OCA 2013

The respondent sought weekly benefits from the appellant insurer pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule 1990.

The insurer terminated benefits, and the respondent sued for past and ongoing benefits, including interest on overdue amounts under s. 24(4).

The insurer brought a motion to determine whether s. 24(4) provides for simple or compound interest.

The motion judge found it provides for compound interest, and the insurer appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 24(4) unambiguously provides for compound interest when read in its entire context and harmoniously with the legislative scheme.

The appellant, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, appealed an order declaring that a claim brought by the Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board in a proposed class action was not a 'Released Claim' under a 2008 Comprehensive Agreement.

The 2008 Agreement settled claims between tobacco companies and government entities regarding tobacco smuggling.

The Court of Appeal held that while the claims might fall within the definition of 'Released Claims', the Board was acting as an agent for tobacco producers to enforce contracts, not as an agent for the Crown.

Therefore, the Board was not a 'Releasing Entity' under the agreement, and the claims were not released.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was rendered paraplegic in a motor vehicle accident.

His mother took an unpaid leave of absence to provide 24-hour care.

The insurer argued that under SABS-2010, it was only required to pay attendant care benefits for the 40 hours per week of paid employment the mother forgone, as that was the extent of her 'economic loss'.

The Court of Appeal held that economic loss serves as a threshold for entitlement to attendant care benefits, not as a measure of the quantum.

Once the threshold is met, the insurer must pay for all reasonable and necessary care provided, subject to statutory maximums.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion for a finding that the respondent was in contempt of court for failing to comply with a disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal held that an order dismissing a motion for contempt is interlocutory, not final, as it is not binding on the trial judge.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed an order finding her in contempt for allegedly manipulating her 16-year-old daughter into refusing to attend a March break vacation with the respondent father.

The motion judge had ordered a temporary change in custody as a remedy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt finding, noting procedural errors, failure to consider all evidence, and an unreasonable conclusion on the record.

The Court also held that changing custodial arrangements is not an available remedy for contempt under Rule 31(5) of the Family Law Rules and cannot be used as punishment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge's presiding over both his bail hearing and trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the jury charge contained errors regarding post-offence conduct, intent, and lacked balance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and concluding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in principle given the brutal, drug-related nature of the planned robbery and killing.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing the proceedings should have been stayed as an abuse of process due to the misconduct of a forensic pathologist and the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario.

The appellant had previously been convicted of murder based on the pathologist's flawed pediatric forensic pathology evidence, a conviction later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that while the state actors' misconduct was egregious and fell within the residual category of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

Balancing the interests, the court found that a trial on the merits was appropriate given the serious nature of the allegations of chronic physical child abuse and the fact that the systemic issues had since been addressed.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him to a medium secure all-male unit at Brockville Mental Health Centre.

Brockville also appealed the disposition, arguing the Board failed to make sufficient inquiries about the suitability of the transfer given its waiting list.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the Board had sufficient information to make its disposition and properly considered the appellant's history, including the facts underlying a recent sexual assault acquittal, to determine the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim, arguing it only discovered its loss from a breach of duty to warn when an internal investigation report was disclosed in 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew the goods were stolen and that it had paid storage fees for missing goods by October 2006.

The court noted that knowing the full extent of damages is not required to trigger the limitation period under section 5 of the Limitations Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of inadequate reasons by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory witness evidence, the physical unlikelihood of the appellant's alleged actions, a non-hearsay statement showing another person's knowledge of the gun, and the impact of the destruction of a TTC video.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship without access, arguing that the admission of hearsay, opinion, and business records evidence violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the Family Law Rules do not prohibit hearsay on summary judgment motions and the mother had consented to the protection finding without objecting to the evidence below.

The court found that admissible evidence and the mother's own admissions justified the disposition, as she had not presented an adequate plan for the care of the children, leaving no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for three home invasions involving robbery and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding his risk of recidivism and amenability to treatment, and erred by applying the pre-July 2008 Criminal Code sentencing regime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the expert evidence, which supported a high risk of violent or sexual recidivism.

The court also held that applying the new regime would not have changed the outcome, as the appellant met neither the test for a long-term offender designation nor a determinate sentence.

The application to admit fresh evidence was also denied.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences following a home invasion.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting in-dock identification evidence and in failing to adequately warn the jury about the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the in-dock identification was properly admitted and the trial judge's instructions on the frailties of the identification evidence were strong, unequivocal, and adequate.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, moved to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed her motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The underlying action involved a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant also sought to compel the production of an article used by an expert at trial and to set aside the Divisional Court's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the single judge's discretionary ruling that the proposed appeal raised issues of significance only to the parties.

The court also held that the production request should have been made at trial and found no reversible error in the costs award.

The appellant college appealed a trial judgment finding it negligently misrepresented the benefits of its graduate international business management program in its course calendar, breaching the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that a special relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care, that students are 'consumers' under the CPA, and that proof of individual reliance is not required to establish an unfair practice under the CPA.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and threatening death, as well as his sentence and designation as a long term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and instructing the jury on bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was necessary narrative and largely elicited by the defence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal due to a procedural fairness error where the trial judge denied submissions on whether the offences constituted serious personal injury offences.

However, the Court found the offences met the statutory definition and imposed the same sentence, adjusting the community supervision order to reflect time already served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking a person and receiving a financial benefit, arguing the trial judge failed to give an appropriate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant and failed to adequately identify the defence's position in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning functionally sufficient and noting that the trial judge had properly incorporated the defence's written position into the charge.

The appellant appealed his sentence, raising constitutional arguments regarding the Truth in Sentencing Act and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to address the constitutional arguments, noting the parties agreed to credit the appellant with an additional 315 days of pre-sentence custody.

The court held the resulting sentence was fit and at the low end of the range given the aggravating factors, including a lengthy record and the theft of vehicles worth almost $150,000.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a trial decision making her child a Crown ward.

She argued the appeal judge erred in applying s. 57(4) of the Child and Family Services Act by failing to properly consider fresh evidence of community members willing to care for the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge that the fresh evidence did not present an actual plan of care, though it noted positive developments regarding a relative's new plan of care.

The appellant appealed his convictions for weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a seized gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding he was arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis.

The court held that the trial judge's finding that the police acted in good faith and their conduct was not egregious was reasonably supported by the context, including the appellant's flight in a high crime area and the brief period of detention.