OCA 2003

The appellant appealed from a judgment following an uncontested trial, challenging the trial judge's decision to preside, the imputation of $65,000 in annual income, the award of lump sum spousal support, the valuation of the wife's pension, and the costs award based on bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or factual findings, and awarded costs of $3,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds: lack of juror impartiality, admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's instruction on discreditable conduct evidence, and the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, noting that defence counsel at trial was satisfied with the juror inquiries and that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of collusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentencing judge's decision regarding a DNA order for a young person under s. 487.052(2) of the Criminal Code.

Although the respondent conceded the sentencing judge made errors in principle, the Court of Appeal found the judge's consideration of the statutory factors persuasive and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose arising from allegations of sexualized conduct toward a teenage complainant in a household setting.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's lack of a credible explanation for admitted conduct as confirmatory of the complainant's evidence, thereby using disbelief of the accused as positive evidence of guilt and effectively shifting the burden of proof.

Although the appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence concerning alleged abuse within the household, the court found it unnecessary to rely on that material.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and possession of a restricted weapon.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the evidence seized from her residence under a general warrant violated her section 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal found that the general warrant was invalid because the police could have obtained a conventional warrant, rendering the search warrantless and a breach of section 8.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), concluding that the police acted in good faith and the exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than its admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing it was inconsistent with his acquittals on related false pretence charges involving cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in the appellant's favour by acquitting him on certain false pretence counts despite evidence of stopped payments, this did not render the fraud conviction inconsistent or unreasonable.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the conviction appeal and dismissed it.

However, the court found the original sentence to be demonstrably unfit given the appellant's age, antecedents, and lack of a criminal record, and varied the sentence to two years less a day.

Following the dismissal of three appeals brought by the appellant, the court received written submissions to fix the costs of the appeal.

The respondent sought costs of up to $33,050.30.

The appellant argued that the respondent should be denied costs entirely due to excessive preparation time and unnecessary motions.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to deny costs but determined that substantial indemnity was not warranted.

The court fixed the respondent's costs on a partial indemnity basis at $17,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant was convicted of counselling murder and counselling unlawful bodily harm after tape-recording conversations in which he encouraged two women to have a doctor maimed or killed.

The appellant claimed he did not intend for the crimes to be committed, but only wanted to get the women's intentions on tape to warn the doctor.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the mental element for counselling was satisfied if the appellant intended his advice to be accepted.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred; the offence of counselling requires proof that the counsellor intended the commission of the offence counselled.

As the Crown conceded there was no evidence the appellant intended the substantive offences to be committed, the appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents $485,000 for economic loss.

The appellants argued they were denied a fair trial due to a lengthy delay in the delivery of the judgment, that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, and that the trial judge erred in the standard of proof for calculating lost business profits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no active prejudice from the delay, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions, and no error in the estimation of economic loss based on the evidence presented.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the use of a conversation with a third party.

The court also held that the sentence was fit, even if the trial judge improperly used the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for killing her two young sons.

At trial, she instructed her counsel not to raise the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) and refused to testify.

On appeal, she sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence that she was suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the offences and was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of her acts.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer criteria and that her decision at trial was a product of her untreated mental illness.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and substituted a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The Crown brought an application to remove the appellant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The counsel had previously provided an opinion letter for a third party, whom the appellant now sought to implicate in the murder of the victim via fresh evidence on appeal.

The parties reached a resolution wherein independent counsel would handle the fresh evidence application and related grounds of appeal, ensuring no breach of duty to the former client while preserving the appellant's right to counsel of choice for the remainder of the appeal.

The Crown's application was withdrawn.

The appellant appealed a judgment relating to custody and access.

On consent of all parties, the Court of Appeal varied the lower court's order in accordance with the filed Minutes of Settlement.

The union brought a motion for leave to appeal an order that amended a receivership order to protect the receiver from successor employer status and denied the union leave to proceed against the receiver before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the legal issues regarding the relationship between bankruptcy courts and labour boards, and the status of a receiver as a successor employer, were significant to commercial practice and warranted consideration by the appellate court.

The plaintiff brought a motion to have the defendant's appeal and the plaintiff's cross-appeal heard together in the Court of Appeal.

The defendant had appealed only the $16,750 punitive damages portion of a $148,143.50 judgment to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, jurisdiction turns on the total amount of the final order, not the amount in issue on the appeal.

Because the final order exceeded $25,000, the appeal and cross-appeal were properly brought to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a procedural endorsement consolidating three appeals involving the respondents Hamilton, Mason, and Spencer.

On consent, the court granted leave to intervene to several organizations, including the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Native Women's Association of Canada, and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto.

The endorsement also established the timetable for perfecting the appeals, filing factums, and the allocation of time for oral arguments.

The appellant, representing unsecured noteholders, sought leave to appeal orders approving a CCAA reorganization plan for the GT Group of Companies.

The appellant argued the plan was unfair because it excluded the parent company, required the parent to transfer assets to subsidiaries, and deprived noteholders of rights to sue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the asset transfer complaint illusory as the assets would be lost to secured creditors anyway, and the loss of rights to sue unsubstantiated.

The Court also noted the appellant's delay and failure to propose an alternative plan.

The applicant sought leave to appeal her sentence of a $2,000 fine for three counts of owning and operating a body rub parlour without a license contrary to a City of Toronto by-law.

She argued she was forced to proceed to trial without counsel, could not afford the fine, was not given an opportunity to speak, and lost her business investment.

The Court of Appeal found that the record contradicted her claims regarding counsel and the opportunity to speak, and that the remaining grounds did not satisfy the statutory test for leave to appeal.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought a review of a Superior Court decision denying him bail on a murder charge.

The Court of Appeal found that significant changes in circumstances had occurred since the initial bail hearing, including the reduction of the charge to second degree murder, clarification that his travel to the US was with police permission, and the fact that the Crown's case was not overwhelming.

The application was granted and the applicant was released on conditions.