OCA 2004

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The original mortgagors sold their property and the purchaser assumed the mortgage.

The mortgagee and the purchaser later agreed to renew the mortgage without notifying the original mortgagors.

When the mortgage went into default, the mortgagee sold the property under power of sale and sued the original mortgagors for the deficiency.

The Court of Appeal held that the original mortgagors were entitled to notice of the renewal agreement.

Because they did not receive notice and did not consent to the renewal, they were released from their obligations under the mortgage.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable, as there was direct evidence from the complainant identifying one of the appellants, which was confirmed by independent evidence.

However, the Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed based on the challenge for cause procedure.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an order of Farley J. made pursuant to Rule 60.12(c).

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order was interlocutory and did not finally dispose of the issues.

Consequently, the appeal lies, with leave, to the Divisional Court.

Costs were fixed at $2,000.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding two mortgage actions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence from a handwriting expert, failed to adequately assist the unrepresented appellants to ensure trial fairness, and arbitrarily curtailed cross-examination.

Concluding that the appellants did not receive a fair trial, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment in part and ordered a new trial for the mortgage actions.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for killing his ex-girlfriend.

He appealed the conviction on several grounds, including the admission of post-offence conduct, similar fact evidence, and hypnotically enhanced testimony from a witness.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking an increase in the 10-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence as fit and entitled to deference.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly relied on business records admitted without objection to find a contract, breach, and damages.

The Court also upheld the judgment against both corporate defendants, noting their pleadings made no distinction between them, and found no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment regarding the calculation of net family property and equalization.

He challenged the trial judge's findings on the separation date, the inclusion of his truck and trailer, the order to sell the matrimonial home, and the valuation of Nortel shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual determinations and concluding that the sale of the matrimonial home was the only practical way to effect equalization.

The respondent's cross-appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the evidence on certain key issues was less clear than it could have been, the trial judge's findings were supported by the record and there was no misappreciation of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support arrears, imputed income, and costs.

He argued that the judge should have forgiven arrears for the entire time he was in Iran, rather than half, and that too much income was imputed to him upon his return.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding arrears, imputed income, or the modest costs award.

The appellant appealed his sentence, including a period of parole ineligibility, for conspiring to import 100 kilograms of drugs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and free of errors in principle.

The court noted the appellant was a career criminal and the mastermind of the offences, justifying the lengthy consecutive sentence and disparity with co-accused.

The period of parole ineligibility was deemed appropriate given the appellant's history of violating probation, parole, and interim release.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after sexually assaulting and strangling the victim.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in defining 'likely' in the jury charge on intent, allowing his former common law spouse to testify, and admitting good character evidence about the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge definition unnecessary but not prejudicial, and upheld the spousal testimony because the relationship had ended.

While the trial judge erred in admitting some good character evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant sued the respondent school board and its former director for defamation based on statements made during a television broadcast regarding her allegations of a teacher's sexual misconduct.

At trial, the jury found the statements defamatory and malicious, but true, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury unfairly restricted the context of the words complained of, leading to a substantial wrong.

Despite the appellant's failure to object to the charge at trial, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial in the interests of justice.

The appellants sought a refund of business taxes for the years 1994 to 1996 under s. 443 of the Municipal Act, arguing they were overcharged due to an error of fact in their assessment classification.

The City denied the application, and the Divisional Court dismissed the subsequent application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the incorrect categorization of the business was an error of fact, not an error in judgment, as the Assessment Commissioner was not aware of the full facts at the time of the original assessment.

The Court also found that a letter from the acting Regional Assessment Commissioner constituted valid confirmation of the error and that the City was the proper respondent.

The appeal was allowed and the City was ordered to consider the refund application.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal in its court and transferred it to the Divisional Court, awarding costs thrown away to the respondents.

The appellant, an Iranian citizen who later immigrated to Canada, brought a civil action in Ontario against the Islamic Republic of Iran for damages arising from his abduction, imprisonment, and torture by Iranian state agents in Iran.

Iran did not defend the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, finding it was barred by the State Immunity Act.

The Court held that none of the statutory exceptions to state immunity applied, including the commercial activity and tort exceptions.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that neither Canada's treaty obligations nor customary international law required Canada to provide a civil remedy against a foreign state for torture committed abroad, and that the State Immunity Act did not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The respondent, an Ohio corporation, obtained a consent decree and a contempt order against the appellant, an Ontario corporation, in a U.S. District Court for trade-mark infringement.

The respondent sought to enforce these non-monetary foreign orders in Ontario and was granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the motion for summary judgment.

The Court held that even if the rules for enforcing foreign non-monetary judgments were relaxed, the foreign orders in this case were too ambiguous in their material terms, particularly regarding their extra-territorial application, to be enforced by Ontario courts.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to quash two municipal bylaws regulating dog kennels.

The appellant alleged the bylaws were passed in bad faith, were discriminatory, and acted in restraint of trade.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the applications judge's findings that the bylaws were reasonable, in the public interest, and not passed with illegality.

Orlando Corporation appealed the trial judge's disposition of costs following a construction negligence trial where damages were reduced by 90% due to contributory negligence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by combining two separate offers to settle under Rule 49.10 and by failing to reduce the respondent's costs despite its expert witness misleading the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to depart from the strict application of Rule 49.10 to avoid an unfair result, and appropriately balanced the witness's conduct against the appellant's minimal success at trial.

The respondent, a judgment creditor of a deceased's estate and his company, brought an action claiming relief under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found that the transfer of the company's assets to other companies controlled by the deceased's widow, and the assumption of a mortgage, constituted oppression and ordered the appellants to pay the judgment debt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the mortgage, which was a legitimate charge against the company's assets.

The Court also held that the respondent, as a contingent creditor, did not have a reasonable expectation that the company would be managed to ensure his debt was paid in priority to others, including tax authorities.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.