OCA 2013

The plaintiff, a black man, sued his former employer for constructive dismissal, alleging a poisoned work environment due to racism after a co-worker refused to attend mandatory training with him.

The trial judge found in favour of the plaintiff, concluding that the co-worker's refusal was racially motivated and that the employer's response was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the employer's appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions regarding racism and a poisoned work environment were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The Court held that a single incident did not objectively establish a poisoned workplace, and the employer's actions in investigating the complaint and offering alternative positions did not constitute a repudiation of the employment contract.

The appellants sought to certify a class action against the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation on behalf of problem gamblers who had signed self-exclusion forms but were subsequently permitted to enter gambling venues and suffered losses.

The action alleged breach of contract, negligence, and occupiers' liability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' decisions denying certification, finding that the claims required highly individualized inquiries into each class member's vulnerability, gambling history, and personal autonomy.

The court concluded that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure as the common issues would not significantly advance the litigation.

The moving parties (class action plaintiffs) brought a motion to quash appeals filed by the respondent objectors.

The court found that the appellants did not have a right of appeal under s. 30(3) of the Class Proceedings Act because they were not parties to the class proceeding.

Furthermore, they did not meet the requirements of s. 30(5) as they had not obtained leave to act as a representative party for an appeal from a judgment on common issues or an aggregate assessment.

The appeals were quashed and the motion to act as representative plaintiff was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found that the Consent and Capacity Board's decision was unreasonable because there was no evidence that the proposed treatment would benefit the appellant, nor any evidence of the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was allowed and the finding of incapacity was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and assault with intent to resist arrest following a physical altercation with police during his arrest.

At trial, a blended voir dire and trial was held to address the appellant's section 7 Charter application alleging excessive police force.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and immediately convicted the appellant without separately analyzing whether the Crown had proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to separate the burdens of proof for the Charter application (balance of probabilities) and the trial proper (beyond a reasonable doubt).

The applicant, whose extradition was requested by the United States, consented to committal but resisted surrender, arguing it would violate his s. 7 Charter rights because he risked being killed in U.S. custody in retaliation for cooperating with law enforcement.

After the Minister ordered his surrender, the applicant sought judicial review and brought a motion to seal the court record and hold the hearing in camera to protect his informer privilege.

Media intervenors argued for greater disclosure.

The court found the applicant qualified as a confidential informer and ordered the record redacted to omit information tending to reveal his identity.

The hearing was directed to proceed in public to the greatest extent possible, with in camera portions only where necessary.

The appellant father, who had sole custody of his autistic son, sought to relocate from Waterloo to Pickering to live with his new partner.

The respondent mother opposed the move.

The motion judge found a material change in circumstances but dismissed the motion, concluding the move was not in the child's best interests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by placing the burden of proof on the father and misapprehended evidence regarding the benefits of the move.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors, the Court concluded the relocation was in the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, finding that his exercise of authority vitiated her consent, and rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's credibility findings were justified and supported by the evidence of the appellant's reign of terror and religious indoctrination in the household.

The court concluded the appellant's exercise of authority vitiated the complainant's consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Barclays Bank PLC, appealed a trial judgment finding its Notice of Early Termination of a complex asset-backed commercial paper transaction invalid and the respondent Devonshire Trust's Notice of Early Termination valid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that Barclays' notice was invalid due to its fraudulent misrepresentation, bad faith, and the principle that a party cannot benefit from its own wrong, as Barclays' failure to make liquidity payments contributed to Devonshire's insolvency.

The Court also upheld the validity of Devonshire's notice.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the calculation of Barclays' Settlement Amount, substituting a figure of $264 million for the trial judge's $12,000 valuation, subject to deductions for mitigation.

The appellant appealed a nine-month custodial sentence and probation order imposed following a guilty plea to sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old employee over whom he held a position of authority.

The court rejected submissions that the exploitation was minimal, that the sentencing judge undervalued rehabilitation, and that an intermittent sentence would have been fit, emphasizing the statutory primacy of denunciation and deterrence in offences involving abuse of persons under eighteen.

The court also held that any issue with the form of the victim impact statement did not disclose reversible error, particularly given the absence of objection and the statutory ability to consider other victim evidence.

Fresh evidence was admitted but found immaterial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

He died while on bail pending appeal.

His widow brought a motion to continue the appeal, arguing that the ground of appeal relating to expert evidence on recovered memory was of broad public importance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no special circumstances to justify expending limited judicial resources on a moot appeal, as the issue of recovered memory is not evasive of appellate review and a successful appeal would only result in a new trial, which is impossible.

The mother appealed a decision dismissing her status review application regarding her child, who had been made a Crown ward with no access.

On appeal, both the mother and the Children's Aid Society sought to introduce fresh evidence, including evidence that the child's prospective adoptive parents had separated.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could impact the outcome, and ordered an assessment report to evaluate the impact of the separation on the child.

The court also requested submissions from the Attorney General of Ontario regarding the mother's claim that institutional delays violated her section 7 Charter rights.

The appeal was reserved pending receipt of the further material.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempt to obstruct justice, break and enter, uttering a threat, and mischief to property, as well as his sentence of nine years' imprisonment and designation as a long-term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on in-dock identification and in failing to disqualify a juror.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate given the context, including that the complainant knew the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that fresh evidence confirmed the appellant remained a high risk to reoffend, justifying the long-term supervision order.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention order.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, while amicus curiae argued for a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety due to his lack of insight into his schizophrenia and the likelihood that he would stop taking his medication if discharged.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applied different standards of scrutiny, and improperly used discreditable conduct evidence regarding an extramarital affair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principles, did not shift the burden of proof, and correctly used the evidence of the affair to assess credibility rather than for impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the eye-witness identification evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by finding the appellant was a danger to the community, as the record showed he had been rehabilitated in the four years since the offence.

Given the appellant's six years on bail without incident and the time already served, the sentence was reduced to time served plus 18 months' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the experienced trial judge fully appreciated the gravity of the offences and the applicable range, but correctly found compelling mitigating circumstances that took the case outside the usual range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony on the basis that he tailored his evidence to fit arguments raised during a voir dire regarding his police statement.

The Court of Appeal held that this reasoning improperly turned the appellant's statutory right to be present at his trial against him, undermining his right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following the release of the court's decision on the appeal, the parties reached an agreement regarding costs.

The court ordered costs of the appeal to the respondent in the agreed amount of $21,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and all applicable taxes.

The appellants, who were subjects of a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) investigation, sued the CRA, the Attorney General, and various investigators for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negligence after criminal charges against them were discharged or stayed.

The motion judge struck most of the claims for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the malicious prosecution and Family Law Act claims, but reinstated the claims for abuse of process and negligence against the CRA investigators, finding it was not plain and obvious that CRA investigators do not owe a duty of care to suspects under investigation.