OCA 2014

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a 2005 settlement for the sale of shares, arguing he lacked mental capacity to consent and instruct counsel at the time.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to prove lack of capacity, lack of instructions, the respondents' awareness of any incapacity, or that the settlement was unfair.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to award the appellant interest on the $700,000 purchase price, as the respondents had the benefit of the appreciating shares in the intervening years.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion regarding compliance with a court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the motion judge's factual finding that while compliance was imperfect, there was no deliberate or wilful violation of the order.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it could not go behind findings made in earlier proceedings and agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants' claims had no potential merit.

The appeal was dismissed with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was arrested without a warrant for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police received tips from confidential informants and observed him discarding a digital scale with cocaine residue.

A frisk search yielded cellphones and money but no drugs, prompting a strip search at the police station which uncovered drugs hidden between his buttocks.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest and the decision to strip search were lawful.

However, the Court found that the strip search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating section 8 of the Charter, because the door was left open, the search was videotaped without consent, and the appellant was not given the option to remove the drugs himself.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

Prior to the hearing, the appellants notified the respondent that they were withdrawing their appeal and subsequently failed to appear in court.

The Court of Appeal noted the withdrawal in its endorsement.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its claim on the basis that it was barred by a broadly worded release from a 1996 action settlement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim related to the lands referred to in the release.

Furthermore, the court found that the appellant was an affiliate or associate of the releasing party due to the common control of both entities by the same individual.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, unlawful confinement, robbery, and use of an imitation firearm after a victim died from suffocation when her face was covered in duct tape during a robbery.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing his Corbett application to exclude his prior robbery convictions.

He also appealed his 18-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he knew his actions put the victim at risk of death, and that the sentence was outside the typical range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion on the Corbett application and that the sentence, while outside the normal range, was fit given the extreme gravity of the offence and the offender's high moral culpability.

The appellant sued the Crown for injuries sustained at a provincial park boat launch.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the tort action because the appellant failed to provide the required 10-day notice under section 7(3) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

On appeal, the appellant argued that strict compliance was not required and sought leave to amend the claim to plead breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislature did not intend a flexible approach to the notice periods under the Act, and that the proposed contractual claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant, a successful bidder on a federal dam construction contract in Quebec, sued the federal Crown in Ontario for negligent misstatement and breach of contract.

The motion judge struck the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding the contract claim arose in Quebec and the tort claim was extinguished by the contract's general conditions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the motion judge applied the correct test to determine where the substance of the claim arose and correctly interpreted the contract as providing an exclusive mechanism for resolving claims.

Following a judgment awarding the respondents their costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity scale, the court reviewed the parties' written submissions.

The court fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $45,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

Following a successful appeal, the parties were unable to resolve the costs of the motion below.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the motion below at $4,500 in favour of the appellants, payable out of the proceeds of the sale of the property, noting that much of the time claimed related to necessary housekeeping matters regarding the sale.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on accomplice evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his designation as a dangerous offender, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and ample evidence to support the verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as medical evidence supported the finding that the appellant was not amenable to treatment, justifying the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant applied to rescind an order dismissing his appeal of a dangerous driving conviction as abandoned, and to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that he was misinformed by trial counsel regarding the length of his licence suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that the guilty plea was part of a broader plea bargain involving other charges.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant applying to set aside all of his convictions, as the interests of justice require a full consideration of the entire plea bargain.

The respondents successfully sued the appellants in a jury trial for negligence after a glass Dutch oven shattered, causing severe injuries.

The jury found the appellants 75% liable for failing to adequately warn of the dangers associated with the product.

On appeal, the appellants argued the claim against one defendant was statute-barred, the jury's causation finding lacked an evidentiary basis, and the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the limitation period and liability, finding the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $25,000 aggravated damages award due to an erroneous jury instruction.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference based on the testimony of his sister, who was 19 at trial but testified about abuse that occurred when she was between 7 and 17.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made two principal legal errors: assessing the adult complainant's evidence as if she were a child witness, and characterizing an admitted exaggeration under oath at the preliminary inquiry as a 'badge of credibility'.

A new trial was directed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, challenging the scope of a no-contact provision that included the Toronto Star.

The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to justify the continued inclusion of the Toronto Star in the condition, noting the appellant's history of threatening and harassing behaviour targeting media agencies.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to minor modifications proposed by the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing the action against the respondent vehicle owner.

The driver, who was impaired and caused a fatal accident, admitted he did not have the owner's consent to drive the vehicle.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by applying a purely subjective test for implied consent and by not directing a trial of the issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered all evidence and credibility, and correctly concluded he could resolve the dispute on summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a decision granting an application for certiorari to quash a subpoena issued to Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that motions raising trial-related matters should generally be heard by the trial court absent special circumstances.

On the merits, the Court agreed with the motion judge that there was no demonstration the proposed witness was likely to give material evidence, though the appellant was not precluded from raising the issue again at trial.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his application to re-open a sending order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA).

The application judge had treated the application as a Wilson application and dismissed it, finding no material non-disclosure in the original ex parte proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction under s. 35 of the MLACMA to hear an appeal from a Wilson order, as such an order is made pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction, not under the Act.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeals from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals as abandoned.