OCA 2003

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, wearing a disguise, attempted robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all relating to incidents involving fast food deliverymen in an apartment building.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to prove identity and intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding similar fact evidence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the reasoning process for similar fact evidence, provided a deficient explanation of reasonable doubt that failed to comply with Lifchus, and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

During deliberations, the jury requested a playback of a specific portion of the appellant's testimony.

The trial judge refused the request, expressing confusion and instructing the jury to continue discussing.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to respond directly to the jury's question and denying them a review of evidence central to the appellant's credibility.

The convictions for the cocaine offences were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that a fiduciary relationship existed between him and the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that cases of this nature turn on their own facts and there was support in the evidence for the trial judge's conclusion.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including aggravated assault endangering life arising from a police chase where he repeatedly drove his vehicle at police officers, causing permanent disability to one officer.

He was sentenced to a total of 7 years and 9 months.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence at the sentencing hearing, that the sentence for aggravated assault was excessive, and that the global sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence relevant to deterrence, the sentence fit given the viciousness of the conduct and prior record, and the global sentence appropriate.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motions judge's decision that the plaintiff was not an 'occupant' of a motorcycle when she was struck by an uninsured motorist while standing near the parked vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the 'objective observer' test to find that the plaintiff was a passenger and therefore an occupant under s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act.

As a result, the respondent insurer was solely liable for the plaintiff's claim.

The respondents, Quebec residents, were injured in an Ontario motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver.

They obtained a judgment in Ontario, but the respondent Katia's claim under Quebec's no-fault scheme was denied.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund appealed an order requiring it to pay the Ontario judgment, arguing that s. 25(2) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act precluded payment because no amount was payable under Quebec law.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 25(2) only requires the foreign jurisdiction to provide substantially similar recourse and does not require a fact-specific determination of entitlement under foreign law.

The appeal was dismissed regarding Katia's claim but allowed regarding Michel's Family Law Act claim, as Quebec law provides no corresponding right.

The appellants appealed a jury award for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the admissibility of lay evidence related to the respondent's claim for loss of future income as a hair colourist, finding it relevant and not prejudicial.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding general damages, finding the jury's award inordinately high, and substituted an award of $125,000.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, three years probation, and a lifetime driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death.

The respondent, while engaged in a 'show of speed', caused a collision resulting in the death of a 29-year-old mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence could have been more substantial, it was not demonstrably unfit given the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of alcohol or drug use, and prior good character.

Furthermore, the court noted that reincarcerating the respondent after he had already been released on parole would serve no genuine societal interest.

The appellants sought leave to appeal a judgment for costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle to justify granting leave.

Leave to appeal was denied and the appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,500.

The Canadian Coalition of Liberal Rabbis for Same-Sex Marriage brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning the right of same-sex couples to marry.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the motion, arguing the Coalition lacked capacity as an unincorporated entity and that intervention at a late stage would cause prejudice.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the Coalition offered a unique perspective that would make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal without causing injustice to the parties.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the appellants requested clarification on the effect of the judgment on two aspects of the trial judge's order for interest.

The Court of Appeal clarified that interest on the respondents' share of Vicbir's RDTOH remains at 6% per annum from January 1, 2001.

The Court also clarified that interest on the share of sums payable to one of the respondents should be calculated on the net amount owing after deducting the sum she owed for reacquired shares.

The appellant, a used car dealer, was convicted of fraud and possession of stolen property relating to the sale of stolen and revinned vehicles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the wilful blindness doctrine and failed to consider significant evidence probative of his state of mind.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge correctly articulated the wilful blindness doctrine, he failed to address a large body of potentially significant evidence that pointed away from a finding of wilful blindness.

This deficiency in the reasons foreclosed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Union Gas Limited, appealed an order made in CCAA proceedings regarding its right to set off amounts owed by the respondent, Algoma Steel Inc., against a rebate owed to the respondent.

The motions judge had denied legal set-off and limited equitable set-off to only one of two contracts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision on legal set-off but allowed the appeal regarding equitable set-off, finding a close connection between the contracts that made it manifestly unjust to enforce payment of the rebate without taking into account the full cross-claim.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dispositions of the Ontario Review Board and the verdict of unfit to stand trial made by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that the fitness hearing should have been conducted by a judge and jury under s. 672.26 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict of unfit to stand trial, declaring the proceeding a nullity, and referred the matter back to the trial court for a fitness hearing before a judge and jury.

The Ontario Review Board's determination was also set aside.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to poor identification evidence and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate under Sheppard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the identification by a witness who had previously met the appellant, along with circumstantial evidence, reasonably supported the verdicts.

The Court also held the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit appellate review.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside decisions of its Discipline Committee and remitted the matter for a rehearing.

The Divisional Court had concluded that the Committee's refusal to grant an adjournment to the respondent physician raised fairness and natural justice concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Divisional Court's decision and noting that the public interest could be protected during an adjournment by imposing terms.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that he exercised undue influence over his mother in the procurement of instruments transferring property to his son.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of physical and moral control amounting to undue influence was supported by the evidence and not undermined by the opinion of a solicitor who was not privy to all family interactions.

Abella J.A. dissented, finding that any presumption of undue influence was rebutted by the mother's evidence and the cogent evidence of her solicitor.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to enjoin the respondents from pursuing a motion in the United States to access testimony and documents obtained through the US discovery process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no comity concerns or overriding policy issues that would warrant an injunction.

The Court held that the respondents were legitimately attempting to gather evidence in a foreign jurisdiction according to its rules, and that the US judge was in the best position to determine whether and how to vary the protective order.

The father applied to reduce his child support obligation because his son was spending 50 per cent of the time with him.

The motion judge reduced the support from over $550 to $100 using a strict formulaic set-off approach.

The Divisional Court overturned this, ordering the Table amount of $688, holding there is a presumption in favour of the Table amount under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the father's appeal, holding that the presumption does not apply to s. 9.

The Court set out a structured discretionary approach to s. 9, starting with a simple set-off, applying a multiplier to reflect fixed costs, and adjusting for actual spending patterns.

The father was ordered to pay $399.61 monthly.