OCA 2014

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim to set aside property transactions made by his late father.

The father had originally placed a residential property in joint tenancy with the appellant, but later severed the joint tenancy and transferred his half-interest to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the initial joint tenancy did not constitute an irrevocable inter vivos gift, and that the subsequent severance and transfer were not the result of undue influence by the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and uttering death threats, as well as his four-year sentence.

He argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to oppose the admission of the deceased complainant's preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant had declined the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant at the preliminary inquiry and had agreed with his counsel's advice at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered all principles, and rehabilitation played no significant role given the appellant's lack of remorse and prior record.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to exercise discretion against the designation and in finding he did not qualify as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly assessed the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, his extensive criminal history, and the lack of a reasonable possibility that his risk could eventually be controlled in the community.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The Crown brought a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal of the respondent's acquittals.

The proposed appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a post-judgment conversation between the trial judge and the investigating officer.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that although the Crown initially pursued the wrong remedy, there was an arguable appeal on the merits and no undue prejudice to the respondent.

The interests of justice favoured allowing the appeal to proceed.

The moving party, a mental health centre, brought a motion to suspend a placement decision of the Ontario Review Board pending appeal.

The respondent, a dual status offender, was ordered by the Board to be transferred from a federal penitentiary to the mental health centre.

The moving party argued that the transfer posed a safety risk and that the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the test for suspending a placement decision is whether the moving party has shown a compelling reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's decision concerning the mental condition of the accused.

The moving party failed to meet this heavy burden.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a street fight in which the victim was fatally stabbed.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to reliance on unreliable eyewitness evidence identifying her as the person who brought the knife to the fight, and that the trial judge misapprehended exculpatory evidence by failing to consider other participants as the possible stabber.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the frailties of eyewitness identification, his factual findings were amply supported by the evidence, and he did not misapprehend the evidence regarding alternate suspects.

The appellant appealed a family law judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in handling a child's statement regarding inappropriate sexual conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the Children's Aid Society had fully investigated the concerns and closed its file.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence relating to events after the original order, advising the appellant to bring a motion to change if circumstances had altered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically DNA found on bandanas and a police baton seized from the appellant's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdicts were not unreasonable.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to make a two-year sentence for weapon possession concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the net sentence to five years and four months.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee by transferring him from Vice President of Operations to Purchasing Manager.

The trial judge awarded 24 months' notice and found the employee was not required to mitigate by accepting the new role.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constructive dismissal finding and the notice period.

On mitigation, the Court held that while the principle of efficient breach might apply, the employer failed to trigger the mitigation duty because it did not offer the employee a clear opportunity to work out the notice period after he claimed constructive dismissal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant's second degree murder conviction was previously set aside by the Court of Appeal and a manslaughter conviction was substituted.

The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the substituted manslaughter conviction.

Considering the appellant's level of culpability as a non-physical participant in the fatal stabbing, his youth, and the time he had already served in custody, the Court imposed a sentence of one day of imprisonment in addition to time served, plus one year of probation.

The appellant father appealed a trial costs order of $185,000, which the trial judge directed to be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) as 'lump sum spousal support'.

The father argued this was an error because spousal support was never claimed or litigated.

The Court of Appeal agreed that characterizing the costs as spousal support was an error, but upheld the trial judge's intention that the costs be enforced by the FRO, as child support was a live issue at trial.

The Court amended the order to characterize the costs simply as 'support'.

The father's other grounds of appeal regarding the quantum of costs and procedural fairness were dismissed.

The mother's motion to quash the appeal for the father's alleged failure to post proper security for costs was also dismissed.

The respondent was acquitted at trial of several driving offences causing death and bodily harm, with the trial judge finding reasonable doubt as to whether the respondent or his passenger was driving at the time of the fatal collision.

The Crown appealed the acquittals, arguing the trial judge made errors of law in his treatment of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended key eyewitness testimony and failed to consider the totality of the evidence, instead applying the reasonable doubt standard in a piecemeal fashion to individual pieces of evidence.

The appellant abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the appeal book, noting the abandonment and fixing the respondents' costs at $4,000 all inclusive.

The applicant, an anesthesiologist convicted of sexually assaulting 21 female patients during surgery, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal against conviction.

He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The grounds of appeal were deemed weak and unlikely to succeed, and the need for immediate enforcement of the judgment outweighed the need for review given the seriousness of the offences.

The application was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant applied to review two orders: one fixing the date for his appeals and another dismissing his application for the appointment of specific counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had previously dismissed or refused to cooperate with three appointed counsel, leading to the appointment of amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications, finding that the appointment of amicus was appropriate to control the court's process and prevent further frustration of the proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention.

It was uncontested that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety, precluding an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's conclusion that a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition was fully supported by the evidence and free of legal error.

Fresh evidence indicated the appellant was incapable of consenting to treatment, making a conditional discharge unavailable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's conclusion that no binding agreement had been formed following negotiations, an offer, and a time-limited counter-offer.

The court held that the counter-offer expired by its own terms and was not accepted within the specified time.

Because there was no communication of acceptance before expiry, there was no meeting of the minds.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.