OCA 2014

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claims against former directors, officers, and consultants of a corporation in which he invested.

The motion judge found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant knew the material facts more than two years before asserting the claims and that the proposed amendments advanced new causes of action unconnected to the original pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claims for oppression and civil conspiracy against the respondents.

The appellants alleged the respondents unlawfully provided their share ownership information to a third party, leading to an injunction that froze their shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondents' conduct was not oppressive, there was no intent to injure to support a conspiracy claim, and the appellants suffered no damages because they had consented to the injunction.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a large marijuana grow operation discovered on his rural property, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on his silence at arrest and the absence of detail in parts of his testimony when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did err in drawing an adverse inference from the accused’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence and in relying on certain missing details in the testimony.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown’s evidence overwhelmingly established guilt and that the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The appellant also challenged the forfeiture of 50% of his property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court held the forfeiture was a proper exercise of discretion and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The Republic of France sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged role in a 1980 terrorist bombing in Paris.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based primarily on a French handwriting analysis linking him to the bombing, finding the report was not manifestly unreliable despite methodological criticisms.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender, rejecting arguments that France had not yet decided to put him on trial and that the case relied on intelligence reports potentially derived from torture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal from the committal order and his application for judicial review of the surrender order, upholding the extradition judge's application of the test for committal and finding the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider that this was his first period of incarceration and by miscalculating pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Summers to grant 115 days of pre-sentence credit.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to 12 months' imprisonment, and specific probation conditions were varied.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for robbery with an imitation firearm, arguing he should receive enhanced credit for his 15 months of pre-trial custody.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Summers, the Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, awarding enhanced credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis, reducing the remaining sentence.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention on a secure forensic unit.

He argued the Board erred by rejecting a hybrid disposition that would have allowed discretion to transfer him to a general forensic unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that a hybrid disposition was premature to be reasonable given the early stages of the appellant's treatment.

Although the Board improperly relied on the appellant's request for an absolute discharge to buttress its findings, the error was of no consequence.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's order for an unequal division of net family property and occupation rent following a 32-year marriage.

The trial judge found unconscionability based on the husband forcing the wife to sign a joint line of credit through violence and threats.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's findings on unconscionability, occupation rent, minor calculation errors, or the amendment of pleadings at trial.

The appeal of the costs award was also dismissed due to the husband's unreasonable behaviour during the litigation.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's finding that he threw a flaming object onto a shopping mall roof was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was an ample basis for the trial judge's conclusion and no reason to re-weigh the evidence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent conceded the sentence was illegal, as the offence is a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, precluding a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court granted one-for-one credit for the five months and ten days the respondent had already served under house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 12 months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after killing the victim and subsequently burying her body and cleaning the crime scene.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the intent required for murder, the common sense inference, self-defence, and the use of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on how the post-offence conduct (flight, lies, and concealment of the body) could be used to infer the specific intent required for murder.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction by applying the necessity defence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly applied the test for necessity and made factual findings that the defence was not made out.

The summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by failing to defer to those factual findings and effectively retrying the case.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a $4 million mortgage scheme and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and $250,000 in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by conducting his own handwriting analysis, failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following unlawful arrest and search, and imposing an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, reasonably assessed the handwriting, and correctly held that conditional sentences are inappropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, appealed a Divisional Court order requiring it to produce a comprehensive record of proceedings under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA) after screening out the respondent's police complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that the Director's decision to screen out a complaint under the Police Services Act is the exercise of a statutory power of decision, as it decides a complainant's legal right to have their complaint pursued.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Divisional Court's order regarding the contents of the record was overly broad, and substituted a narrower requirement for the record of proceedings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment for unpaid credit card debt.

He argued the motion judge erred in refusing his request for an adjournment, which he sought via an agent due to a family emergency.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, noting that the motion judge had considered the merits of the appellant's claim and found no basis to set aside the default judgment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued a car dealership and its employees for breach of contract, negligence, and conspiracy regarding a brake replacement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the conspiracy claim, finding no evidence to support it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant failed to prove a conspiracy and that the defendants' conduct was consistent with breach of contract or negligence.

The appeal and the appeal as to costs were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault following a group swarming attack and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by finding he was a direct participant rather than merely a party to the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was entitled to make independent factual findings where the jury's verdict was ambiguous, and that the 12-month sentence was entirely proper given the planned and organized nature of the attack.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of nine years in custody for possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

He argued the sentence exceeded the range for a first offender, violated the parity principle compared to his co-accused, and overemphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was justified by the totality principle, the appellant's role as a supplier with a higher quantum of drugs, and the trial judge's proper consideration of mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the conclusion that the offence occurred in 1999 as alleged in the information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the date of the offence is not an essential element unless it is critical and the accused is misled or prejudiced.

The court found the appellant knew the case he had to meet and the date played no part in his defence.