OCA 2006

The respondent obtained summary judgment against the appellant for unpaid goods.

The appellant sought a stay of the judgment pending the determination of its counterclaim for damages related to a previous delivery of allegedly defective goods.

The motion judge refused the stay, finding the claims were not closely connected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge misapprehended the evidence, as the claims were closely connected through ongoing negotiations.

A stay was granted on the condition that the appellant pay the judgment amount, interest, and estimated trial costs into court.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment to examine a non-party and in finding no genuine issue for trial regarding repayment and forgery of a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion to refuse the adjournment due to the appellant's lack of due diligence.

The Court also held that the appellant's forgery claim could not raise a triable issue because he had explicitly admitted signing the note in his statement of defence, and no motion to withdraw the admission under Rule 51.05 had been brought.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was defending himself and his property when he threatened to shoot police officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had no legal justification for his actions, despite noting the police could have handled the situation with more sensitivity.

The young person appealed the decision of the application judge refusing a transfer to Youth Court pursuant to s. 16(9) of the Young Offenders Act.

The application judge found that the young person constituted a danger to the public based on a risk assessment, personal history, and involvement in a serious offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's evaluation and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of criminal negligence causing death after driving a van with a friend on the hood, resulting in the friend falling off and suffering fatal injuries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding his conduct constituted criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make a specific finding that the driving was a marked departure from the norm, and by failing to consider all surrounding circumstances, including the victim's instigation and the appellant's youthfulness, in assessing wanton or reckless disregard.

The parties separated and were unable to agree on the treatment of the appellant's workers' compensation benefits for a workplace injury.

The application judge found that the benefits fell within the definition of property under the Family Law Act and should be included in the appellant's net family property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that disability benefits represent income replacement and are more appropriately treated on the same basis as income from employment.

The court concluded that the benefits should be taken into account for spousal support but excluded from the equalization of family property.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of stolen property.

He raised issues regarding the voluntariness of his statement to police, a warrantless search, trial judge interference, the jury charge on recent possession, and the trial judge's answer to a jury question about a missing witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge that undermined the fairness of the trial.

Leave to appeal the conditional sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed as there was no error in principle.

The appellant sought to set aside a separation agreement, alleging mistakes, material non-disclosure, and an unfair process.

The trial judge dismissed the application but rectified the agreement to account for a hidden gambling account.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his process and in failing to set aside the agreement based on errors in business valuation, income calculation, and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the parties had freely negotiated the agreement with full disclosure, but allowed the appeal in part to reduce the trial costs awarded to the respondent from a substantial to a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed an order finding that purported Minutes of Settlement were unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the settlement lacked material and fundamental terms, such as provisions regarding second mortgages and rights of first refusal.

Furthermore, the Court found that even if an agreement existed, the appellant repudiated it through his conduct, including failing to communicate, execute documents, or maintain the property.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a full indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim regarding an alleged misrepresentation by the respondent's employees.

The trial judge found that there was no real intention on the part of the prospective purchasers and the appellants to enter into an agreement to purchase the properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, noting it was consistent with the parties' conduct and not unreasonable.

The Court also rejected the argument that missing portions of the trial transcript prejudiced the appellants' ability to challenge the factual finding, as the missing evidence did not relate to the issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and touching for a sexual purpose involving a minor complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and misapplied the burden of proof regarding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statutory preconditions for the videotaped statement were met and conceded at trial, and that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof when assessing the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the counterclaim was in substance an action for damages for being sued and therefore did not disclose a valid cause of action.

The appellant husband appealed an order regarding support arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had sufficient material to infer that the husband's claim of inability to pay the arrears was false.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent wife.

The appellant husband, residing in Saskatchewan, obtained a provisional order to terminate spousal support.

The provisional order was sent to Ontario for a confirmation hearing because the respondent wife resided there.

The Ontario court found that not all evidence from Saskatchewan had been transmitted, failing to comply with s. 18(3) of the Divorce Act, but dismissed the motion for confirmation instead of remitting it back.

The Court of Appeal allowed the husband's appeal, holding that a proper record was essential, set aside the dismissal, and directed the matter be remitted for a confirmation hearing in Alberta, where the wife now resides.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a management contract.

The appellants argued that the earliest the respondents could terminate the contract was if they failed to meet the 2002 budget, and thus they were entitled to termination pay.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the contract was for a one-year term and was renewable only if the parties agreed on a sound business plan.

Since the parties could not agree on a plan, the contract was not renewed, and the respondents were not required to pay termination pay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that a denial in the statement of defence, when read with a letter from the respondent's counsel, did not constitute an admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to conclude there was no unambiguous concession and that the denial put the plaintiff to the proof of its allegations.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they failed to articulate a satisfactory basis for the conviction, particularly regarding the central issue of the complainant's credibility.

The trial judge failed to resolve crucial points undermining the complainant's evidence, such as the timing of when she started crying and evidence suggesting a friendlier relationship with the appellant than she admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order determining that his wrongful dismissal claim was statute-barred.

He received notice of termination on December 12, 1994, with a termination date of January 31, 1995, and commenced his action on January 30, 2001.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the breach of the employment contract occurred on December 12, 1994, when the appellant was dismissed without reasonable notice, as alleged in his statement of claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a preliminary inquiry judge's discharge on a firearm charge.

The complainant testified that during an assault over a drug debt, one of the appellants struck him with what appeared to be a .45 calibre handgun and threatened to kill him.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellants on the firearm count, citing a lack of evidence that the gun was pointed or that a threat to shoot was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Superior Court that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by improperly weighing the evidence and choosing among competing inferences rather than determining if a jury could reasonably conclude the gun was real.

The appellant was blinded in the eye by a bungee cord while helping the respondent secure a mattress to the roof of a van.

The appellant sued the respondent for negligence.

The respondent sought coverage under the appellant's automobile insurance policy and his own homeowners' policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was not an 'occupant' or in 'possession' of the van, so the automobile insurer had no duty to defend.

However, the Court found that the homeowners' insurer did have a duty to defend, as the allegations of negligence (failing to warn about or test the bungee cord) could constitute concurrent non-auto related causes, meaning the claim did not clearly fall within the policy's exclusion for injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle.