Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 27

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Date: 2022-11-15

Before: Lindsay Lake, Vice-Chair

Date of Order: 11/15/2022

Tribunal File Number: 13816/ACRB

Case Name: Windrift Adventures Inc., Adrienne Spottiswood, Thomas Pryde, Georgina Pierce, Clayton Cauchy, Renata Sauder, Jillian Pryde, and Cody Pryde v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant: No submissions were requested by the Board

For the Respondent: Kateryna Toderishena, Counsel

BACKGROUND

1The respondent, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, filed a request for reconsideration of the August 18, 2022 decision¹ of the Animal Care Review Board (Board).

2In the decision, I varied a January 18, 2022 Statement of Account issued by the respondent to Windrift Adventures Inc., Adrienne Spottiswood, Thomas Pryde, Georgina Pierce, Clayton Cauchy, Renata Sauder, Jillian Pryde, and Cody Pryde (the appellants) from the original amount of $1,114,720.27 to $505,760.00. The $505,760.00 was comprised of the following amounts:

Transportation Costs: $0.00 Boarding Costs: $505,760.00 Veterinary Costs: $0.00 Total Costs: $505,760.00

3The respondent is requesting that the reconsideration be granted and that the original amount of the Statement of Account be restored.

RESULT

4The respondent's request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

5The grounds upon which a request for reconsideration can be granted are set out in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, Version I (October 2, 2017) as amended (Rules). The grounds that the respondent submitted apply in this matter are Rules 18.2(a) and (b), as it submitted that I:

(i) Acted outside of my jurisdiction or violated the rules of procedural fairness; and/or (ii) Made an error of law or fact such that I would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.

6For the reasons that follow, I find that I did not act outside of my jurisdiction, did not violate the rules of procedural fairness, or made any errors of law and/or fact such that I would likely reach a different result had the error not been made.

Procedural Fairness

7The respondent’s primary submission is that by requiring the respondent to present their evidence first during the hearing, I violated the rules of procedural fairness. According to the respondent, this compromised its ability to respond effectively to the appeal as a number of theories were raised by the appellants after the respondent’s case was closed. The respondent further submitted that it did not have an opportunity to adduce additional evidence. I disagree.

8As discussed in the decision at paragraphs [18] through [20], the respondent is the party holding all of the information regarding the quantum of the Statement of Account.² Indeed, the Statement of Account in the original amount of $1,114,720.27 that was served on the appellants was only three pages long.³ Requiring the appellants to present their evidence first would cause them to have to present the respondent’s material. Procedurally and practically, it does not make sense for the party requesting that the Statement of Account be revoked or varied to $Nil present that request without the information about the Statement of Account having been presented first.

9Moreover, s. 25.0.1(a) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act (SPPA)⁴ permits the Board to determine its own procedures and practices and allows the Board to may make orders respecting procedures and practices that apply in any particular proceeding. Therefore, the SPPA permits the Board to order which party presents its evidence first. Here, one of the reasons in having the respondent present its evidence first was to prevent procedural issues that arose when the same parties appeared before me in Pryde, Spottiswood and Pierce v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector.⁵ In that hearing, the appellants presented their evidence first on agreement by the parties which led to several procedural problems and required additional submissions from the parties on numerous issues including the rule in Browne v. Dunn. Requiring the respondent to present its evidence first in this matter was to avoid a similar situation in this hearing.

10In any event, I do not agree that requiring the respondent to present its evidence first compromised the respondent’s ability to respond effectively to the appeal. The respondent submitted that a number of theories were raised by the appellants after the respondent’s case was closed and, as a result, it submitted that it did not have an opportunity to adduce additional evidence on these issues. For example, the respondent identified the issue of causation of the dogs’ conditions that required medical care and my alternative finding that the transportation costs were not payable because the respondent’s removal process fell far below the prescribed standards of care for animals in Ontario. However, I disagree with the respondent that it was “robbed” of the opportunity to respond to these issues as it made no request to call rebuttal or reply evidence at the hearing and only took this position once I highlighted the deficiencies in their evidence in the decision.

11The respondent also submitted that I violated the rules of procedural fairness by:

(i) Starting my analysis from an assumption that costs set out on a Statement of Account are not recoverable as they are unreasonable, unsubstantiated, and unnecessary until proven otherwise; and (ii) Requiring the respondent to disprove all of the theories advanced by the appellants.

12Procedural fairness, however, relates to procedure and has been defined as primarily encompassing the following:

(i) Ensuring that parties understand the case they must meet; and (ii) Ensuring that the parties have an opportunity to be heard to allow them to respond accordingly.⁶

13The Board’s January 28, 2022 Case Conference Report and Order identified the issue in dispute between the parties and a videoconference hearing was scheduled. The decision considered the issue in dispute and the hearing lasted for 20 days, which included several procedural motions at the start of the hearing. While the respondent noted my enforcement of strict timelines regarding the testimony from its veterinarian witnesses and denial of further testimony time after some of the respondent’s veterinarian witnesses were not able to attend, the respondent’s witnesses provided testimony on 9 of the 11 days where evidence was heard. Indeed, the respondent had a fulsome opportunity to present its evidence which I considered in its entirety in rendering my decision.

14For these reasons, I find that I did not violate the rules of procedural fairness such that a reconsideration is warranted on this ground. Further, I find that the respondent’s submissions as set out in paragraph [11] above are more appropriately analyzed under errors of fact and/or law.

Acting Outside of my Jurisdiction

15The respondent also submitted that a reconsideration is warranted in this matter because I exceeded my jurisdiction by wading into the respondent’s policy and operations by:

(i) Criticizing the respondent for not providing free transportation services using its limited vehicle fleet; (ii) Not consulting with the appellants during the removal process and subsequent care for the dogs; (iii) Not having veterinarians conduct the triage examination of the dogs at the Windrift properties; (iv) Failing to negotiate daily boarding rates and discounts with the kennels; (v) Failing to investigate whether different types of kennel suites were available that may have had a lower daily rate; (vi) Failing to investigate whether two dogs could be boarded together in one kennel suite to reduce boarding fees; and (vii) Failing to investigate whether there were any outdoor locations that could board the dogs.

16The respondent submitted that I acted outside of my jurisdiction as the respondent is not required to take any of the actions set out above in paragraph [15] under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019 (Act).⁷

17I agree with the respondent that none of the actions set out above are required by the Act. However, I did not make an order in the decision requiring the respondent to change their practices. Rather, the respondent’s actions were scrutinized as they are ultimately reflected in the quantum of the Statement of Account and the consideration of the quantum is squarely within the Board’s jurisdiction. Therefore, I find that I did not exceed the Board’s jurisdiction when I scrutinized the respondent’s actions when considering whether the Statement of Account should be confirmed, revoked, or varied and, as a result, a reconsideration is not granted on this ground.

Errors of Fact and/or Law

18The respondent relied upon Rule 18.2(b) for its position that I made several errors of fact and/or law such that a reconsideration is warranted on this basis. Specifically, the respondent submitted that I erred by:

(i) Finding that the respondent had the “initial evidentiary burden” in a Statement of Account appeal to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Statement of Account reflected the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs are reasonable such that the Statement of Account should be confirmed; (ii) Finding that once the respondent meets the initial evidentiary burden, that the onus then shifts to the appellants to prove that the Statement of Account should be varied or revoked on a balance of probabilities; (iii) Alternatively, the respondent submitted that I went well beyond an “initial evidentiary burden” by requiring the respondent to rebut and/or disprove certain grounds of appeal raised by the appellants; (iv) Finding that the transportation costs “do not amount to ‘necessaries to relieve…distress’”⁸ and, therefore, are not recoverable under the Act; (v) Alternatively, the respondent submitted that I erred in finding that the transportation costs were not recoverable because the removal process fell “far below the prescribed standards of care for animals in Ontario;”⁹ and/or (vi) Reducing the boarding amounts to $20.00 per day.

19In order to interfere with a decision under Rule 18.2(b), however, I must not only have made an error of law or fact, but that error must also be significant enough that I likely would have come to a different decision had the error not been made. Minor or inconsequential procedural or substantive mistakes are not enough to interfere with a decision made at first instance.

20For the reasons that follow, I find that I did not make an error of law or fact and, therefore, a reconsideration of the decision under Rule 18.2(b) is not warranted.

Initial Evidentiary Burden

21In submitting that I erred in law by finding that the respondent had the “initial evidentiary burden” in a Statement of Account appeal, the respondent advanced many of the same arguments it made during closing submissions at the hearing that I have already considered and were included in the decision.

22For example, the respondent submitted that the decision is inconsistent with the Board’s decision in Shekhurdina v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Shekhurdina).¹⁰ The respondent’s submissions regarding Shekhurdina were addressed in the decision at paragraph [16] and, with respect, I am not bound by previous decisions of the Board. Thus, the respondent disagreeing with my analysis of Shekhurdina does not point to any error in fact or law and is not a ground for reconsideration.

23Similarly, the respondent submitted that I erred in the interpretation of the word “appeal” as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov (Vavilov).¹¹ I addressed the respondent’s submissions regarding Vavilov in the decision at paragraphs [15] and [21]. Again, disagreeing with my findings rather than pointing to any errors of fact and/or law is not sufficient grounds to grant a reconsideration.

24Further, the respondent also made the same submissions that it did at first instance regarding the Straub decision, alleging that I erred by relying upon it when it was distinguishable. The respondent’s submissions regarding Straub were considered and addressed in the decision at paragraphs [12], [17], and [22]. Again, the respondent has pointed to no errors in law or fact but rather disagrees with my findings which is not a ground for reconsideration.

25The respondent did submit, however, that I erred by going well beyond an “initial evidentiary burden” by requiring that the respondent rebut and/or disprove certain grounds of appeal raised by the appellants by:

(i) Effectively treating the Statement of Account appeal as a hearing de novo which tasked the respondent with defending the Statement of Account in its entirety; and/or (ii) Starting my analysis from an assumption that costs set out on a Statement of Account are not recoverable as they are unreasonable, unsubstantiated, and unnecessary until proven otherwise.

26In doing so, the respondent submitted that I have signaled to animal owners in Ontario that they can advance any allegation on an appeal, “however baseless,” and the respondent will be required to disprove it. This, according to the respondent, places an impossible burden on it, only assigns an illusory and superficial burden on the appellants, and creates the possibility that appellants can succeed on an appeal without calling any evidence or making any submissions. The respondent submitted that such a position is contrary not only to the scheme of the Act, but also to the guiding principle in civil law that is “he who asserts must prove.”

27The difficulty that I have with the respondent’s submissions is that they are based upon an assumption that Board proceedings are akin to any other civil proceeding between two equal parties. They are not.

28The respondent performs a regulatory function and, therefore, the parties involved in proceedings before the Board are more similar to those involved in quasi-criminal or regulatory proceedings where the enforcement agency has the burden of proof.¹² I make this finding not only because of the inequity of this situation as discussed at paragraphs [106] to [112] of the decision, but also because the respondent is in exclusive possession of all of the relevant documents regarding the Statement of Account and, in some matters as is the case here, the animals giving rise to the dispute.

29The respondent, however, submitted that I also erred in finding that the respondent has in its exclusive possession relevant documents to substantiate the Statement of Account, such as invoices and medical records, because the appellants are also in exclusive possession of relevant documents and, therefore, this means that Board proceedings are parallel to civil proceedings. Again, I disagree. All of the documents regarding the quantum of the Statement of Account are in the exclusive possession of the respondent. The only documents that the respondent alleges are in the “exclusive possession” of the appellants are their financial information and medical records of the dogs leading up to the removal. The respondent, however, submitted that “ability to pay” is not a proper consideration to vary a Statement of Account and conceded that the dogs were not removed for any health concerns. Therefore, it remains unclear to me the relevance of the documents in the exclusive possession of the appellants to the appeal or how these documents would, for example, have any weight regarding boarding fees.

30For all of these reasons, I find that I did not make any error of law by going well beyond an initial evidentiary burden as submitted by the respondent. Further, if I am incorrect on this finding, I find that there was no error made because the proceedings before the Board are not akin to civil proceedings but are more similar to quasi-criminal or regulatory proceedings where the burden rests with the enforcement agency or regulatory authority. Therefore, the respondent’s request for a reconsideration is not granted on this ground.

Transportation Amounts

31The respondent also submitted that I erred in finding that transportation costs “do not amount to ‘necessaries to relieve…distress’” and, therefore, are not recoverable under the Act.¹³ In making this submission, the respondent submitted that necessaries can be provided pre-, post-, or during the removal process by relying upon s. 2(2)5 of the Act. This is a new argument that was not advanced at first instance and no information has been provided by the respondent as to why it could not have been made at first instance. A reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to correct the shortcomings of their submissions and evidence once highlighted by the Board as parties are required to put their best foot forward when first called upon to do so.

32The respondent also submitted that I erred in my alternative finding that the transportation costs were not recoverable because the removal process fell “far below the prescribed standards of care for animals in Ontario”¹⁴ on two grounds.

33First, the respondent submitted that I erred in law as the guidance and standards for transportation of animals in Canada are set out in federal legislation and that the respondent was complying with the Health of Animals Regulations, Part XII – Transport of Animal¹⁵ enacted under the federal Health of Animals Act.¹⁶ While the respondent may have questioned Ms. Spottiswood about this federal regulation, the respondent did not rely upon it in closing submissions and, as a result, this is also a new argument made for the first time upon reconsideration which is not proper and will not be considered.

34Second, the respondent submitted that the Act does not require that conditions of transport be equivalent to the day-to-day care of animals. I disagree. As stated in the decision at paragraph [52], O. Reg. 444/19 does not exempt AWS from the prescribed standards of care or state that AWS does not need to provide standards of care when animals are removed. There is simply no qualification provided in the regulation.

35Additionally, the respondent submitted that I erred in finding that the photo of the Luckhart truck at the Moonstone property taken right before the doors on the Luckhart truck were closed showed a void that “could easily allow the crates on the second row to shift in transport.”¹⁷ The respondent submitted that I made this finding in the absence of evidence that the crates could actually shift despite Regional Supervisor Munoz’ testimony that the crates were not tied down. This submission proposes a re-weighing of the evidence that was fully available to me, and which I considered, at first instance. In my opinion, it was open to me to arrive at the conclusion that I did regarding the crates, and it did not require actual evidence that the crates shifted during transport. Re-weighing the evidence is not the task upon a request for reconsideration.

36For all these reasons, the respondent’s request for reconsideration regarding the transportation amounts is denied.

Boarding Amounts

37The respondent submitted that I made several errors of fact and/or law regarding the boarding amounts such that I would have arrived at a different outcome had these errors not been made.

38The respondent first submitted that I erred by reducing the boarding amounts to $20.00 per dog per day with no other amounts for taxes, food, enrichment, or other items. The respondent submitted that, “none of those charges were upheld without a reasonable explanation.”¹⁸ Further, the respondent submitted that it was “not required to explain why some facilities chose different ways to structure their billing and invoices for services” as this is “an irrelevant consideration when determining a reasonable cost for service.”¹⁹

39The respondent is correct that there were no amounts included on the varied Statement of Account for taxes on the daily boarding fees. While not explicitly addressed in the decision as I am not required to address or reference every piece of evidence before me, not all of the boarding facilities charged the respondent taxes. For example, the invoices from the Kingston Humane Society, the North Bay and District Human Society, the Peterborough Humane Society, and the Quinte Humane Society do not include any HST amounts whereas the remaining boarding facilities, including the Oakville & Milton Humane Society, included HST amounts on their invoices. Again, no evidence or explanation was provided by the respondent as to why some boarding facilities included HST amounts on their invoices while others did not. Therefore, as the respondent failed to provide an explanation for the inconsistencies of taxes being charged by some but not all of the facilities, I find that I did not err in not including any amounts for taxes on the daily boarding amounts on the varied Statement of Account.

40Similarly, I found that the respondent failed to provide an explanation as to why only some of the kennels invoiced for services and items over and above the daily boarding rates invoiced while others did not in determining the reasonableness of these additional fees.²⁰ This was the explanation as to why I did not include these amounts in the varied Statement of Account total. It is open to the respondent to disagree with my findings, but such disagreement does not point to any errors.

41I also disagree with the respondent that it has no obligation to call evidence to support why some facilities charged for amounts over and above daily boarding fees while others did not. This is the very evidence that goes to the heart of assessing the reasonableness of amounts incurred by the respondent for the necessaries provided to the appellants’ dogs while in the care of the respondent. The respondent submitted that my analysis of the daily rate “demonstrates a misunderstanding of the legal concept of ‘reasonableness,’”²¹ because, according to the respondent, reasonableness contemplates a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.²² I agree, but reasonableness is only one consideration in a statement of account appeal. Reasonableness can also encompass comparison between similar items and services in determining what is and is not reasonable and this is what was done in the decision based on all of the evidence before me.

42The respondent further submitted that I erred by only confirming a daily boarding rate of $20.00 per dog per day as this amount was based on a daily boarding rate for a puppy. While the respondent is correct that this daily amount is for a puppy, no evidence was adduced as to why a higher daily rate was charged for an adult dog versus a puppy by the respondent. Again, I find that the respondent pointed to no errors but rather disagreed with my findings which it is open to do, but it is not the basis for a reconsideration.

43The respondent also alleged that I erred in fact by finding that the respondent failed to provide evidence to substantiate the varying daily boarding rates of the kennels located across Ontario. The respondent’s position was that Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that “the rates varied based on local jurisdiction and demand.”²³ I disagree. In the decision at paragraphs [62] and [63], I stated that Regional Supervisor Munoz could only speculate as to reason for the daily rates differing across Ontario as she had no firsthand knowledge as to the daily boarding fees.²⁴ The respondent also submitted that I erred in fact by finding that Regional Supervisor Munoz could not explain the discrepancy that the respondent was being charged more than the posted public rate at Shadowbrook Kennels.²⁵ The respondent’s position is that Regional Supervisor Munoz explained that the public rate may not include things that the respondent was receiving like enrichment, walks, etc. I disagree that this was Regional Supervisor Munoz’s evidence. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that she could not speak to what the public rate entailed in terms of care and food and that she “didn’t know.” Therefore, I find that I made no error of fact regarding portions of Regional Supervisor Munoz’s testimony.

44The respondent also submitted that “there were many prior decisions of this Board upholding boarding rates well above $20 per day.” This submission does not point to any errors as I am not bound by other Board decisions. Furthermore, as I stated in paragraph [101] of the decision, factors considered by the Board on a statement of account appeal are not prescribed in the Act and likely vary on a case-by-case basis. As such, factors that may have been relevant in a previous decision of the Board may have no application in other decisions. In any event, the respondent did not direct me to any specific prior decisions on this point.

45Under the heading of Boarding Fees, the respondent also submitted that I erred in requiring a higher standard than that of a balance of probabilities when, for example:

(i) Requiring the respondent to provide details of which dog the Greenie Pill Pockets were purchased for at paragraph 83 of the decision; and (ii) Failing to give any weight to the appellant’s failure to call evidence to demonstrate alternative housing options and what the fees for such options would have been.

46These submissions are specific examples of the respondent’s position that I required the respondent to defend the Statement of Account in its entirety and its submissions that I went well beyond requiring the respondent to prove the initial evidentiary burden on a balance of probabilities. These arguments were considered and addressed more broadly above in paragraphs [21] to [30] and, for the reasons set out above, I find that I did not err in fact or law on these submissions.

47For all of these reasons, I find that I did not make an error in fact and/or law regarding the boarding amounts and, therefore, a reconsideration is not granted on this basis.

Veterinarian Amounts

48The respondent submitted that I erred in varying the veterinary amounts on the Statement of Account from $121,725.77 to $0 because I required the respondent to prove that the veterinary care was to relieve distress or that it was related to conditions caused by the appellant.

49To support its position, the respondent submitted that:

(i) There is no requirement under s. 35(1) of the Act for the respondent to prove that the necessaries provided while the animals were in the respondent’s care were provided to relieve distress as the second half of s. 35(1) only refers to “necessaries” while in care; and (ii) There is nothing in s. 35(1) that limits the costs of medical necessaries only to conditions caused by the appellants such that “it is irrelevant whether the medical issue was caused by the original owners or was discovered or occurred after the animal was removed.”²⁶

50Even if I agreed with the respondent on its interpretation of the second half of s. 35(1), the respondent failed to make any submissions regarding the issue of causation at first instance after the issue was raised by the appellants.²⁷ A reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to correct the shortcomings of their submissions and evidence once highlighted by the Board. Therefore, I am not prepared to address the respondent’s submissions regarding the issue of causation and the veterinary amounts as it was open for the respondent to advance these arguments during the hearing but, for whatever reason, it did not.

51Moreover, the respondent’s submission that causation is an irrelevant consideration whether an amount is included on a statement of account is inconsistent with its actions. At paragraph [103] of the decision, I discuss a Giardia outbreak at one of the kennels, two dogs obtaining injuries while in care at one kennel, and that there was a streptococcus zooepidemicus kennel outbreak. All of these conditions arose after the dogs were removed from the appellant’s care but yet veterinary amounts incurred by the respondent to treat these conditions were not included on the Statement of Account. Therefore, the respondent’s actions in excluding such fees are in direct opposition to the position it has taken in its reconsideration submissions.

52I also do not agree with the respondent’s submissions that I erred in failing to confirm any amount from the September 24, 2021 Walkers Line Veterinary Hospital invoice because “there was no evidence about a diagnosis or further follow-up.”²⁸ The respondent’s submission did not fully recite my reasons for not confirming this invoice from the decision. At paragraph [116] of the decision, I stated that the only witness who provided testimony about this invoice was Regional Supervisor Munoz and she simply read the contents of it and offered no further explanation. I find that no error was made as suggested by the respondent.

53Finally, the respondent submitted that I erred in failing to confirm some amounts of the $18,000 total cost for veterinary care for M-42 given my statement in the decision at paragraph [126] that it may have been reasonable to allow some amounts for an investigation into M-42’s condition at the outset. I do not agree that I erred as no evidence was led as to what investigation may have been reasonable under the circumstances. In addition, the respondent failed to address the causation issue regarding this amount as discussed above.

54For all of these reasons, I find that I made no error of fact and/or law regarding the veterinary amounts such that a reconsideration is warranted on this basis.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

55The respondent’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Footnotes

1. 1Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24 (the “decision”).
2. 2The respondent disagrees with this finding in the decision, and this is discussed below at paragraph [30].
3. 3The decision, para. 18.
4. 4R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.
5. 52021 ONACRB 25.
6. 6See the reconsideration decision of IMN v. Intact Insurance Company, 2019 CanLII 101473 (ON LAT) at para. 9 and 17-004229 v The Guarantee Company of North America, 2018 CanLII 112115 (ON LAT) at para. 7.
7. 7S.O. 2019, c. 13.
8. 8Request for Reconsideration – Submissions of the Respondent, para. 30.
9. 9Ibid. at para. 35.
10. 102021 ONACRB 15.
11. 112019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653.
12. 12For example, the Act provides Animal Welfare Inspectors (AWIs) and the respondent broad, police-like powers in areas under the jurisdiction of the Board. Pursuant to sections 24(2), (4), (5), (7), and (8) of the Act, AWIs are permitted entry to inspect “any place” under s. 24(1) of the Act including a dwelling upon obtaining a warrant. Where a warrant is obtained, s. 28(1) of the Act permits AWIs and any police officers assisting the AWIs to “use whatever force is reasonably necessary to execute the warrant.” During an inspection, s. 25(1) of the Act permits AWIs to, among other things, conduct tests, require production of any animal or thing including documents, and remove any documents or things that are relevant to the inspection to make copies or for further inspection. Ultimately, sections 31(1), (2), and (4) of the Act permits an AWI to remove an animal from the place were it is if certain conditions are met, again using “whatever force is reasonably necessary to remove the animal,” and the respondent may ultimately decide to keep the removed animal in its care pursuant to s. 31(6) of the Act. All of these powers are in addition to an AWI’s authority to cause an animal to be euthanized under s. 32(1).
13. 13Supra note 8 at para. 30.
14. 14The decision, para. 39.
15. 15C.R.C., c. 296.
16. 16S.C. 1990, c. 21.
17. 17The decision, para. 46.
18. 18Supra note 8 at para. 50.
19. 19Ibid.
20. 20The decision, para. 66.
21. 21Supra note 8 at para. 55.
22. 22Canada (minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para. 59.
23. 23Supra note 8 at para. 52.
24. 24The decision, paras. 62-63.
25. 25Supra note 8 at para. 54.
26. 26Ibid. at para. 63.
27. 27The decision, paras. 99 and 100.
28. 28Supra note 8 at para. 73.