OCA 2002

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the respondent for the redemption of preference shares.

The appellants argued that an oral collateral agreement delayed the payment obligations until the completion of a separate share sale, and that the respondent's interference in that sale justified equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the alleged collateral agreement contradicted the clear terms of the written redemption agreement and guarantee, which included an entire agreement clause.

The court also found that equitable set-off was expressly precluded by the guarantee and that the motions judge did not exceed her jurisdiction in granting summary judgment.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions on costs of the cross-appeal.

On consent of the appellant in the cross-appeal, the court awarded costs of the cross-appeal to the respondents in the cross-appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $2,000 each.

The appellant was convicted of fraud for failing to report employment income while receiving social assistance.

She appealed, arguing that the welfare agency's sharing of her T4 slips with the police violated her rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the compelled production of pre-existing documents like T4 slips does not violate the principle against self-incrimination under s. 7.

Furthermore, the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 that the agency would not share evidence of fraud with the police.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to delete a probation term requiring $100 monthly restitution payments due to the appellant's limited means, though the intermittent jail sentence and free-standing restitution order were upheld.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The lower court had ordered a new trial based on inconsistencies between a police officer's notes and the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that mere differences between the notes and testimony did not automatically warrant a new trial without further exploration of the inconsistencies.

The Court also rejected the respondent's fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for a sentence appeal.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of assaulting the mother's nine-year-old daughter.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing that the trial judge's conduct and comments during the trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made improper favourable comments about Crown witnesses and improper negative comments about defence witnesses, including criticizing an accused for using an interpreter.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, federal public service employees, brought a civil action against the government and senior managers alleging workplace harassment and abuse of authority.

The motions judge dismissed the action, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the grievance process under the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) and the collective agreement, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Weber.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the PSSRA grievance process was not intended to be an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism for complaints that are not referable to third-party adjudication.

Since the appellants' claims could not be adjudicated under the PSSRA, the court retained concurrent jurisdiction and declined to defer to the statutory regime.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences related to an incendiary fire and insurance fraud.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive and his alteration of an alarm system certificate to maintain insurance coverage.

The verdict was deemed reasonable.

The custodial sentence was upheld as being within the acceptable range.

The restitution order of $473,000 was reduced by $170,000, representing the agreed amount realized from the sale of the lands by the insurer.

The respondent was acquitted of operating a heavy diesel-fuelled motor vehicle that contravened emission standards under O. Reg. 361/98.

The justice of the peace acquitted the respondent because the Crown had not proved the Drive Clean Guide, which was incorporated by reference into the regulation.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 5(4) of the Regulations Act, the justice of the peace was required to take judicial notice of the regulation and the Guide incorporated within it.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

Following his arrest, he asserted his right to counsel but was unable to reach his lawyer.

Before he could consult counsel, police introduced an undercover officer to him and played a tape of his intercepted confession, prompting him to make incriminating remarks.

The trial judge admitted the statements, finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge applied the wrong test.

Applying a causal link approach, the Court found the police conduct amounted to elicitation in violation of s. 10(b).

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2), the curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The moving party, a former teacher, sought an extension of time to appeal an order striking out his statement of claim against the responding parties for malicious prosecution, slander, and intentional infliction of harm.

The claims arose after students accused him of soliciting bribes, leading to criminal charges of which he was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish a firm intention to appeal within the time limit and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the statement of claim failed to plead sufficient facts to support the causes of action.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 117.04(1) of the Criminal Code, which authorizes search warrants for weapons on public safety grounds, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision violates s. 8 because it lacks a requirement that the peace officer have reasonable grounds to believe that weapons are likely to be found on the person or premises to be searched, and that such grounds be presented to the issuing justice.

The Court found this omission allowed for overbroad searches and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force or effect, with the declaration suspended for six months, and the search warrant for the appellant's residence was quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and uttering a death threat.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the police's retention of the appellant's fingerprints, which were taken during a previous arrest for charges that were subsequently withdrawn, violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court of Appeal held that the retention of fingerprints after charges are withdrawn does not automatically violate s. 8.

The police policy of destroying fingerprints upon request strikes a reasonable balance between the individual's privacy interests and the state's law enforcement objectives.

Since the appellant never requested the destruction of his fingerprints, their retention and subsequent use to identify him in the sexual assault investigation were reasonable and lawful.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 18 months' notice for wrongful dismissal, damages for mental distress, punitive damages, and solicitor-and-client costs.

The employee had suffered a workplace injury and was persistently harassed by the employer to return to work, causing her severe emotional distress and physical illness.

The Court of Appeal reduced the notice period to 12 months and set aside the punitive damages and costs awards.

However, the Court upheld the $15,000 award for mental distress, finding that the employer's extreme and insensitive harassment constituted the independent tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized materials during the execution of a search warrant.

The warrant was partially invalid as it authorized a search for a 'pedophile collection' based only on suspicion.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 489(1) of the Criminal Code and the plain view doctrine, and alternatively under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the seizure was unlawful as it amounted to an exploratory search, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach serious and the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence.

The trial judge failed to adequately explain the elements of self-defence under section 34(1) of the Criminal Code, including the definition of provocation, and failed to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the accumulation of errors undermined the correctness of the verdict and that the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring that the sale of Hydro One shares by the Crown contravened s. 48(1) of the Electricity Act.

Before the appeal was heard, the government withdrew the public offering and enacted new legislation repealing s. 48(1) and expressly authorizing the sale of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the legal and factual foundation of the dispute had disappeared and that the circumstances did not justify an exception to the general rule against hearing moot appeals.

The plaintiffs, Ontario residents, were injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York State involving a vehicle driven by a New York resident.

The plaintiffs sued in Ontario.

The defendant moved to determine the applicable law.

The Court of Appeal held that the substantive law of New York (lex loci delicti) applies, while the procedural law of Ontario (lex fori) applies.

The Court determined that costs and the cap on non-pecuniary damages are procedural matters governed by Ontario law, whereas pre-judgment interest is a substantive right governed by New York law.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 12 years following a retrial.

He appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge improperly intervened during the cross-examination of the main Crown witness and erred in admitting clothing seized in breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions did not result in a miscarriage of justice and that the admission of the seized clothing would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also upheld the 12-year parole ineligibility period, noting it reflected a careful consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors as well as the jury's recommendation.

The appellant, acting as receiver and manager for a general partner, appealed a judgment determining that the assets of a dissolved limited partnership must be distributed according to the priority scheme in s. 24 of the Limited Partnerships Act.

The appellant argued that the partnership agreement ousted the statutory priority and that assets should be distributed based on percentage interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that unequivocal language is required to oust the legislative priority provisions.

Because the partnership agreement did not explicitly address priority, the statutory scheme applied.

The appellant was convicted of selling professional lacrosse tickets without a licence under s. 2(20) of By-Law 20-85.

On appeal, he argued that tickets are not 'goods' within the meaning of the by-law and that the municipality lacked the authority to enact the provision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that tickets fall within the ordinary meaning of 'goods' as movable personal property, and that the municipality had the necessary authority under the Municipal Act to enact the licensing by-law.