OCA 2014

The appellant died prior to the appeal and no order to continue was obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without prejudice to the estate's right to take appropriate steps to revive it.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of discreditable conduct, misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, and misdirected the jury on the elements of first degree murder, specifically regarding unlawful confinement and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assaults, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and assault simpliciter involving his three daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence, particularly regarding credibility, demeanour, the application of the W.(D.) principles, and the reliability of child witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided comprehensive reasons, properly applied the burden of proof, and made credibility and reliability findings that attracted deference.

The appellants guaranteed a loan made by the respondent to a retirement residence developer.

When the developer defaulted, the respondent sued the appellants on the guarantee and obtained summary judgment.

On appeal, the appellants argued they were released from liability because the loan terms were materially altered without their consent, specifically by converting the fixed-term loan to a demand loan and entering a forbearance agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence regarding material alterations and applied the incorrect test for prejudice.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter referred to trial on the defences of material alteration and laches.

The appellant recruitment agency sued the respondent trucking companies for breach of contract after its services were terminated.

The trial judge found only the subsidiary company liable for failing to provide six months' notice, but that company subsequently went bankrupt.

On appeal, the appellant argued the parent companies were liable for inducing breach of contract and under the common employer doctrine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inducing breach claim was not pleaded at trial and lacked the requisite intent, and upholding the trial judge's finding that the contract was solely with the subsidiary.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding a Sanderson costs order was also dismissed.

The moving party, a construction lien claimant, sought an extension of time to appeal an order that granted priority to a mortgagee over the proceeds of sale of a property in receivership.

The notice of appeal was filed 18 days late, after the receiver had already distributed the funds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, no adequate explanation for the delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal.

The Court also noted that leave to appeal would have been required under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and would not have been granted.

The appellants were substantially successful on their appeal, which resulted in a new trial on certain issues.

They sought costs of $52,994.52 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued for a reduced amount of $25,000 due to divided success.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants were substantially successful but applied a minor reduction for divided success, fixing costs at $45,000 all-inclusive.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

Following the release of the main appeal decision, the appellants and respondents settled the issue of costs.

The respondents sought an additional $5,000 in partial indemnity costs against the interveners.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs against the interveners, finding that the respondents had already recovered substantial costs from the appellants and incurred only nominal costs from the intervention.

In a national class action by terminated GM dealers against GMCL and Cassels Brock, Cassels Brock brought third party claims against out-of-province local lawyers who provided independent legal advice to the dealers.

The Quebec-based third party law firms moved to stay or dismiss the third party claims for lack of jurisdiction.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the Ontario court had jurisdiction because the wind-down agreements were Ontario contracts connected to the dispute, and that Ontario was the most appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the application of the Van Breda presumptive connecting factors and forum non conveniens principles to third party claims.

The appellant was originally charged with indictable offences and elected trial by judge and jury in the Superior Court of Justice.

On the trial date, the Crown re-elected to proceed by summary conviction, and the appellant pleaded guilty before the Superior Court judge.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown had the authority to re-elect the mode of proceeding, the Superior Court of Justice is not a summary conviction court and lacked jurisdiction to take the guilty pleas and impose sentence.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence and pleas were quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for an assessment of his former solicitor's bills under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge found no 'special circumstances' to justify assessing the 12 paid bills, which were rendered over four years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that payment indicated acceptance of the accounts.

The parties, a same-sex couple, entered into a civil partnership in the United Kingdom when same-sex marriage was not permitted there.

After moving to Ontario and separating, the respondent sought a divorce and equalization under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act.

The appellant argued they were not spouses.

The motion judge declared the civil partnership a marriage under the Civil Marriage Act and the parties spouses under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation consistent with the modern approach to statutory interpretation and Charter values.

The appellants, a law firm and its partners, were sued for damages arising from the allegedly improper appointment of a lawyer as a committee of a client's person and estate, and from the allegedly negligent administration of the client's estate.

The appellants' professional liability insurer argued that the allegations constituted a single claim under the policy because they arose from 'related' errors, omissions, or negligent acts.

The application judge agreed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that the two claims arose from errors, omissions, or negligent acts that were sufficiently different in nature and kind, and therefore were not 'related' within the meaning of the policy.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions regarding the costs of the forfeiture hearing.

The court awarded the respondent costs of the forfeiture hearing fixed at $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants, nieces of the deceased and remainder beneficiaries of his estate, appealed a decision declaring the Constantine Gicas Family Trust validly created.

They argued the trust lacked the three certainties and was not properly constituted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the trust was validly declared and constituted, and that specific shares were properly transferred to it.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, finding that because the litigation was reasonably necessary to administer the estate due to the testator's conduct, costs should be paid out of the estate rather than by the appellants personally.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault involving a teenage complainant.

The trial judge found that the appellant had cultivated a relationship of trust with the vulnerable youth, provided drugs and gifts, and engaged in grooming behaviour culminating in sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence supported the finding that the appellant occupied a position of trust and that a deliberate course of grooming conduct could amount to an invitation to sexual touching for the purposes of the sexual exploitation offence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s credibility assessments and found no reversible error arising from the limited adverse inference relating to cross‑examination.

The convictions were affirmed.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's refusal to restore an action that had been dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The Court of Appeal found that the registrar had no jurisdiction to dismiss the action because the 90-day period following the status notice had not elapsed.

Furthermore, the motion judge erred in finding prejudice to the respondent based on the disposal of a fuel tank prior to the dismissal, as this was not prejudice arising from the dismissal itself.

The appeal was allowed, and the registrar's dismissal order was set aside.

The appellants (Daimler Chrysler) appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed their motion to have the actions against them declared statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had relied on a police accident report that incorrectly identified the driver as the owner of the vehicle.

The true owner, Daimler Chrysler, was discovered during examinations for discovery, more than two years after the accident.

The motion judge found that the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence and the discoverability principle applied for the Limitations Act claims.

For the Trustee Act claims, the motion judge found special circumstances and no prejudice to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her application of the discoverability principle or the special circumstances test.

The Attorney General of Canada moved for a stay pending appeal of a judgment declaring provisions of the Canada Elections Act that restricted non-resident citizens from voting unconstitutional.

The application judge had found the five-year non-residency limit violated section 3 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the risk of irreparable harm was balanced between the parties, and the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay to allow newly enfranchised non-resident citizens to vote in upcoming federal by-elections.

The young person appealed a custodial sentence of 300 days followed by 14 months' probation for the sexual assault of a friend.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his trial testimony as an aggravating factor and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of empathy and remorse, as evidenced by text messages sent after the assault, rather than his trial testimony.