OCA 2004

The appellant appealed his conviction and 18-month sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to declare a mistrial based on an alleged breach of his section 14 Charter right to an interpreter, and that the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably gave no weight to a hearsay affidavit regarding the interpreter issue, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range with no error in principle.

The appellant appealed an order of the Ontario Review Board directing his continued detention at a mental health centre.

The index offence was criminal harassment.

The Board found that the appellant suffered from a major mental illness, continued to have feelings for the victim, and would likely discontinue his medication without external controls.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat was not unreasonable and was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision granting the respondents relief from forfeiture and cancelling a municipal tax sale of their farm.

The respondents had failed to pay property taxes, and the township initiated a tax sale.

After tenders were opened but before the sale was finalized, the respondents offered to pay the full cancellation price.

The municipal treasurer refused, believing she had no discretion to cancel the sale once tenders were opened.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under subsection 12(6) of the Municipal Tax Sales Act, the treasurer retains the discretion to cancel a tax sale at any time up to the registration of the tax deed.

The respondent was convicted by a jury of fraudulently obtaining GST refunds.

Prior to sentencing, the trial judge declared a mistrial, finding that the Crown's failure to preserve the respondent's employment records amounted to an abuse of process and a breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after the jury's verdict had been recorded.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence of 8 months, combined with credit for pre-trial custody and pre-trial bail equivalent to house arrest, amounted to the equivalent of a penitentiary term.

Although the sentence was lenient and at the low end of the range, the Court admitted fresh evidence showing the offender had resumed caring for his son and found employment.

The Court concluded the sentence was not so inadequate as to warrant interference and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial was unfair because their counsel was discharged mid-trial, a mistrial was not declared, and the trial judge relied on the appellant's conduct in court outside the witness box to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to justify the removal of counsel, no error in proceeding after a two-week adjournment for the appellant to prepare to represent himself, and sufficient additional basis for the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appellants were charged with cruelty to animals after a search of their property under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (OSPCAA) resulted in the seizure of numerous animals.

The trial judge acquitted the appellants, finding the search warrant invalid because it authorized multiple officers to enter, which she held violated the OSPCAA.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court applied the Interpretation Act to find that the singular wording in the OSPCAA included the plural, validating the warrant and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that the Interpretation Act applied, the search was reasonable, and the presence of police officers to keep the peace did not violate the appellants' Charter rights.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a nine-year-old complainant.

He argued that the trial judge erred in permitting the complainant to testify under oath, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the evidence did not support a conviction under section 152 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's inquiry into the complainant's understanding of an oath, as no objections were raised at trial.

The court also held that the verdict was reasonable and that section 152, interpreted purposively, encompasses a request by an accused to permit him to touch a complainant's private parts.

The young person appealed a conviction, arguing that prior consistent statements were improperly admitted and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the brief statements, which were not objected to at trial.

Although the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and conclusory, the Court held that the record as a whole supported the verdict, particularly given the young person's admission of guilt to witnesses whose evidence was accepted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge's decision relied heavily on credibility assessments, ultimately rejecting the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

In doing so, the trial judge misapprehended a crucial piece of the appellant's testimony regarding the complainant's emotional state.

The Court of Appeal applied the test from R. v. Morrissey, finding that the misapprehended evidence played an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process and adverse credibility finding.

Consequently, the conviction was not based exclusively on the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the appeal regarding the proceeds of trafficking should be allowed, and an acquittal was entered on that count.

On the remaining counts, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing police identification evidence, including a 'drive-by' identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in law, did not give improper weight to the police officers' evidence, and properly relied on substantial corroborating evidence.

The appellant appealed an order varying the amounts owed by the respondent under a separation agreement.

The motion judge had found a material change in circumstances based on a finding that the respondent's income had decreased to $48,000.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the $48,000 figure was demonstrably wrong and that the respondent's actual income was at least $207,000.

The Court held that this decline in income did not provide a sufficient basis for variation given the recent signing of the agreement and the cyclical nature of the respondent's real estate business.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached fiduciary duties owed to the respondents regarding the financing of a joint venture to construct an apartment building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellants violated their duty of full disclosure, were in a serious conflict of interest, and made secret profits on a mortgage they set up.

The court also upheld the trial judge's calculation of the amounts owing between the parties.

The appellants brought a second motion for summary judgment on the eve of a scheduled five-day trial.

The motion was dismissed, and the Divisional Court dismissed the subsequent appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to address whether a party can bring more than one motion for summary judgment or the application of res judicata, finding that the Divisional Court did not err in dismissing the appeal given the timing of the motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for damages arising from future sales of EPIPEN products in France.

The motion judge had concluded that a May 10, 1993 letter was merely an agreement to agree.

The Court of Appeal found the letter ambiguous, containing both language of a contract and language suggesting a future contract, and held that its proper characterization required trial evidence regarding the parties' history, industry practice, and subsequent conduct.

The respondents' cross-appeal on alternative grounds for summary judgment was dismissed as those issues also required resolving factual and credibility disputes.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's brother's evidence as corroborative, given his admission that he was not in the room during the alleged incident.

The trial judge also erred in finding the mother's evidence corroborative, as it was effectively exculpatory.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Hockin.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.

At trial, he claimed to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and amnesia, rendering him unable to remember the events.

The defence introduced statements the appellant made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, which the Crown then cross-examined him on.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury against using disbelief of his amnesia as circumstantial evidence of guilt, by allowing cross-examination on protected statements under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, and by failing to instruct the jury not to rely on third-party opinions of his truthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and holding that the appellant waived the protection of s. 672.21 by introducing the statements himself.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to decide a certiorari application regarding an interlocutory order for severance made by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that certiorari should not substitute for the lack of a statutory appeal from an interlocutory order.

The Court also found the anticipatory Charter breach claim premature, noting the trial judge is best positioned to decide severance.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision on an interlocutory application in a criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no provision in the Criminal Code that permits appellate review of such a decision.