OCA 2008

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision denying a stay of proceedings under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court agreed that the underlying application was a straightforward Charter-based constitutional challenge of a federal law regarding citizenship, rather than a matter involving the administrative handling of citizenship files.

The appellant, a person with a disability who shares joint custody of her three children on an alternating week basis, appealed a decision reducing the basic needs component of her income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The Tribunal had awarded her 100 per cent of the shelter allowance but only 50 per cent of the basic needs allowance, reflecting the shared custody arrangement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjust the basic needs allowance to reflect the reality of joint custody, as the appellant did not have primary care and control of the children more than 50 per cent of the time.

The young person appealed a conviction entered by a summary conviction appeal judge, arguing a violation of her s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the burden was on the accused to demonstrate a violation and there was no evidence to support the claim.

The failure of police to record that the accused did not wish to speak to a lawyer did not establish a failure to comply with s. 10(b).

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's demeanour after the event and at trial as confirmatory of a lack of consent, and by failing to resolve critical credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while demeanour was not confirmatory of lack of consent, its use did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's comments were largely a response to defence counsel's suggestions.

The court also found the credibility issues raised by the appellant to be peripheral or adequately explained.

Following the disposition of four appeals, the Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the appeal and the underlying proceedings.

The appellant was awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, with the respondents ordered to pay a portion on a partial indemnity basis and the remainder to be paid from the Fund.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $75,000, and the costs of the underlying Rule 10 and Rule 21 motions at $135,000.

The appellant employer was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after an employee was injured by a machine.

The justice of the peace dismissed the charges because the Crown failed to provide authoritative definitions or expert testimony for technical terms like 'pinch point' and 'lock-out'.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, agreeing that the justice of the peace erred in principle by requiring expert testimony when lay witnesses had provided evidence on the meaning of the terms.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondents damages for malicious prosecution and awarding the appellant Wayne Scott $1 in damages for assault.

The dispute arose from altercations over a right of way between trailer park owners and cottagers.

The appellants argued the jury verdicts were unreasonable and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions.

The respondent Bettes cross-appealed the finding of assault against him and the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding that there was evidence to support the jury's findings, the jury instructions were proper, and the nominal damages award was open to the jury.

The appellants appealed their sentences, arguing the trial judge erred in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the guilty pleas.

Given the appellants' serious criminal records and the fact that the offences were committed while on probation or parole, the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting an agreed statement of facts from a previous mistrial and that doing so violated his s. 13 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the statement was a voluntary admission and not equivalent to prior testimony.

However, based on fresh medical evidence, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and deleted the requirement for 200 hours of community service from the appellant's conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender following convictions for attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

He submitted the trial judge erred by restricting his expert's testimony and rejecting the expert's opinion on his prospects for controlling his alcoholism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly qualified the expert and was entitled to prefer the Crown expert's evidence that the appellant's prospects for treatment were extremely poor.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his status in a minimum secure setting, deleted a condition permitting community living, and denied his request for an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to the community, noting his recent elopement, failure to take medication, and lack of insight.

The court held that the Board did not err in rejecting the options of an absolute or conditional discharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying nine charges of fraud over $5,000 against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges arose from alleged misrepresentations of a publicly traded company's financial affairs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's assessment of the inherent time requirements and his allocation of institutional delay.

The Court found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown's accommodation of co-accused counsels' schedules contributed to the unreasonable delay, and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff, a shareholder and creditor of a closely held corporation, brought an oppression action alleging that another shareholder and director misappropriated corporate funds.

The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing they were derivative in nature and required leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the claims were properly advanced under the oppression remedy in s. 248.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the overlap between derivative actions and oppression claims, particularly in closely held corporations where the risk of frivolous lawsuits is minimized.

The appellant's criminal charges were stayed on the eve of trial due to delay and disclosure issues, and the trial judge awarded costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of the costs award, finding that while the 16-month delay triggered a s. 11(b) inquiry, the Crown's conduct did not amount to the marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards required to justify a costs award.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's reasons and adding that the appellant's right of review must be pursued by way of judicial review rather than a civil action in the courts.

The appellant's horses were seized by the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.

The Animal Care Review Board faxed an unsigned copy of its decision to the appellant's counsel, and later served a signed copy by registered mail.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's appeal for being outside the 15-day limitation period, calculating the time from the receipt of the unsigned fax.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a decision is not a decision until it is signed, and that faxing an unsigned copy did not meet the statutory service requirements.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to grant relief from ex-parte foreclosure judgments obtained by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondents failed to make full, fair, and frank disclosure when obtaining the ex-parte orders, specifically by failing to properly account for monies paid by the appellants under minutes of settlement.

The appeal was allowed, and the ex-parte foreclosure orders were set aside.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that a demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code was invalid because she was not driving or in care and control of her vehicle at a time sufficiently proximate to the demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant drove her car within a close enough time frame to the demand to come within 'past signification'.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of tax evasion and making false statements in his tax returns.

The trial judge found that all essential elements of the offences were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but acquitted the respondent because she could not calculate the exact amount of unpaid tax due to an allegedly understated opening net worth statement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown is not required to negate every possibility regarding the amounts put forward, especially when the taxpayer failed to keep proper records and the matters are peculiarly within their knowledge.

The acquittals were set aside, convictions were entered, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.