 after persuading victims to give him money to invest, which was never returned.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his Charter application regarding alleged police misconduct without a voir dire, and by improperly assessing his father's defence evidence.

He also appealed his 12-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Kutynec threshold to the Charter application and made no error in assessing the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit for a large-scale fraud involving exploitation of relationships.

The applicant was convicted of speeding after mailing a notice of intention to appear that was received after the 15-day period stipulated on the Offence Notice.

The applicant sought leave to appeal, arguing that under Rule 4 of Regulation 200, the calculation of time meant his notice was filed on time, and that the Offence Notice failed to comply with the Provincial Offences Act by not specifying the manner of delivery.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal on these two grounds, finding they raised questions of law of general application concerning the calculation of time limits and the sufficiency of prescribed forms.

The appellant pleaded guilty to mischief and criminal harassment after distributing degrading emails and a naked photograph of his former intimate partner and a former co-worker.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment and a suspended sentence, seeking a conditional discharge and introducing fresh evidence of rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the appellant's positive prospects and time served, a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the serious nature of the offences and the need for denunciation.

The appellants appealed an order establishing a sale process for two corporations involved in an oppression remedy claim.

The motion judge ordered that the two corporations being sold could no longer be parties to the litigation to facilitate the sale.

The appellants argued this would cause tax prejudice, but the Court of Appeal found that any tax consequences could be addressed through expert calculation without flowing damages through the corporations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm possession and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on circumstantial and DNA evidence linking the appellant to a gun thrown from a room.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-trial custody at a ratio of 1.5 to 1, applying the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, which reduced the sentence by two months.

The appellant appealed a 5-year sentence for a drug offence.

The trial judge found the appellant was a trusted courier and not part of a criminal organization.

The co-accused, an active drug trafficker with a criminal record, received a 4-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the 5-year sentence offended the parity principle, noting the appellant was a youthful first offender.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 42 months.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding an estate dispute.

Both parties agreed the appeal should be allowed in part.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no bequest to the appellant of any interest in the cottage and the dismissal of her claim for damages.

However, the court found the motion judge erred by leaving the estate in limbo after the respondents were prepared to renounce being trustees.

The Court of Appeal modified the order to remove the respondents as trustees and appointed the appellant as trustee, with conditions on disposing of real property.

The respondents were ordered to pass accounts, and the appellant was ordered to return a bracelet and ring to the estate.

Costs of the motion below were fixed at $12,500 for the respondents, with no costs for the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 19(1.2)(a).

The appellants appealed a decision finding that a retaining wall encroaching on a right of way did not create a substantial obstruction to their rights under a 1916 grant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's findings were well-supported by the evidence and owed deference.

The respondents' cross-appeal seeking leave to appeal the denial of costs at the application stage was also dismissed, as there was no error in principle.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to bring a section 11(b) Charter application for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court also held that the appellant failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, as a section 11(b) application would not have had a reasonable chance of success given the periods of defence delay.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 17 months and 14 days' custody, along with a forfeiture order for his van, cellular phone, and cash.

He appealed the sentence and the forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding it fit given the appellant's record and the fact he was on bail for the same offence.

However, the Court set aside the forfeiture order, concluding the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the van, phone, or cash were offence-related property, as there was no evidence linking them to the commission of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two pounds of the drug were found in her luggage upon returning from Panama.

She appealed her conviction and four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her credibility and seeking to admit fresh evidence of photographs to corroborate her story.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it related to a non-essential aspect of her testimony.

The conviction and sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in his credibility assessment and the sentence was within the acceptable range.

The appellant school board appealed an order requiring it to indemnify the respondent employee for legal costs incurred during a workplace investigation into alleged expense fraud.

The employee's contract contained an indemnity clause for costs related to any 'proceeding', excluding cases of dishonesty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prima facie evidence of dishonesty was presented, the merits of the allegations were for arbitration, and the formal workplace investigation constituted a 'proceeding' under the broad wording of the contract.

The respondent, a licensed horse trainer, injected a performance-enhancing drug into a horse before a race.

He was acquitted at trial of fraud and cheating while playing a game.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by concluding the betting public was not at risk of deprivation, as bettors are entitled to rely on compliance with the regulatory scheme.

The trial judge also erred in finding horse racing is a game of pure skill without considering if it is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The acquittals for fraud were set aside and convictions entered, while a new trial was ordered for the cheating charges.