OCA 2009

The deceased's ex-wife and his common-law partner both claimed entitlement to his surviving spousal pension benefit.

The OMERS Appeal Sub-committee found in favour of the common-law partner.

The ex-wife successfully applied for judicial review, with the Divisional Court quashing the decision on the basis that the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the standard of review for the legal obligation to give reasons is correctness, not reasonableness.

Applying a functional approach, the Court found the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient as they explained why the decision was made and permitted effective judicial review.

The appeal was allowed and the application for judicial review dismissed.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences after a handgun was found in his pocket during a traffic stop.

He argued the stop under the Highway Traffic Act was a ruse for an unconstitutional criminal investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the stop was legitimate and not a pretext.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence, finding it failed the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge rejected his evidence simply because she believed the complainant, and that the reasons were insufficient under the Sheppard test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not expressly articulate the basis for rejecting the appellant's evidence, a fair reading of the reasons as a whole showed she considered all the evidence, including the complainant's emotional state and the 911 call, which supported the complainant's version of events.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance, as well as his global sentence of 44 months.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge on identification evidence, restricted cross-examination on the Sophonow report, misdirected the jury on inferences from a cell phone call, and failed to grant two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court also upheld the sentencing judge's discretionary decision to deny two-for-one credit based on the appellant's history of disobeying court orders.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, an unsuccessful prospective purchaser of the debtor's assets, sought to appeal an order appointing an interim receiver and approving the sale of the debtor's assets to another party.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the appellant lacked standing.

The court reaffirmed that an unsuccessful bidder does not have a legal or proprietary right in the property being sold and therefore does not have a direct interest sufficient to challenge a sale approval order.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their request to stay a contempt proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the material before the motion judge did not support the request, particularly as there was no evidence that an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal the underlying interlocutory injunction order could succeed.

The appellants appealed a contempt order and the penalty imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even excluding the alleged hearsay evidence, there was ample evidence to support the findings of contempt.

The court also upheld the penalty, characterizing it as moderate in the circumstances, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages and dismissal of claims regarding a fraudulent kick-back scheme perpetrated by two officers of the appellant company and its suppliers.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in deducting advances made by the officers from the damages awarded for secret commissions, as the officers had no authority to borrow money from the bank to repay themselves.

The damages against the officers and their company were increased to $73,641.45.

The court also set aside a counterclaim judgment in favour of a supplier, finding he had already been fully paid.

The remainder of the appeal, including claims against the bank for unauthorized withdrawals and altered documents, and claims for punitive damages, was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with sexual offences and the trial was delayed by a mistrial due to lack of judicial resources and a subsequent adjournment due to the illness of a key witness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing the entirety of these delays as institutional or Crown delay.

Properly calculated, the institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, lifted the stay of proceedings, and ordered the trial to proceed.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable and inconsistent with their acquittals on other counts, that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and shifted the burden of proof, and that they received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the qualitatively different evidence on each count, correctly applied the W.(D.) principles, and that the ineffective assistance claim fell short of the required threshold.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's conclusions, noting that the motion judge carefully reviewed the record and allowed any claim with a scintilla of evidence to proceed to trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's careful and thorough reasons.

The appellant's request for leave to appeal costs was also denied, as there was no basis on the record to grant such leave.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against a former employee, which the motion judge had found to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The former employee had previously blown the whistle on alleged irregularities in the appellants' affairs, leading to a prior settled action and a release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the current action was brought for an improper purpose, specifically to harass the respondent and suborn her testimony in an ongoing oppression proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties (defendants) sought to set aside an order dismissing their motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The appeal had been deemed abandoned under rule 61.14(2) after the moving parties failed to file the notice within ten days.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision, agreeing that the moving parties failed to demonstrate a firm intention to appeal within the time period and failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment enforcing an Indemnity Agreement and collateral demand mortgages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the Indemnity Agreement was a specialty subject to a 20-year limitation period and that the action on the collateral mortgages was brought within the 10-year limitation period, which commenced when moneys were advanced under the primary indemnity obligation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred by granting judgment on the mortgage covenants for an amount in excess of the primary indemnity debt, as the mortgages were collateral security.

The landlord sued the tenant in negligence after a fire started in the tenant's unit, causing property damage.

The parties brought a motion by special case to determine if the landlord's subrogated insurer was precluded from maintaining the claim.

The motion judge allowed the claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the Offer to Lease required the tenant to contribute to the cost of insurance, the risk of fire loss passed to the landlord, precluding the subrogated claim.

Following a successful appeal that reversed the trial judgment, the Court of Appeal received written submissions regarding the appropriate award of trial costs.

The court awarded trial costs to the successful appellant in the fixed amount of $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim for damages arising from charges brought under the Travel Industry Act.

The appellant argued the Registrar was negligent by failing to provide notice and a hearing for its licence renewal under s. 6 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to pay the prescribed fee to apply for renewal.

Consequently, there was no pending application and no obligation to provide notice or a hearing.

The self-represented appellant's personal injury action was dismissed by the trial judge on his own motion before the appellant's evidence-in-chief was completed, on the basis that the evidence was incoherent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while a trial court has inherent jurisdiction to control its own process, this does not extend to dismissing cases without hearing the available evidence and submissions.

The appellant's right to a fair trial was denied.