OCA 2001

The appellant (defendant at trial) appealed the trial judge's finding of liability and assessment of damages.

The trial judge found that the appellant breached his obligation to the respondent by secretly informing clients that their partnership was ending, soliciting them, and misappropriating files.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a lease, which arose as a special case under Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court judge's interpretation of the parties' intentions based solely on the lease provisions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it had no merit with respect to the first respondent based on binding precedent, and noting no basis was advanced for the appeal against the second respondent.

Solicitor and client costs were awarded to both respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal by British Aviation Insurance Group (Canada) Ltd., finding that the trial judge's findings were reasonably supported by the evidence.

Consequently, the respondent did not pursue its cross-appeal, which was also dismissed.

A concurrent appeal by McDonnell against the dismissal of an action against AOG was dismissed because it raised new issues not argued at trial and contradicted the evidence of its own representative.

All appeals were dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, challenging three findings of fact and the valuation of a motor vehicle claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant exceptionally unreliable and the motor vehicle claim unproven.

The appellants appealed a motions judge's decision regarding their status as a 'complainant' under the OBCA and the waiver of a Fraudulent Conveyances Act claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the issue of 'complainant' status should be decided at trial on a full evidentiary record.

The Court also held, based on a concession by the respondent, that the Fraudulent Conveyances Act claim was not waived.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision determining that theatre seats and movie screens located in its theatre were trade fixtures, allowing the respondent to remove them.

The Court of Appeal applied the four-factor test for leave to appeal under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The court found the issue was not of general significance to the practice or the specific CCAA proceeding, and the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court issued a brief endorsement finding no merit in the appeal and dismissed it with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a contract, specifically concerning the absence of a cost cap relating to a retirement under clause 8(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court's interpretation and noting that such a retirement was entirely within the appellant's control.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision, arguing that the trial judge erred in findings of fact and that the respondent's delay in initiating proceedings should disentitle them from advancing their claims.

The Court of Appeal found no global error in the findings of fact and agreed with the trial judge regarding the delay.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the characterization of funds from a non-competition agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that money paid and to be paid under the non-competition agreement constitutes property for the purposes of establishing the appellant's net family property.

The appellants sought to enforce a Florida default judgment for damages arising from a real estate transaction against the respondents in Ontario.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the Florida judgment was obtained by fraud and its enforcement would contravene public policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against most respondents, holding that the fraud defence requires newly discovered facts that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, which the respondents failed to demonstrate.

The public policy defence was also rejected.

However, the appeal was dismissed against one respondent whose absolute discharge from bankruptcy released her from the judgment debt.

The appellant appealed a finding that he was a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence.

He had pleaded guilty to twenty sexual offences against young boys.

Due to a procedural error, two informations covering the same conduct were before the court, and the trial judge mistakenly referred to '39 convictions'.

The Court of Appeal held that this procedural irregularity did not vitiate the process and that the trial judge's reference was an inadvertent error.

The court found that the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed only to set aside the convictions on the first information, but the appeal regarding the dangerous offender application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment and for leave to deliver a statement of defence.

The motions judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that it was a collateral attack on a final order and should have been appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge erred in finding he lacked jurisdiction, as the proper remedy to set aside a default judgment is under Rule 19.08.

However, the Court of Appeal declined to set aside the default judgment, finding that the appellant failed to put forward a good defence on the merits due to an entire agreement clause in the personal indemnity he signed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The deceased purchased two retirement savings plans and designated family members as beneficiaries.

Shortly before her death, she executed a holograph will listing her assets, including the plans, and leaving bequests to various individuals and charities.

The estate trustee argued the will implicitly revoked the prior designations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under sections 51 and 52 of the Succession Law Reform Act, a revocation or designation in a will must relate expressly to the plan or the prior designation.

The holograph will failed to meet these statutory requirements, so the original beneficiary designations remained valid.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation action against his former sister-in-law.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis that the defamatory statement proved in evidence varied from the statement pleaded, and that the appellant failed to prove malice or that the listener understood the words referred to him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in her analysis of malice and identification, and should have granted leave to amend the statement of claim to conform with the evidence.

The summary judgment in favour of one respondent was set aside, while the appeal regarding the other respondent was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for selling cocaine to an undercover officer, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence.

The officer identified the appellant from a photo array eight months after the transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of identification evidence and reasonably concluded the photo array was fair and the officer's identification was reliable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting prior consistent statements, bad character evidence, and undisclosed evidence from his wife, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding no serious errors and applying the curative proviso where necessary.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the court stayed the convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, leaving the incest conviction to stand.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a courier employee acted as an agent for the police when opening a package containing cocaine, thereby violating section 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge found that the employee acted independently based on his perceived obligation to his company, and the police officer did not encourage the search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that no agency relationship existed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a developmentally disabled complainant and an eight-month custodial sentence.

The majority held that the complainant’s videotaped and oral out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the principled hearsay exception because the evidence established necessity through her indefinite inability to testify and threshold reliability through timing, demeanour, absence of apparent fabrication, and corroborative admissions by the appellant.

The court further upheld findings that the complainant lacked capacity to consent to the sexual activity and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief had no air of reality, given the appellant’s knowledge of her significant cognitive limitations and failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain capacity and consent.

The s. 11(b) delay argument and sentence appeal were also rejected.

A dissent would have ordered a new trial on the basis that necessity was not established because the complainant’s unavailability may have been temporary and the inability to cross-examine her impaired full answer and defence.