Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13
Between:
Windrift Adventures Inc., Adrienne (Spottiswood) Pryde, Thomas Pryde, Georgina Pierce, Clayton Cauchy, Renata Sauder, Jillian Pryde, and Cody Pryde
Appellants
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Lindsay Lake, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Eric Gillespie, Counsel Carson Frankum, Paralegal
For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Counsel Jason Kirsh, Counsel
Court Reporter: Barbara Pollard
Heard by videoconference: May 26-28, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Windrift Adventures Inc. is a dog sledding and horse-riding business that operates out of two locations in Ontario – one in Oro-Medonte (Moonstone) and one in Severn (Severn). Windrift Adventures Inc., Adrienne (Spottiswood) Pryde, Thomas Pryde, Georgina Pierce, Clayton Cauchy, Renata Sauder, Jillian Pryde, and Cody Pryde, the appellants, all owned dogs that were living at the two properties.
2On September 23, 2021, Animal Welfare Service (AWS) removed a total of 229 dogs from the appellants’ two properties. They removed approximately 111 dogs of various breeds, age, and sex from Severn and approximately 118 dogs of various breeds, age, and sex from Moonstone. The dogs that were removed were subsequently kept in the care of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, the respondent. The respondent also issued two previous Statement of Accounts (SOAs) regarding the removed dogs. The removal, the decision to keep in care, and the two previous SOAs were the subject of lengthy proceedings before the Animal Care Review Board (Board), the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal.
3After all appeal avenues were exhausted for these previous matters, the dogs that remained in the care of the respondent were forfeited to the Crown on January 24, 2024 as the first SOA went unpaid: s. 35(4) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act).
4The respondent issued a final SOA to the appellants dated September 30, 2024 in the amount of $1,431,180.00. This final SOA covers the period of January 1, 2023 to the day before the date of forfeiture and only sought costs for boarding the dogs.
5On October 11, 2024, the appellants filed an appeal of the final SOA to the Board. After three adjournments, the hearing proceeded on May 26-28, 2025.
ISSUE IN DISPUTE
6The sole issue in dispute is whether the final SOA should be confirmed, revoked, or varied.
RESULT
7The final SOA is confirmed in the amount of $1,431,180.00.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
8On January 27, 2025, the respondent filed a motion seeking direction from the Board on whether the Board would accept Adrienne (Spottiswood) Pryde to act as a representative for all other appellants in this matter. The Board scheduled this motion to be heard at the start of the hearing.
9As the appellants were represented by both counsel and a paralegal at the hearing, the respondent withdrew its motion.
ANALYSIS
10Under s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act, the respondent may, from time to time, serve on the owner or custodian of an animal an SOA respecting any costs incurred if the costs were in relation to, among other things, keeping the animals in the care of the respondent under s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act.
11Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act states that costs set out in an SOA may include costs for providing care for an animal that has been removed and/or that the respondent has kept or taken into its care. Owners or custodians are presumptively liable for the amount specified in an SOA pursuant to s. 35(3).
12An owner or custodian of an animal may appeal an SOA to the Board: s. 38(2)4., PAWS Act. After a hearing, the Board may confirm, revoke, or vary an SOA and order that the costs be paid, as confirmed or varied, to the Minister of Finance: s. 38(9)3.1, PAWS Act.
13The total amount of the final SOA in this matter is $1,431,180.00 representing boarding costs for the dogs while they were in the care of the respondent from January 1, 2023 to January 23, 2024.
14The respondent’s position is that the final SOA should be confirmed in the amount of $1,431,180.00. The appellants submitted that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil.
15For the reasons that follow, I confirm the final SOA in the amount of $1,431,180.00.
The respondent has met its initial evidentiary burden
16The parties agree that the respondent has the initial evidentiary burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the charges reflected in the final SOA reflect costs incurred for care provided and that the costs were reasonable. Once the respondent meets this initial evidentiary burden, the onus shifts to the appellants to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be varied or revoked: Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.) at para. 41 and s. 35(1), PAWS Act.
a) The final SOA reflects less than the actual incurred costs of boarding
17The respondent argued that they had met their initial evidentiary burden of proving on a balance of probailities that the final SOA reflected less than the actual costs incurred because:
(i) It provided supporting invoices as well as information on each of the dogs in a Third SOA Summary Chart;
(ii) These documents were not challenged when the respondent sought to have them entered as exhibits at the hearing;
(iii) The final SOA was based on $20.00/dog/day for boarding which was less than the actual amounts incurred; and
(iv) Similar information and documentation were found to be sufficient to meet its initial evidentiary burden regarding the second SOA in Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 40 (Windrift SOA #2), which was upheld by the Divisional Court on an application for judicial review: Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272.
18Regional Supervisor Brandon James was the sole witness who testified on behalf of the respondent. He testified that he issued the final SOA to the appellants along with a covering letter, the Third SOA Summary Chart, and supporting invoices from 15 kennel facilities. Regional Supervisor James testified that some of the supporting invoices covered periods of time outside of the period covered by the final SOA as they straddled this period and the period covered under the second SOA. He also testified that totaling all the invoices would not provide an accurate amount of the actual costs of boarding the dogs for the period of the final SOA, and that the actual boarding costs for the dogs was far greater than the costs included on the final SOA of $20.00/dog/day. Indeed, the supporting invoices showed daily boarding fees for the dogs which ranged from $24.00 plus food and taxes per day to $60.00 per day plus food and taxes.
19Regional Supervisor James also confirmed the reason for his decision to only seek $20.00/dog/day for boarding costs in the final SOA which was also reflected in the covering letter as follows:
In consideration of the decision of the Animal Care Review Board in Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24, this Statement of Account contains boarding costs only, at the rate that was approved by the Board of $20 per dog per day. This Statement of Account covers the costs of boarding from January 1, 2023 to January 23, 2024. As the per the enclosed invoices, the actual costs of boarding are well over $20 per dog per day.
20Regional Supervisor James further testified about the Third SOA Summary Chart. He stated that the Third SOA Summary Chart set out the following details for each dog that was in the care of the respondent:
(i) The property from which the dog was removed;
(ii) The identification number of each dog;
(iii) What boarding facility the dog was located at;
(iv) The sex of the dog;
(v) The “cost per day” at $20.00;
(vi) The total number of days the dog was in care of the respondent (the maximum number of days being 387);
(vii) The calculated cost per dog, which was the total number of days the dog was in the care of the respondent multiplied by $20.00; and
(viii) Notes which included if the dog had died or was euthanized in the care of the respondent, or if the dog was returned to the appellants along with the dates of these events.
21It was the respondent’s position that the Board accepted similar information and documentation to be sufficient for the respondent to meet its initial evidentiary burden regarding the second SOA in Windrift SOA #2.
22In the Windrift SOA #2 decision, the Board found that the respondent had met its initial evidentiary onus based on an affidavit sworn by Senior Manager Sara Munoz. Senior Manager Munoz’ affidavit pointed to a covering letter served with the second SOA which stated (para. 28):
In consideration of the decision of the Animal Care Review Board in Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24, which is currently subject to a Judicial Review, this Statement of Account contains boarding costs only, at the rate that was approved by the Board of $20 per dog per day. This Statement of Account covers the costs of boarding from January 18, 2022 to December 31, 2022. As…per the enclosed invoices, the actual costs of boarding are well over $20 per dog per day. Furthermore, Animal Welfare Services has incurred and continues to incur ongoing costs to address and treat various health issues present in this Windrift dog population including cancer, hip dysplasia, mammary masses, etc.
23Senior Manager Munoz’s affidavit also noted that none of the actual boarding rates charged were as low as $20.00/day/dog, and that AWS provided itemized boarding facility invoices addressed to AWS to the appellants. The Board noted in this decision that the appellants did not put forward any evidence at the hearing, but only made submissions in response to the unchallenged evidence called by the respondent.
24In Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272, the Divisional Court upheld the Board’s decision in Windrift SOA #2 and found that there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings, including the finding that the respondent met its initial evidentiary onus based on the affidavit of Senior Manager Munoz (paras. 33 and 36).
25I am not persuaded by the appellants’ submission that this matter is “drastically different” than the Windrift SOA #2 decision such that it should be distinguished from this matter. The appellants argue that I should not follow the decision in Windrift SOA #2 because:
(i) The appellants entered approximately 7,000 pages of veterinarian reports and invoices as evidence at this hearing whereas the appellants did not enter any evidence in Windrift SOA #2;
(ii) The appellants challenged the credibility and reliability of the respondent’s only witness in this hearing, Regional Supervisor James, whereas in Windrift SOA #2, the appellants did not cross-examine the respondent’s witness; and
(iii) The appellants relied upon the Divisional Court decision in Manikam v. Toronto Community Housing Corporation, 2019 ONSC 2083 (Manikam) in this matter, and this decision was not referenced or considered in Windrift SOA #2, and there was no discussion on the necessity and reliability of hearsay evidence in Windrift SOA #2.
26The appellants are correct that I granted their request to admit into evidence almost 7,000 pages of veterinarian records concerning the removed dogs while they were in the care of the respondent. However, I do not agree with the appellant’s position that the existence of medical records would displace a finding that the respondent has met its initial evidentiary onus that the charges reflected in the final SOA reflect the costs of care provided, and that the costs were reasonable. The respondent did not include any amounts on the final SOA for veterinary fees and, moreover, any arguments based upon these veterinarian records are more appropriately considered when determining whether the final SOA should be varied.
27Further, the fact that the appellants challenged the credibility and reliability of Regional Supervisor James’ evidence is not a sufficient reason to distinguish the Windrift SOA #2 decision from this matter. In Windrift SOA #2, the Board noted that the appellants did not challenge or cross-examine Senior Manager Munoz on her affidavit. Here, the appellants cross-examined Regional Supervisor James and submitted that I should not place weight on his evidence as he was an unreliable witness. Specifically, the appellants argued that Regional Supervisor James misled an issuing court regarding the use of two warrants obtained by two Informations he swore as he used the warrants to remove the appellants’ dogs from the two properties, which was the exact opposite of what he informed the issuing court – he informed the court that he would return for a second warrant after planning for the removal. Therefore, according to the appellants, I should find that Regional Supervisor James was an unreliable witness because he misled the issuing court through his sworn Informations.
28Inspector conduct is outside of the jurisdiction of the Board and, as I stated previously in paragraph 6 of the motion decision and order in Pryde, Spottiswood and Pierce v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2021 ONACRB 31, warrants are issued on the basis of the sworn Informations before the Ontario Court of Justice and, therefore, can only be challenged in the forum in which they were issued, using the proceedings available in that forum. It is not for this Board to question the basis upon which the warrants were issued. In any event, the appellants have relied upon one statement made in the Informations that are collectively 60 single-spaced pages long. I am not persuaded to find that Regional Supervisor James is an unreliable witness based on one inconsistent statement out of 60 pages made over three and a half years ago.
29Even if I am wrong and I should find Regional Supervisor James to be an unreliable witness based on the Informations, there is no dispute that the dogs were in the respondent’s care during the timeframe covered by the final SOA after a decision was made to keep them in the respondent’s care and that the respondent was incurring fees for their boarding. Therefore, even if Regional Supervisor James is not a reliable witness, it is reasonable to find that the respondent would still be incurring fees to kennel the dogs while they are in the respondent’s care (Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24 (Windrift SOA #1) at (para. 71)). Additionally, the amount of the final SOA is not calculated based on totaling the invoices introduced through Regional Supervisor James’ testimony – it based on a calculation of $20.00/dog/day.
30I am also not persuaded by the appellants’ argument that this case is “drastically different” from the Windrift SOA #2 decision because this matter is distinguishable, and that I should not place weight on Regional Supervisor James’ testimony regarding the invoices because:
(i) The invoices are hearsay; and
(ii) Regional Supervisor James’ testimony does not meet the necessity and reliability tests for admission of hearsay evidence as outlined in Manikam.
31In Manikam, the Divisional Court addressed the duty of fairness required in eviction proceedings when the only evidence being relied upon in support of the findings was hearsay evidence (para. 1). At first instance, the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) found, in the absence of the tenant, that the tenant threw a rabbit off her 15th floor balcony to its death and thereby committed an illegal act warranting her eviction pursuant to s. 81 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (RTA) (para. 2).
32At a review hearing, the tenant and another witness testified and denied that the tenant threw the rabbit off the balcony (para. 3). The only evidence relied upon by the landlord at the review hearing was a police officer who read notes taken by another police officer which contained a signed statement by the tenant’s ex-boyfriend. Neither officer witnessed the incident, and the ex-boyfriend was not called to testify at the review hearing (paras. 3-4). The LTB concluded that given “the Tenant’s unreliable testimony in tandem with the on-scene police officer’s notes, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Tenant was the individual who threw the rabbit over the balcony” (para. 16).
33The tenant sought a judicial review of the LTB’s initial decision as well as the review hearing decision on the basis that the LTB violated the rules of natural justice and denied the tenant procedural fairness by preferring the double hearsay evidence to the testimony of the tenant and her witness (para. 22). The Divisional Court agreed with the tenant and found that the LTB breached the tenant’s right to procedural fairness by admitting and relying on hearsay evidence in the circumstances in that case (para. 47).
34In noting that there were common law exceptions to the exclusion of hearsay evidence, the Divisional Court held that evidence that does not fall within the traditional exceptions may still be admitted into evidence if it is necessary and reliable (Manikam, para. 30). The Court continued:
Necessity requires satisfying the trier of fact that there is no other way to get the evidence before the court. The reliability requirement is generally met when it can be demonstrated that “there is i) no concern about the truth of the statement because of the circumstances in which the statement was made; or ii) no real concern arising from presentation of the statement as hearsay because the circumstances permit the testing of its truth and accuracy by means other than contemporaneous cross-examination” (Watt’s Manual, at p. 424) (para. 31).
35Finally, the Divisional Court held that even if the evidence can satisfy the requirements of necessity and reliability, hearsay evidence may still be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (para. 31).
36In addition to arguing that the invoices were hearsay evidence, the appellants also argued that the testimony of Regional Supervisor James fails both the necessity and reliability requirement for the admission of hearsay evidence. Specifically, the appellants submitted that Regional Supervisor James’ testimony:
(i) Fails the necessity requirement because no explanation was provided as to why no one was present from the kennels to testify about the invoices underlying the final SOA; and
(ii) Fails the reliability requirement because on cross-examination, Regional Supervisor James “knew nothing” regarding the kennels and that the invoices do not show if the standards of care were being met while the dogs were being boarded.
37The appellants’ closing submissions on the Manikam decision, however, are inconsistent from their statements made during the hearing. I agree with the respondent that the appellants did not challenge the admissibility of the invoices when the respondent sought to enter them as evidence through Regional Supervisor James’ testimony and have them marked as exhibits at the hearing. In fact, the appellants conceded that the invoices were likely admissible under an exception to hearsay, such as business records or another purpose, and they stated at that time they would only be making submissions in closing as to the weight that I should give to the invoices. Therefore, I find that the decision in Manikam is distinguishable from this matter because:
(i) In Manikam, the Court focused on the admission of the hearsay evidence (paras. 34 and 35) and was clear that necessity and reliability are only considered to determine admissibility if hearsay evidence did not fall under a traditional exception to hearsay; and
(ii) In this matter, the appellants were clear that they were not taking issue with the admission of the invoices as evidence at the hearing.
38Finally, I disagree with the appellants that the respondent has not met its initial evidentiary burden because the costs set out on the final SOA are “not based on evidence.” In this regard, the appellants submit that the amounts being claimed on the final SOA for boarding are similar to the veterinary costs that I considered in the Windrift SOA #1 decision in which I varied those costs on the first SOA to $Nil.
39In Windrift SOA #1, I varied the veterinary costs of $121,725.77 to $Nil because I found that the veterinary amounts charged for the initial triage of the dogs after removal and before arriving at the kennels were not for providing necessaries to the dogs but were rather to provide preventative treatment to house the dogs at indoor kennels (para. 92). I also found that the respondent failed to prove that the veterinary amounts included on the first SOA that were dated after the triage did not arise as a result of the care, or lack therefore, provided by the respondent or any of its agents as none of the dogs were removed from the appellants due to any health issues (paras. 101-102).
40In this matter, there are no issues concerning “providing necessaries” as the language of sections 35(1) and (2) of the PAWS Act has changed since my decision in Windrift SOA #1. At the time of the decision of Windrift SOA #1, s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act read as follows:
If an animal welfare inspector has provided an animal with necessaries to relieve its distress or the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector has taken an animal into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector may, from time to time, serve on the owner or custodian of the animal a statement of account respecting the cost of the necessaries.
41Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act was amended in January 2024 and now reads:
The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector may, from time to time, serve on the owner or custodian of an animal a statement of account respecting any costs incurred in relation to the animal if the costs were incurred in relation to any of the following circumstances:
An animal welfare inspector has taken steps to relieve the animal’s distress, which may include providing it with necessaries to relieve its distress under section 33.
An animal welfare inspector has removed the animal from the place where it was under subsection 31 (1) or (2).
The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector has kept the animal in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care under subsection 31 (6) or taken the animal into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care under subsection 44 (8).
42Necessities are now only considered for costs incurred to relieve distress under s. 33 of the PAWS Act and s. 33 is not at issue in this matter. Further, there is no issue of causation regarding the boarding amounts being claimed on the final SOA.
43For all these reasons, I find that the actual boarding costs incurred were more than the $20.00/dog/day as reflected on the final SOA based on the invoices, the Third SOA Summary Chart, and Regional Supervisor James’ testimony. Therefore, the respondent has met the first part of its initial evidentiary onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that it incurred greater costs to board the dogs than what is reflected on the final SOA.
b) The boarding costs on the final SOA are reasonable
44I find that the respondent has proven on a balance of probabilities that the boarding costs of $20.00/dog/day are reasonable because:
(i) I accept Regional Supervisor James’ testimony that $20.00/day/dog was far below the actual amounts charged by the kennels that housed the dogs;
(ii) I also accept Regional Supervisor James’ testimony that the respondent sought to recover boarding costs in the amount of $20.00/dog/day based on my findings in Windrift SOA #1;
(iii) The appellants agreed that the actual boarding costs were more than $20.00/dog/day; and
(iv) The appellants provided no evidence that the daily boarding costs per dog should be lower than $20.00/dog/day aside from questioning the whether the care provided while boarded met the standards of the PAWS Act and O. Reg. 444/19, “Standards of Care and Administrative Requirements.” In my view, whether the standards of the PAWS Act and O. Reg. 444/19 were met while the dogs were boarded is not a consideration on whether the costs are reasonable; rather, whether the standards of the PAWS Act and O. Reg. 444/19 were met while the dogs were boarded is more appropriately considered when determining if a SOA should be varied.
45I am also not persuaded by Ms. Pryde’s testimony that it does not cost $1.4 million per year, or even $20.00/day/dog, to care for the dogs in determining whether the costs on the final SOA are reasonable. Ms. Pryde did not offer any documentary evidence to support this portion of her testimony or offer any evidence or specific details as to what the actual costs were to the appellants to care for the dogs prior to their removal.
46Finally, the parties spent a great deal of time making submissions concerning efforts to have the dogs returned. Specifically, the respondent submitted that the costs of the final SOA are reasonable because it was open to the appellants to seek a return of the dogs by way of an application at any time and, therefore, the respondent was unable to negotiate long-term boarding rates because the return of the dogs was always a possibility. Indeed, 15 dogs were returned to the appellants on May 30, 2023 and Ms. Pryde testified to a great deal of effort made by the appellants to have additional dogs returned. While I find it concerning that no long-term kennel rates were negotiated after 1.5 to 3 years of keeping the removed dogs in the care of the respondent and agree with the appellants that filing an application at any time is a remedy available in all matters where the respondent has removed and kept an animal in its care, the respondent is only seeking partial recovery of the actual boarding costs from the appellants. Therefore, the total amount of the final SOA already provides a discount to the actual boarding costs of $24.00/day/dog plus food and taxes to $60.00/day/dog plus food and taxes.
47Therefore, I find that there is sufficient evidence before me that the respondent has met its initial evidentiary burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the charges reflected in the final SOA reflect less than the actual costs incurred for care provided and that the costs were reasonable based on Regional Supervisor James’ testimony which, similar to the decision in Windrift SOA #2, included the reasons for only seeking $20.00/day/dog on the final SOA, the information provided in the Third SOA Summary Chart, and the supporting invoices.
The final SOA is confirmed
48As the respondent has met its initial evidentiary burden, the onus now shifts to the appellants to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be varied or revoked.
49The appellants submit that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil because:
(i) While the dogs were in the respondent’s care, the dogs have not been provided with proper necessaries and/or with adequate care;
(ii) The amounts charged on the final SOA were not appropriate; and/or
(iii) Financial hardship/ability to pay.
50For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellants have not proven on a balance of probabilities that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil.
a) The appellants have failed to prove that the dogs were not provided with proper necessaries and/or adequate care
51The appellants submitted that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil because the dogs were not provided with proper necessaries and/or with adequate care. To support this position, the appellants argued that Regional Supervisor James had “no knowledge” of the care needs of sled dogs and that the dogs were in distress or died while being boarded by the respondent.
52I agree that Regional Supervisor James confirmed in cross-examination that he did not know what exercise a sled dog requires, or what would constitute “natural movement” for sled dogs. He also testified that he was not aware of the grooming requirements or what type of enrichment is appropriate for sled dogs. Regional Supervisor James further confirmed that he was not aware of whether the kennels would have known this information about sled dogs either as he was “not in conversation with the kennels.” Nevertheless, I also agree with the respondent that the appellants did not call any evidence of any specific needs for sled dogs that would be beyond the needs of a regular dog in terms of exercise, enrichment, natural movement, etc. I also agree with the respondent that it was open to the appellants to call this evidence, but they did not. More than bald attacks on the lack of knowledge of Regional Supervisor James regarding sled dogs is required to show that the dogs were not provided with necessaries and/or with adequate care while in the respondent’s care such that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil.
53The appellants also relied upon the testimony of Regional Supervisor James to support their position that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil on the basis that the dogs were in distress and/or died while being boarded, and that they should not have to pay the final SOA in these circumstances. The appellants relied on Regional Supervisor James’ testimony in this regard despite criticizing his knowledge on sled dogs and asking me to find that he was an unreliable witness for the reason set out in paragraph 27 above.
54In any event, the appellants relied upon the cross-examination of Regional Supervisor James in which he confirmed that an animal would be in distress in his opinion if:
(i) It requires medical attention;
(ii) It does not require medical attention but is still sick;
(iii) It is injured; and
(iv) If a veterinarian agrees to euthanize an animal.
55The appellants also relied upon Regional Supervisor James’ confirmation in cross-examination that a reasonable owner would not pay someone to put their animal in distress, including amounts for boarding costs, if the end result is that the animal is sick, injured, or deceased.
56The Third SOA Summary Chart showed that 15 dogs died or were euthanized from January 1, 2023 to January 23, 2024 while in the care of the respondent. The appellant also submitted approximately 7,000 pages of veterinarian records as evidence at that hearing that, according to the appellants, showed that the dogs were in distress while in the care of the respondent. The appellants’ position is that, based on the testimony of Regional Supervisor James and the veterinarian records, the appellants should not have to pay for the boarding costs for the dogs as they were being put in distress as the dogs were sick, injured, or died during the period of the final SOA.
57Following a dispute over whether to accept veterinary records into the hearing evidence, I allowed the appellants to submit and rely upon almost 7,000 pages of veterinary records for the hearing. I found that the records met the low threshold of relevancy as they pertained to the dogs that were in the care of the respondent and I allowed them into the evidence pursuant to s. 15(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (SPPA). However, I also cautioned the appellants that I expected the parties to make specific reference to the portions of the records being relied upon by page number. I stated that I would not be reviewing the evidence page by page without guidance from the appellants as it was not my role as the adjudicator to puzzle through large volumes of documents to decipher and assemble an evidentiary foundation for one’s case.
58The appellants assured me that this is not what they were requesting of me with these records. The appellants’ position was that I could consider the records in their totality as evidence that the dogs were distress. According to the appellants, the information contained in the veterinary records should have been introduced through an expert witness called by the respondent, not by the appellants. In this regard, the appellants argued that while the respondent has not claimed any amounts on the final SOA for veterinary costs, that the respondent’s actions were tantamount to concealing information from me and from the public on what happens to animals once removed by AWS.
59The appellants further supported their position that it should be the respondent who calls experts to explain veterinary records in the hearing based on the inequities of the animal welfare system that I previously commented on in my reconsideration decision in Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 27. In this reconsideration decision, I found that the Board proceedings are not akin to other civil proceedings between two equal parties because:
(i) The respondent performs a regulatory function and, therefore, the parties involved in proceedings before the Board are more similar to those involved in quasi-criminal or regulatory proceedings where the enforcement agency has the burden of proof; and
(ii) The respondent is in exclusive possession of all the relevant documents regarding SOAs and, in some matters, the animals giving rise to the dispute (paras. 27 and 28).
60The appellants state that it should be incumbent upon the respondent to lead evidence to show that the standards of care as required by the PAWS Act and O. Reg. 444/19 were being met by the boarding facilities that housed the dogs. Failing to call expert evidence to explain the significant number of veterinary reports for the period covered by the final SOA means, according to the appellants, that the respondent has not proven that the standards of care were being met such that that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil. I disagree.
61As stated in paragraph 48 above, once the respondent meets it initial evidentiary burden in appeals of SOAs, the onus then shifts to the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the SOA should be varied or revoked. It was appellants that advanced the argument in support of their appeal that the dogs have not been provided with proper necessaries and/or with adequate care while in the care of the respondent. As such, it was on the appellants to prove this ground of appeal on a balance of probabilities by calling evidence to support their position. Therefore, I disagree with the appellants’ argument that it is on the respondent to call expert evidence to provide insight into the veterinary records from the respondent. As the respondent pointed out, Dr. Rumney, veterinarian, was originally listed as a witness in the October 28, 2024 Case Conference Report and Order to testify at the hearing for the appellants. However, for reasons unknown, the appellant did not call Dr. Rumney, as a witness who may have been qualified to explain and provide an opinion on the veterinarian records in light of the standards of care.
62While I agree with the appellants that there is an overwhelming number of veterinary reports for the period of time that is covered by the final SOA for the dogs, I place no weight on the veterinary reports because the appellants:
(i) Did not point me to any specific page or section of the reports as I stated was required when I admitted the records into evidence; and
(ii) Did not call expert evidence to provide information on the reports including whether the conditions set out therein were as a result of natural causes or as a result of the care, or lack therefore, being provided at the kennels.
63I also do not place weight on Ms. Pryde’s testimony regarding the condition of the dogs that were returned to the appellants in support of the appellants’ position that the final SOA should be varied because the dogs were not being provided with proper necessaries and/or with adequate care. Ms. Pryde provided general comments regarding her concerns of the condition of the dogs when they were returned to the appellants. Ms. Pryde’s testimony lacked specifics and she was not altogether clear that the issues she was speaking of occurred during the period of time covered by the final SOA. I also struck her testimony where it was clear that she was speaking of dogs returned outside of the timeframe covered by the final SOA as they were not relevant to the matter in dispute. Ms. Pryde did, however, provide specifics regarding one dog named Grizzly who was returned to the appellants during the period of time covered by the final SOA on May 30, 2023. According to Ms. Pryde, Grizzly was a young dog that now “walks around stiff” and that there is “no reason for such a young dog to be walking around like this.” Ms. Pryde relied upon a 4 second video of Grizzly that showed him walking. The appellants, however, provided no medical evidence in support of Ms. Pryde’s claims regarding Grizzly that would allow me to make a finding regarding the cause of his stiff walking.
64For all these reasons, I find that the appellants have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the dogs have not been provided with proper necessaries and/or with adequate care such that the final SOA should be varied on this basis.
b) The amounts charged on the final SOA were appropriate
65I also find that the appellants have not proven on a balance of probabilities that the amounts charged on the final SOA were not appropriate such that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil.
66In support of this position, the appellants called into question the respondent’s decision to only seek $20.00/day/dog for boarding costs when the actual costs of boarding, as well the veterinarian fees, far exceed the total amount of the final SOA. The appellants argued that by only seeking $20.00/dog/day, the taxpayers of Ontario are required to cover the shortfall.
67I agree with the respondent, however, that the Board does not have jurisdiction to call into question or scrutinize the respondent’s decision to seek recovery of some or all the costs it incurs for care of animals through SOAs. Serving a SOA to recover costs is discretionary under s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act and, therefore, there is not even a requirement that the respondent issue a SOA let alone that it seeks recovery of any particular amount of the costs.
c) Insufficient evidence of financial hardship and the appellants’ inability to pay
68I find that the appellants have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the final SOA should be varied based on financial hardship and/or the appellants’ ability to pay.
69The appellants submitted that these matters have had a dramatic effect on them personally and on their business. The appellants submitted that it is a matter of public record that the appellants all owe more than $2 million based on the previous two SOAs. Ms. Pryde testified that the appellants have “limited income” from farming, and that collection agencies are pursuing them for the outstanding amounts of the SOA #1 and #2 which is accumulating $2,500.00 in interest each month. Ms. Pryde testified that the appellants are “never going to get out from this,” and that they would have to live with the debt already owing for the rest of their lives. The appellants submitted that none of Ms. Pryde’s testimony on the issue of financial hardship was tested in cross-examination and the respondent led no evidence to refute Ms. Pryde’s claims. As a result, the appellant submitted that Ms. Pryde’s testimony was sufficient evidence that the appellants should not have to pay the final SOA based on financial hardship and/or the ability to pay. I disagree.
70The respondent is correct that the onus is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the final SOA should be varied based on financial hardship and/or the ability to pay. Here, while Ms. Pryde has provided testimony as to the overall financial impact on the appellants, I agree with the respondent that the appellants have not provided any documentation to support Ms. Pryde’s testimony. I also find that Ms. Pryde’s testimony was vague and that she did not provide any specifics as to the ability of each appellant to pay, including the corporate appellant, Windrift Adventures Inc.
71While the Divisional Court has affirmed that the aggregate care costs of the dogs from the previous SOAs have been “disastrously high” for the appellants (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272), there is simply no documentary evidence before me to support the position that the appellants are unable to pay the final SOA such that it should be varied on this basis and Ms. Pryde’s testimony was not sufficient as it lacked particulars and failed to speak to the hardship to each of the appellants. Therefore, I find that the appellants have not proven on a balance of probabilities that the final SOA should be varied to $Nil based on financial hardship and/or ability to pay.
ORDER
72Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, I confirm the final SOA in the amount of $1,431,180.00 and order that these costs be paid by the appellants to the Minister of Finance.
Released: July 25, 2025
Lindsay Lake, Vice-Chair