OCA 2002

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against his former partner's son.

The appellant argued the trial judge made several errors, including improperly using neutral evidence to buttress the complainant's credibility, applying an uneven standard to criminal records, improperly using a prior consistent statement, and misapprehending evidence regarding inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or evidence.

The respondent physician pleaded guilty to defrauding OHIP of nearly $1 million over seven years through false billings.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and a restitution order.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit given the egregious breach of trust and the paramount need for general deterrence in large-scale frauds against the public health care system.

Taking into account the respondent's unusual mitigating circumstances and the time already served under the conditional sentence, the Court imposed a sentence of 18 months' incarceration.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for damages arising from sexual contact in 1972.

The defendant sought to add the plaintiff's parents and former boyfriend as third parties, arguing they were responsible for the plaintiff's damages due to subsequent abuse.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to add the third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that section 1 of the Negligence Act only permits claims for contribution and indemnity between concurrent wrongdoers, not independent tortfeasors whose acts occurred at different times.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order that required payment of the judgment amount into court as a condition for a stay of execution pending trial on its counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the doctrine of equitable set-off did not apply, as the claims arose over different time-frames and did not go to the root of the claim.

The Court also found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary order under Rule 20.05(3) imposing terms on the counterclaim, given the appellant's admission of the debt and lack of assets in the jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed an order of the Divisional Court that set aside an award of disturbance damages made by the Ontario Municipal Board in respect of land expropriated by the Ministry of Transportation.

The Divisional Court had concluded that an intention to sell the land was essential to awarding disturbance damages for delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court misapprehended the Board's reasoning, holding that the Board was entitled in law to award disturbance damages for the 38-month freeze period prior to expropriation, as the delay imposed an unreasonable disturbance.

The appeal was allowed and the Board's award of $71,959.00 for disturbance damages was restored.

The respondent, a young offender, was charged with wilfully failing to comply with a probation order.

At trial, the charge was dismissed because the youth court had failed to provide a copy of the disposition to the respondent's counsel, as required by s. 20(6)(a) of the Young Offenders Act.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's further appeal, holding that the requirement in s. 20(6)(a) is imperative.

The failure to provide counsel with a copy of the disposition deprived the young person of the opportunity to obtain legal advice regarding the probation order, rendering it unenforceable.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed the appellants' costs at $10,000, inclusive of the costs of the stay motion, disbursements, and GST.

The applicant, who was self-represented, applied for bail pending his appeal from convictions for attempting to obstruct justice.

He had been sentenced to ten months' imprisonment.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but opposed release on public interest grounds, citing the applicant's criminal record, which included breaches of court orders and forcible confinement.

The court denied the application, finding it was not in the public interest to release the applicant due to the risk that he would commit further offences, including offences against the administration of justice.

The appellants appealed the summary dismissal of their negligent misrepresentation claim against the respondent bank, and the partial judgment granted on the respondent's claim on a mortgage guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the misrepresentation appeal, finding no evidence that the bank falsely represented a third party's financial status or implied he would personally guarantee the loan.

On the guarantee claim, the Court held that the motion judge properly granted judgment but varied the order to grant the full amount of $869,091.18, while staying $246,000 of that judgment pending the determination of the appellants' counterclaim for an improvident sale.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in heroin and trafficking in heroin.

At trial, the judge directed a verdict of acquittal on possession charges but allowed the jury to consider evidence relating to those charges when deliberating on the remaining counts.

On appeal, the appellant argued this violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Grdic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Grdic does not apply to overlapping evidence in a single proceeding with multiple counts, as established in Arp.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the 'in furtherance' jury instruction and the trial judge's reference to money found in a stuffed bear.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by ample medical evidence indicating the appellant suffered from a delusional disorder that impaired his ability to understand treatment information and appreciate its consequences.

Apotex appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the provincial government's decision to list its generic drug, Apo-Sertraline, on the provincial Formulary with a limited use designation.

The limitation restricted its interchangeability with Pfizer's Zoloft to the treatment of depression, reflecting federal patent protections on other uses.

Apotex argued the province exceeded its jurisdiction under the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act by considering patent restrictions rather than just therapeutic equivalence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the province had clear jurisdiction to ensure the Formulary only lists drugs that are legal to sell under federal law.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred during the jury selection process by failing to adequately instruct the triers on the challenge for cause process and by interfering with his peremptory challenge rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the triers were not instructed on the standard of proof or the need for unanimity.

Furthermore, the trial judge's failure to pre-screen prospective jurors for personal hardship forced counsel to waste peremptory challenges.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court reviewed written submissions regarding the costs of a motion for leave to appeal.

The moving party argued that costs should not follow the event or should be nominal, while the responding party sought costs in excess of $2,000.

The court rejected both extremes, fixing the responding party's costs at $1,400 plus GST.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

The Crown alleged in the information that the appellant directed witnesses to make a false statement, but at trial argued that knowledge of falsity was irrelevant if coercion was used.

The trial judge convicted based on coercion without finding the statements were false or the appellant knew they were false.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown was bound by the particulars in the information, which required proving the appellant knew the statements were false.

Since the Crown conceded it could not prove this knowledge, the conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal with costs, agreeing with the reasons of the lower court judge.

Counsel were permitted to file written submissions on the amount of costs.

The appellant mother appealed a motions judge's decision denying her request to relocate from Ottawa to Oakville with her five-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred by refusing to admit fresh evidence regarding the mother's pregnancy and changed family circumstances, refusing to permit cross-examination of the court-appointed assessor, and delegating the mobility determination to the assessor without independently applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors.

The appeal was allowed, permitting the mother to relocate with the child.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident.

In a prior arbitration for accident benefits, the arbitrator found the appellant was uninsured at the time of the accident.

The appellant subsequently brought an action against the tortfeasor for negligence and against his insurer for breach of contract and negligence.

The motions judge dismissed both actions on the basis of abuse of process and issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the tort action was separate from the contractual dispute, and the negligence claim against the insurer raised different issues than those decided in the arbitration.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his brother.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed the appellant confessed to the murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the informant, misdirected the jury on after-the-fact conduct, and provided an inadequate charge on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the informant's severe credibility issues necessitated a Vetrovec warning, the trial judge improperly left equivocal demeanour evidence to the jury as consciousness of guilt, and the pre-Lifchus reasonable doubt charge failed to properly locate the standard above probability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following the release of reasons for judgment allowing the appeals by the Canadian Red Cross Society and Canada, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on the costs of the trial.

The Court ordered that the Canadian Red Cross Society shall have its costs on a party-and-party scale from the plaintiffs, with no costs to or against Canada or Ontario.

The disposition of Bayer's costs ordered by the trial judge was not disturbed.