OCA 2006

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing narcotics, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the assessment of witness credibility, the appellant's videotaped statement, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions on credibility and the videotaped statement were fair and did not subject the appellant's statement to special scrutiny.

Although the trial judge's summary of the defence position was brief, the single issue of lack of knowledge was made crystal clear to the jury throughout the charge.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge that the trial judge erred by failing to consider neutral delay factors, such as obtaining trial continuation dates, and by presuming prejudice without evidence.

The appeal judge correctly concluded that the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an arbitration board's ruling.

The arbitration board had concluded it lacked jurisdiction under the collective agreement to award aggravated or punitive damages for an unjust dismissal grievance.

The Divisional Court held the standard of review was correctness and that the board erred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the pragmatic and functional approach dictated a standard of patent unreasonableness due to strong privative clauses and the board's expertise in interpreting collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal concluded the board's decision was not patently unreasonable and restored its ruling.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a violent bank robbery.

During the investigation, police used a self-styled spiritualist and Obeah practitioner as an agent to elicit a confession from the appellant.

The appellant argued the resulting statement was inadmissible as the product of a 'dirty trick' and protected by religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the relationship between the appellant and the spiritualist was a corrupt criminal relationship aimed at evading police, not a genuine religious confession.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on expert evidence, challenge for cause, and co-conspirator utterances.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim that it communicated confidential information regarding the availability and purchase price of a commercial property under an oral confidentiality agreement.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to make adequate findings of fact and credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons permitted meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge reasonably concluded the information was not confidential and noted the absence of any written documentation supporting the alleged agreement.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police officer failed to comply with the immediacy requirement for a breath demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence clearly showed the officer formed a reasonable suspicion and made the demand immediately.

The appellant appealed a judgment granting the respondent specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to find a condition prohibiting the sale to the respondent's girlfriend, and in ordering specific performance instead of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that no such condition existed, the property was sufficiently unique to warrant specific performance, and the order would not cause undue hardship to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the decision of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $250.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring a road passing through the respondents' property to be an access road under the Road Access Act, but restricting its use and denying costs.

The respondents cross-appealed the declaration and the denial of their request to close the road.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the road was an access road but found no statutory basis for restricting its use to specific parties or purposes.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by failing to determine whether parties entitled to notice had a legal right to use the road before denying the closure request under s. 3(1)(b).

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered regarding the road closure and stayed damage claims.

In supplementary reasons settling the order of a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal fixed the judgment awarded to the respondent franchisee at $208,632.26 and the appellant franchisor's counterclaim at $94,200, along with respective prejudgment interest.

Because the respondent ultimately recovered less than its trial settlement offer, the court varied the trial costs award from a solicitor and client basis to a party and party basis, reaffirming that distributive costs awards should be avoided.

The Crown appealed the imposition of a 20-month conditional sentence for domestic violence offences and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by underestimating the gravity of the offences and that a penitentiary sentence was clearly warranted.

However, because the respondent had already served almost 12 months of house arrest and completed a rehabilitation program, the Court declined to reincarcerate him and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order allowing a receiver to sell a property free of their leases.

The receiver conceded that the motion judge's statement of the law was overly broad and that equitable considerations should have been weighed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice, noting the appellants were not given a proper opportunity to lead evidence on the equities.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order of Justice Ground, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice.

The decision was based on the reasons provided in the companion endorsement in Court File C44279.

Costs were fixed at $4,000 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years and four days for sexual touching and three counts of breach of recognizance.

The offences involved touching a young boy over his clothes, committed while the appellant was subject to an order prohibiting him from being alone with children.

The trial judge had considered a medical report indicating a likelihood of future abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that while a significant sentence was necessary for public protection, the total sentence was excessive given the low gravity of the specific offence and the fact that the medical report was not filed as an exhibit.

The court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence for sexual touching from three years to two years.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a pilot charged with importing, trafficking, and possession of cocaine and hashish for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused, finding he was not a member of the conspiracy to import drugs, lacked actual knowledge of the drugs, and was not wilfully blind.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that the trial judge erred by excluding the accused's own intercepted statements, which were admissible as admissions regardless of his membership in the conspiracy.

The trial judge also erred in excluding hearsay statements of alleged co-conspirators and relying on irrelevant factors to determine conspiracy membership.

Furthermore, the trial judge's finding that the accused was not wilfully blind because further inquiry would have placed him in jeopardy was logically incompatible with his earlier finding that the accused was not acting under duress.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment issued on a promissory note and the motion judge's refusal to grant a stay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision based on the record before her.

However, based on fresh evidence tendered on appeal, the Court upheld the summary judgment but ordered a stay of the judgment until the respondent provides proof of compliance with its obligations to obtain releases of guarantees under the parties' Shareholder's Agreement and Undertaking and Indemnification Agreement.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding his right to occupy a stone house and an award of occupation rent.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the appellant's license to occupy the property was conditional on his continuing as caretaker/manager, and his resignation terminated that right.

However, the Court found no basis for the trial judge's award of occupation rent.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the occupation rent award.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge made errors in findings of fact and demonstrated bias and trial unfairness.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's findings of fact and no basis for the assertions of bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 14 months' pay in lieu of notice for wrongful dismissal.

The respondent was a younger employee with 2.5 years of service in a middle management position.

The trial judge had enhanced the notice period due to the employer's failure to provide a promised reference letter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a valid employment agreement but found the 14-month notice period manifestly excessive.

The Court reduced the notice period to 7 months, finding it to be a reasonable, albeit generous, period that included a modest enhancement under Wallace principles.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim.

The motion judge had concluded that a letter found by one of the appellants in February 2003 did not postpone the running of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's thorough and careful reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.