OCA 2003

The appellant pleaded guilty to a Highway Traffic Act offence and was fined.

Due to a clerical error by the justice of the peace, the committal warrant incorrectly stated the appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, leading to his arrest and alleged assault in jail.

The appellant sued the justice of the peace, correctional officers, and others for wrongful arrest and imprisonment.

The motions judge struck the claims against the justice of the peace and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to plead malice or bad faith with particularity as required to overcome judicial immunity.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act regarding a property transfer from the respondent to his wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's argument regarding beneficial ownership was raised for the first time on appeal and lacked necessary factual findings.

Furthermore, the court upheld the application judge's conclusion that the respondent did not have the requisite intent to defraud, as he had sufficient income to meet his liabilities and the appellant knew of the transfer.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents in relation to a complex tax loss scheme involving limited partnerships.

On appeal, they argued that evidence obtained during a joint investigation by Revenue Canada's Tax Avoidance and Special Investigations sections violated their Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that while the predominant purpose test from Jarvis might push back the date the Charter breach occurred, the evidence was inevitably discoverable and properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, finding the sentences fit for a massive $118 million tax fraud.

The Crown appealed jury acquittals on charges of sexual assault and break and enter with intent to commit sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in leaving honest but mistaken belief in consent with the jury, because the evidentiary record disclosed no air of reality to the defence.

In the circumstances known to the accused, including prior rebuffed advances, the complainant's intoxication, sleep, passivity, and explicit verbal rejection, the accused was required by s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

Having taken none, the defence was statutorily unavailable and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in principle, as the delay was neither inordinate nor inexcusable.

The appellant had made efforts to move the matter along, and the failure to schedule discoveries was partly due to the respondents.

Furthermore, any presumption of prejudice was rebutted because the deceased witness died within the limitation period, evidence of faded memories was tenuous, and witness statements were available to refresh memories.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that evidence led to explain the absence of a witness was highly prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the evidence left the jury with the erroneous impression that the witness had helpful evidence for the Crown and that the appellant was responsible for his absence.

Given the weaknesses in the Crown's case, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 21 months' incarceration and a five-year driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent ran a red light at high speed, struck and killed a pedestrian, dragged her 190 meters, and fled the scene.

He had a lengthy record of driving offences.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and protection of the public.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to four years and three months (after credit for pre-trial custody) along with a lifetime driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, which was based solely on the eyewitness identification of the complainant, a taxi driver.

The Court of Appeal found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to discrepancies in the complainant's descriptions, the brief and stressful nature of the encounter, and flaws in the photo line-up.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and indecent assault involving young boys over a 12-year period.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 7 years, considering the serious breach of trust, the appellant's prior convictions for similar offences, and victim impact statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range and revealing no basis to interfere.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent wife $2,500 monthly in indeterminate compensatory spousal support, $35,000 in retroactive support, and child support based on a three-year income average.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the wife suffered permanent economic disadvantage by postponing her education to support the husband's university studies early in the marriage.

The Court held that the wife's current income did not negate her entitlement to long-term compensatory support to reflect the parties' former joint standard of living.

The plaintiff appealed an order denying its motion to amend its pleadings to add a claim for equitable subrogation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that under Rule 26.01, the amendment must be allowed unless there is non-compensable prejudice.

The court held the claim was tenable in law and permitted the amendment without prejudice to the defendants' right to plead a limitation period defence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay rent, remove his boathouse, and enjoining him from entering the respondent's property.

The trial judge found the boathouse was situated on the respondent's land and a landlord-tenant relationship existed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the boathouse was at least partly on the respondent's land and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed.

The Court amended the trial judge's order, which was overly broad in declaring the respondent owned all the land on which the boathouse rested, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that no enforceable agreement was reached for a fur salon licence, as essential terms were missing.

The respondent cross-appealed the finding that it negligently misrepresented its ability to terminate an existing licence, and appealed the costs award, specifically the allowance of expert witness fees as a full disbursement on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, cross-appeal, and costs appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable errors and correctly treated expert fees as disbursements not subject to partial indemnity reduction.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to prove the respondent was at fault.

The appeal regarding damages was not considered as liability was not established.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order that struck her constructive trust claims on the basis of res judicata stemming from a consent order in Ireland.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the scope of the Irish consent order and the respondent's domicile must be resolved at trial.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that Ontario was forum non conveniens, noting that Ontario was the acknowledged appropriate forum for the appellant's support claims.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a written agreement.

The appellant argued that a contemporaneous oral agreement altered its payment obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the written agreement was clear and unambiguous, and evidence of an oral agreement cannot be admitted to contradict its terms.

The Court also noted that even if the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause, summary judgment was appropriate under s. 7(2), para. 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a transaction between the bankrupt company and its subsidiaries was a reviewable transaction under s. 100 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and constituted oppression under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found a conspicuous difference between the fair market value of the promissory note given up by the bankrupt and the shares it received.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding fair market value, and holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in allowing the trustee in bankruptcy to act as a complainant for the oppression remedy.

The Crown brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of a judgment declaring the medical use of marijuana regulations invalid.

The lower court had suspended the declaration of invalidity for six months.

The Crown sought to extend this suspension by staying the judgment until the appeal could be heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown provided no evidence or rationale to support extending the suspension period or to show prejudice if the judgment took effect.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the administration of an estate and the associated costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's assessment of credibility and expert evidence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and set it aside.

The Court held that beneficiaries are entitled to an accounting of an estate's assets, and because the estate had not been fully administered, the costs of the trial of an issue should be borne by the estate on a solicitor-and-client basis.

Success being divided, no costs were awarded for the appeal.