OCA 2009

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell 100,000 shares of a private company to the respondent.

The appellant argued that no binding agreement was reached, that third-party approval was a condition precedent, and that specific performance was an inappropriate remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that an objective reasonable bystander would find the parties intended to contract based on securities industry custom.

The Court also upheld the specific performance order, noting the shares were unique and damages would be inadequate.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's analysis and conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The plaintiff egg producer sued the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Health Canada for negligent investigation after its flock was suspected of salmonella contamination, leading the plaintiff to destroy the flock before final negative test results were received.

The motion judge found that the agencies owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that neither agency owed a private duty of care to the plaintiff.

The relationship lacked sufficient proximity, and the Health of Animals Act demonstrated a legislative intent to exclude a private law duty through its statutory compensation scheme and immunity clause.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had excluded observations made by the police officer as the respondent exited his vehicle, treating them as compelled direct participation in roadside sobriety tests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that observations made as a driver exits a vehicle, even in response to an officer's direction, do not constitute compelled direct participation under the Milne and Orbanski framework.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction.

The central issue was whether the trial judge's finding that the complainant was in fear was reasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court correctly determined the finding was not unreasonable and that the reasons were adequate.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Registrar appealed a Divisional Court decision that found the Board erred in law regarding a liquor licensee permitting drunkenness on its premises.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Board misinterpreted the word 'permits' in section 45(1) of the regulation, holding that it requires proof the licensee knew or ought to have known of the drunkenness.

Although the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Divisional Court's assessment that the evidence could not support a finding against the licensee, it declined to order a new hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment awarding custody of the parties' child to the respondent mother, along with spousal support, child support based on imputed income, and an equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custody and equalization orders, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court set aside the spousal support award due to a lack of evidence of economic disadvantage, and reduced the child support obligation, finding no evidentiary basis to impute income to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction, arguing that a 15-minute delay before providing a roadside breath sample violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a 15-minute delay for the purpose of obtaining a proper breath sample is a justified limitation on the right to counsel, rendering the availability of cell phones irrelevant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action on a summary judgment motion, which he did not attend.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis that a claim for negligent investigation could not possibly succeed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in law, as the viability of a negligent investigation claim remains an open question in Ontario.

The Court set aside the dismissal of the action, allowing it to proceed.

The appellants mistakenly delivered heating oil to the plaintiffs' home, which had been converted to natural gas 22 years earlier by the respondents.

The oil was pumped into a decommissioned fill pipe, causing a massive spill and environmental contamination.

The appellants settled the plaintiffs' claim and sought contribution from the respondents for negligently decommissioning the system.

The trial judge dismissed the third-party claim, finding the specific chain of events was not reasonably foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by focusing on the precise manner of the incident rather than the general foreseeability of a mistaken delivery.

The respondents breached the standard of care by failing to permanently plug the fill pipe.

The respondent used a portion of the appellants' driveway to park his car, relying on a prescriptive easement.

The application judge granted a declaration of a prescriptive easement, finding that a 40-year right had crystallized before the appellants' predecessor in title gave written permission in 1991.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in calculating the time period under the Real Property Limitations Act, as the 20 or 40-year period must be the period 'next before' the commencement of the action.

The 1991 written permission defeated the statutory claim.

Furthermore, the doctrine of lost modern grant did not apply because the use was always with the oral permission of the predecessors in title.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict regarding a motor vehicle accident where the respondent suffered a severe brain injury.

The jury found the appellant's driver 61% liable and the respondent 39% liable, awarding nearly $14 million for future care costs.

The appellant argued the liability apportionment and damages were perverse and resulted from deficient jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability and damages, finding the jury's conclusions were not plainly unreasonable and the trial judge's instructions were adequate.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs in part, reducing the substantial indemnity costs award to prevent it from amounting to full indemnity.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed in 2005.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to two years less five days, noting that had the trial judge and counsel been aware of the immigration consequences, the joint submission would have taken them into account.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter given the amount of the judgment, without prejudice to the appellants commencing an appeal in the proper forum.

The moving party sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing its appeal for delay.

The underlying action involved a claim against environmental consultants for allegedly overstating PCB contamination, which was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to set aside the Registrar's order, finding that the moving party failed to adequately explain its delay and, crucially, that the appeal lacked merit because the principal of the moving party admitted on discovery that he knew all material facts to start a claim well before the limitation period expired.

The appellants appealed their eight-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the appellants' ages, and their prospects for rehabilitation.

The sentences were reduced to six years.

In a subsequent addendum, the Court clarified that the two months of pre-trial custody credit granted by the trial judge applied to the reduced six-year sentences, leaving five years and ten months to be served.

The appellant, a violent recidivist, was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and theft under $5,000 against a 15-year-old stranger.

He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to 30 months of pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5 to 1, with an order for delayed parole.

On appeal, he argued the sentences should be concurrent, he should receive 2 for 1 credit, and the delayed parole order was tainted by bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences, the reduced pre-sentence credit, or the delayed parole order.

The Crown appealed the 30-month sentence (reduced to one day after pre-trial custody credit) imposed on the respondent for manslaughter.

The respondent had strangled the victim after discovering her in his home attempting a robbery and being attacked by her.

The Crown argued the sentence was unfit and outside the established range for manslaughter involving strangulation and disposal of a body.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the acceptable range given the unique circumstances, including the victim's unprovoked attacks, the respondent's lack of prior record, and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody.

The accused were separately convicted of driving 'over 80'.

In both cases, the trial judge found the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, but allowed the Crown to rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the accused did not bring a Charter application.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions, holding that a 'demand' under s. 258(1)(c) must be a valid demand made on reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeals and restored the convictions, holding that under R. v. Rilling, the Crown need not prove reasonable and probable grounds to rely on the presumption of identity unless the accused brings a Charter application.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the action was a collateral attack on a previous order and therefore an abuse of process.

The court also found that the aspect of the claim challenging the propriety of a property sale would require re-litigating previous factual findings, and applied the principles of issue estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.