OCA 2006

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly address the Long-Term Offender (LTO) question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the medical experts were not examined on the LTO issue and the trial judge did not effectively decide the question.

The court concluded that a new hearing was necessary.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to correct an error in paragraph 11 of its reasons for judgment released on November 17, 2005.

The court amended the reasons to replace the reference to 'Subordinated Debenture Holders' with 'Senior Debt Holders' in the first two sentences of the paragraph.

The appellant, a bystander not targeted by any police investigation, successfully applied to quash an Ontario search warrant that relied on information obtained in breach of a British Columbia non-dissemination agreement and misrepresented B.C. court proceedings.

The application judge found a serious breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights but refused to award costs, applying the traditional rule that costs in criminal proceedings require serious Crown misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction under s. 784(1) of the Criminal Code to hear the appeal.

The Court further held that the traditional Crown misconduct rule does not apply with equal force to a bystander seeking a s. 24(1) Charter remedy.

Given the appellant's vulnerability, the need to encourage the vindication of Charter rights, and the Crown's decision to staunchly resist the application despite warnings of the warrant's flaws, the Court awarded the appellant $20,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, which arose from an incident involving a bondage fantasy.

The defence argued the complainant had consented while in an alcohol-induced blackout.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Crown's closing address was inflammatory and misstated evidence, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the expert evidence regarding blackouts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Crown overstated the evidence in some instances, the trial judge's instructions adequately corrected the errors and prevented prejudice.

The appellant, a civilian employee of the RCMP, brought a civil action against a co-worker, a supervisor, and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging harassment and failure to provide a safe working environment.

The motion judge dismissed the action against the supervisor and the Attorney General, finding the dispute was governed by the collective agreement and the Public Service Staff Relations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that courts must defer to the statutory grievance procedure for matters involving employment relations and workplace safety.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to stay an order of a motion judge pending appeal.

The motion judge had refused to dissolve an injunction prohibiting protestors from occupying land, even though the land had been purchased by the Province of Ontario, until criminal contempt proceedings were disposed of.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the paragraph continuing the injunction, finding a serious issue as to its validity, irreparable harm to the public interest and land claim negotiations, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court declined to stay the paragraph referring the contempt matter to the Attorney General for carriage.

The appellant was convicted of assault, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault against his wife.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting prior discreditable conduct evidence, reversing the burden of proof, misusing the complainant's statements to her doctor, and failing to consider good character evidence.

He also appealed his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or evidentiary rulings.

While the trial judge erred in stating a penitentiary sentence was mandatory, the Court of Appeal upheld the 30-month sentence as fit given the serious domestic violence context.

The appellant, a young Aboriginal man from a remote community, appealed his conviction and five-year sentence for aggravated assault against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W. (D.) principles or assessment of credibility.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found that the trial judge and counsel erred by failing to adequately consider s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the Gladue principles.

However, after ordering and reviewing a new pre-sentence report addressing the Gladue factors, the Court concluded that the five-year sentence remained fit due to the severe aggravating circumstances of the domestic assault and the appellant's high risk to re-offend.

The plaintiffs, assignees of a bankrupt Ontario corporation, brought actions against two Iranian state-owned oil and drilling companies for breach of contract, conversion, and conspiracy arising from oil drilling operations in Iran.

The defendants appealed the dismissal of their motions to stay the actions for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals in part, staying the action against the oil company based on a forum selection clause in favour of Iran, and staying part of the action against the drilling company for lack of a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The court allowed the claim based on a 1998 contract to proceed in Ontario due to a valid forum selection clause in favour of Ontario.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the responding party's cross-appeal, arguing that the responding party was required to obtain leave to cross-appeal because the cross-appeal raised different issues than the moving party's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that under Rule 61.07(1.1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a respondent may serve a notice of cross-appeal without obtaining leave if the appellant has already been granted leave to appeal, regardless of whether the cross-appeal relates to different issues.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The purchasers had invoked a provision of the agreement when the vendor was unwilling or unable to comply with outstanding work orders.

The Court of Appeal found that the purchasers did not act capriciously or arbitrarily, and upheld the trial judge's finding that the agreement was null and void, entitling the purchasers to the return of their $5,000 deposit.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order regarding his alleged failure to comply with the respondent condominium's pet rules.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the interpretation of a 2003 release and the compliance issue were intertwined and should have been submitted to mediation and arbitration under the Condominium Act before the respondent resorted to the court.

The application was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after Customs officials found 849 grams of cocaine hidden in his luggage.

At trial, the Crown relied on false statements the appellant made to Customs officials during routine questioning to prove he knew the drugs were in his luggage.

The appellant argued that admitting these statutorily compelled statements violated his s. 7 Charter right against self-incrimination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that routine questioning at the border does not engage the principle against self-incrimination, as travellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy or right to remain silent in that context.

The 40-month sentence was also upheld.

The appellant appealed from a judgment enforcing a settlement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law by the motion judge in enforcing the settlement and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent to be deducted from the settlement funds.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment determining the ownership of a property in favour of the Estate of Samuel Lallman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence or the admission of discovery evidence.

The court also upheld the relief granted against a non-party to one of the proceedings and rejected the defence of laches.

The appellant appealed his long term offender designation.

On consent of the Crown and the appellant, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and accepted a joint submission.

The appellant was declared a long term offender and sentenced to ten years and four months imprisonment, with six years of pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a further four years and four months of incarceration.

This is to be followed by an eight-year long term supervision order.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence after pleading guilty to robbery, kidnapping, sexual assault and arson committed while a youth, following transfer of the charges to adult court under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court reviewed arguments that the sentence was harsh and excessive, that mitigating factors and rehabilitation were undervalued, and that consecutive sentences and pre-sentence custody credit were wrongly imposed.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge carefully considered the offence circumstances, the offender's circumstances, and the applicable sentencing principles.

Although the sentence was at the high end for a youthful offender, it remained within range and was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued her father for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse.

The father had previously been convicted of criminal offences based on the same conduct.

At the civil trial, the father adduced evidence from his two sons, who claimed they had committed the abuse, not him.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in permitting the father to relitigate the underlying facts of his criminal conviction.

The evidence of the sons was not 'fresh evidence' as it was known prior to the criminal trial, and allowing the relitigation constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant and the Crown both appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment, three years' probation, and a ten-year s. 161 order for internet luring.

The appellant had communicated explicitly with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl and was arrested at a pre-arranged meeting location.

The Crown sought to introduce fresh statistical evidence on youth internet usage, which the Court of Appeal rejected for failing the due diligence requirement.

The Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings, including the rejection of an expert's opinion that the appellant did not intend physical contact.

The Court concluded that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for this offence, and while the six-month sentence was lenient, it was not manifestly inadequate.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant husband, a professional hockey coach, appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $27,000 per month in spousal support to the respondent wife.

During the marriage, the husband directed a large portion of his high income into a retirement compensation arrangement to secure the family's financial future.

The appellant argued the support award, which exceeded the wife's immediate day-to-day needs, constituted an impermissible redistribution of capital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the savings pattern was a substantial component of the family's standard of living and the award appropriately met the wife's ongoing need for future financial security.