Appeals under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Julie Gabriel
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Order Made By: Tassia Poynter, Member
For the Appellant: Julie Gabriel, Self-represented (Not in attendance)
For the Respondent: Jason Kirsh, Counsel
Heard by Videoconference: May 22, 2025
OVERVIEW
1These appeals are about whether Julie Gabriel (the Appellant) must pay two statements of account for veterinary and other costs related to her dog, Louie, following an emergency surgery to treat a urethral prolapse.
2Louie was removed from the Appellant’s home on March 20, 2025, after a veterinarian advised that it was necessary to do so to relieve distress caused by his medical condition. Louie underwent emergency surgery and was then kept in the care of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (the Respondent) for two days while he recovered from surgery before being returned to the Appellant on March 25, 2025.
3The Respondent served the Appellant with two statements of account for veterinary and other costs in relation to Louie. The first statement of account is dated April 1, 2025, and is in the amount of $7,535.71 (SOA #1). The second statement of account is dated April 10, 2025, and is in the amount of $336.57 (SOA #2).
4The Appellant appealed both statements of account to the Animal Care Review Board (the Board). In her written notices of appeal, the Appellant asks the Board to revoke/vary the statements of account because she does not have the funds to pay them.
5The Respondent argues that both statements of account reflect actual and reasonable costs incurred in relation to Louie and asks the Board to confirm the statements of account.
ISSUES
6Should SOA #1 dated April 1, 2025, and SOA #2 dated April 10, 2025, be confirmed, revoked, or varied?
RESULT
7For the following reasons, the Board varies both SOA #1 and SOA #2 to $0.00 because the Respondent has not met its initial evidentiary burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the costs underlying the statements of account are reasonable.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The Appellant did not attend the hearing
8On April 23, 2025, the parties participated in a case conference regarding 16939/ACRB, the appeal of SOA #1.
9On May 15, 2025, the parties participated in a case conference regarding 17016/ACRB, the appeal of SOA #2. On consent of the parties, the Board ordered that the two appeals be heard at the same time under section 9.1(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (SPPA).
10Also on May 15, 2025, the Board sent the parties a Notice of Videoconference Hearing which provided the date, time, and details for joining the hearing via Zoom.
11On May 22, 2025, the Board convened the hearing of these matters at 9:30 a.m., as scheduled.
12By 9:35 a.m., the Appellant had not joined the hearing. The Board adjourned while a Board Case Management Officer (CMO) telephoned the Appellant to inquire if she would be joining the hearing. The Appellant did not answer and the CMO left a voicemail message.
13At 9:42 a.m., the CMO sent an email to the Appellant advising her to join the Zoom hearing as soon as possible or reply by return email or telephone call to advise of her status.
14At 9:45 a.m., the Board took a further recess to permit the Appellant more time to join the hearing and/or contact the CMO.
15By 10:15 a.m., the Appellant had still not joined the hearing, nor had she responded to the CMO’s voicemail message or email message.
16The Appellant did not submit an adjournment request either before or during the hearing.
17The Respondent advised that it wished to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence.
18I was satisfied that the Appellant was given reasonable notice of the hearing, and that she had several opportunities to contact the Board on the date of the hearing to inform the Board of her intention to attend the hearing and/or any issues regarding her attendance but did not do so.
19As a result, under section 7(3) of the SPPA, I proceeded with the hearing in the absence of the Appellant at 10:15 a.m. on May 22, 2025.
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
20In deciding whether to confirm, revoke, or vary a statement of account, the Board considers whether the costs were incurred in relation to an animal in the circumstances outlined in section 35 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019 c. 13 (PAWS Act).
21Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act makes an animal owner responsible for costs incurred by the Respondent in cases where an inspector has removed, kept, or taken an animal into care or has provided necessaries to relieve an animal’s distress under section 33.
22Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act outlines the types of costs that may be recovered by the Respondent on a statement of account, including costs incurred to: relieve the animal’s distress; remove or take the animal into care; provide care for an animal that has been removed; provide care to an animal that has been kept or taken into the Respondent’s care; and to take any prescribed action in relation to the animal.
23As set out in further detail below, the Respondent has an initial burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the charges reflected in the statement of account reflect the actual costs incurred and that the costs are reasonable. If the Respondent meets this burden, the onus shifts to the owner of an animal to show that a statement of account should be revoked or varied.
A. Respondent’s evidence
24The Respondent’s evidence was unchallenged because the Appellant did not attend the hearing and therefore made no submissions, nor were any of the documents the Appellant filed with the Board entered as evidence.
25In support of its position to have the accounts confirmed, the Respondent called Jamie Boudreau, an inspector with Animal Welfare Services (AWS), as a witness. Inspector Boudreau adopted a written witness statement that was entered as evidence at the hearing. Her witness statement provided details regarding why Louie was removed, the treatment Louie received, and the costs associated with Louie’s examination, treatment, and hospitalization, as set out below.
i. Events leading to Louie’s removal and surgery
26On March 8, 2025, Louie was diagnosed with urethral prolapse by a veterinarian at Downtown Animal Hospital. Due to financial concerns, the Appellant did not pursue the recommended treatment for Louie’s condition at that time.
27On March 13, 2025, AWS became aware of Louie’s condition, and a short time later issued an order under section 30 of the PAWS Act requiring the Appellant to follow veterinary recommendations regarding Louie’s care by March 25, 2025. During that time, the Appellant attempted to secure a National Pet Card loan to pay for Louie’s recommended care but was denied.
28On March 20, 2025, Inspector Boudreau contacted the Kawartha Veterinary Emergency Clinic regarding Louie’s condition, and spoke with Dr. Chownard, a veterinarian, who told her that urethral prolapse is a medical emergency. Dr. Chownard signed a Certificate of a Veterinarian Advising the Removal or Euthanasia of Animal(s) that stated that it was necessary to remove Louie to alleviate distress caused by known urethral prolapse, and that he required immediate evaluation and treatment. Later that same day, Inspector Boudreau removed Louie from the Appellant’s care.
29Because the Kawartha Veterinary Emergency Clinic did not have a urologist on staff, Inspector Boudreau brought Louie to Capital City Specialty Emergency Animal Hospital (Capital City) where he was examined and underwent preanesthetic bloodwork and received intravenous fluids for the purpose of hydration and administering medication.
30The following day, Louie underwent a series of procedures to repair the collapsed urethra and minimize the possibility of recurrence of his condition. This included procedures to remove all the necrotic tissue in the urethra, create a new opening in the urethra and tack it to healthy tissue (urethropexy, and urethral resection and anastomosis), and a neutering procedure (pre-scrotal orchiectomy), all of which were recommended by Dr. Larose, a urologist at Capital City.
31Between March 20 and 22, 2025, Louie remained at Capital City where he was monitored. Although Louie could have been returned to the Appellant on March 22, 2025, neither Inspector Boudreau nor any other AWS inspector was available to return Louie to the Appellant and so he was boarded at Kinburn Kennels until March 25, 2025. Neither statement of account includes charges for Louie’s boarding between March 22 and March 25, 2025.
32On March 25, 2025, Inspector Boudreau returned Louie to the Appellant.
33On April 1, 2025, Inspector Boudreau served the Appellant with SOA #1, in the amount of $7,535.71.
ii. Follow-up visit to assess Louie’s ongoing bleeding
34On April 6, 7, and 8, 2025, the Appellant contacted Inspector Boudreau to inform her that Louie was bleeding from his penis. At that time, Inspector Boudreau and other AWS Central East and East Inspectors were traveling to Ottawa for a regional meeting and therefore no inspectors were available to assess Louie’s situation or issue a further order under section 30 of the PAWS Act. As a result, Inspector Boudreau relied on section 33 of the PAWS Act and asked the Appellant to voluntarily bring Louie back to Downtown Animal Hospital so that he could be examined. Section 33 of the PAWS Act authorizes an inspector who is lawfully in any place and who finds an animal in distress to take any reasonable steps to relieve the animal’s distress.
35On April 8, 2025, the Appellant brought Louie to Downtown Animal Hospital and his examination showed the urethra was intact. The examining veterinarian stated that Louie required no further surgery nor follow-up examinations, and prescribed Louie additional sedation to help keep him calm as he continued to recover.
36On April 10, 2025, Inspector Boudreau served the Appellant with SOA #2, in the amount of $336.57, related to this follow-up visit.
iii. Costs underlying SOA #1
37Inspector Boudreau testified that SOA #1 included costs incurred for: examination; sedation to examine the genital area to determine next steps; pre-surgical bloodwork; a urinalysis to rule out potential underlying factors such as a urinary tract infection; surgery; hospitalization; and medications used in hospital and for post-operative care.
38The Respondent filed a detailed and itemized undated invoice from Capital City.
39When asked by the Board if she is familiar with the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Suggested Fee Guide (the Guide), and whether these charges fell below, met, or exceeded the suggested fees set out in the Guide, Inspector Boudreau testified that:
a. While she is aware of the Guide, she is unfamiliar with the fees;
b. Because Capital City is a specialty and emergency clinic, it is to be expected that the fees will be a little higher than usual; and
c. Given the extent of the prolapse, the surgical procedures Louie underwent could not be completed by a regular veterinarian at a regular veterinary clinic. Rather, it was necessary for Louie to receive care at a specialty clinic.
iv. Costs underlying SOA #2
40Inspector Boudreau testified that SOA #2 included costs incurred for an examination and for the medication’s gabapentin and trazodone.
41The Respondent filed a detailed and itemized invoice from Downtown Animal Hospital dated April 8, 2025.
B. Respondent’s submissions
42The Respondent argued that the charges it incurred in relation to Louie and later billed to the Appellant via the statements of account were for the types of charges permitted under section 35(2) of the PAWS Act. Specifically, the Respondent argued that the costs were incurred to relieve Louie’s distress under section 35(2)1 of the PAWS Act.
43In respect of its initial evidentiary burden on a statement of account appeal, the Respondent relied on two decisions: Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 and Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272. The Respondent argued that it had met its initial evidentiary burden by calling Inspector Boudreau as a witness and entering the two invoices underlying the two statements of account into evidence. Regarding the invoices, the Respondent’s position was that the charges on those invoices are presumptively reasonable based on the two Windrift cases.
44The Respondent further argued that this case can be distinguished from a recent Board decision in LaPointe v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 145 (LaPointe), where the Board found that the Respondent did not meet its initial evidentiary burden. In that case, the Appellant took the position in his notice of appeal that the charges incurred by the Respondent were unnecessary and, therefore, the costs underlying the statement of account were unreasonable. The Respondent argued that, by contrast, the only ground of appeal advanced by the Appellant in this case is her inability to pay and, therefore, the Board has no evidence before it that the costs were not reasonable. As a result, the Respondent did not adduce more evidence regarding whether the costs were reasonable.
C. Board’s analysis and conclusions
45For the following reasons, I disagree with the Respondent’s submissions on what evidence satisfies its initial evidentiary burden on a statement of account appeal and find that it has not met its burden in this case.
i. Purpose and scope of the Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden
46In Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501, the Divisional Court upheld the Board’s decision in Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24, which placed an initial evidentiary burden on the Respondent for an appeal of a statement of account.
47The Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden can be summarized as a two-part test that requires the Respondent to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:
a. the charges on the statement of account reflect the actual costs incurred in relation to the animal; and
b. the costs are reasonable (see Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 at paras. 41-43).
48Both the Divisional Court and the Board in the cases cited above discuss the purpose of the Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden on an appeal of a statement of account.
49In upholding the Board’s decision as reasonable, the Divisional Court found that the Board had reasonably explained why the principle of “he who asserts must prove” is not applicable in an appeal of a statement of account. Specifically, the Board reasoned that if the Respondent did not have an initial evidentiary burden, an appellant could end up liable for unsubstantiated amounts simply because the Respondent included the amounts on the statement of account (see Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 at para. 47; Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24 at paras. 18-21; and Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 27 at paras. 26-28).
50This reasoning flows from the Board’s consideration that because the Respondent is in exclusive possession of all relevant documents related to a statement of account, it is appropriate for the Respondent to bear an initial evidentiary burden so that the appellant knows the case they must meet (see Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 24 at para. 18).
51In its reconsideration decision of the 2022 Board decision, the Board further explained that Board proceedings are not akin to any other civil proceeding between two equal parties. Rather, the Respondent performs a regulatory function and, therefore, the parties involved in proceedings before the Board are more similar to those involved in quasi-criminal or regulatory proceedings where the enforcement agency has the burden of proof (see Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 27 at para. 28).
52In addition, the Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden is connected to the Board’s power to determine its own adjudicative process, including determining which party presents evidence first. Section 39(2) of the PAWS Act empowers the Board to provide for and require practices or procedures that are alternatives to traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures and to determine the order in which issues and evidence in a proceeding will be presented (see Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 at paras. 45-46).
ii. The Appellant’s pleadings do not alter the test for the Respondent to meet in satisfying its initial evidentiary burden; invoices are not presumptively reasonable
53I do not agree with the Respondent’s submission that because the Appellant did not take the position that the costs were unreasonable in her notices of appeal that the Respondent did not need to adduce evidence regarding whether the costs are in fact reasonable.
54In my view, the Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden is not a high bar for the Respondent to meet. Rather, it calls for at least some evidence to establish that it has met the two-part test on a balance of probabilities.
55If I were to accept the Respondent’s position, the two-part test would be inconsistently applied by the Board and entirely dependent on an appellant’s grounds of appeal which are most often articulated before the appellant has detailed information regarding the costs underlying the statement of account and their justification. Further, I find that the rationale for the Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden is incompatible with applying the two-part test in some, but not all, appeals of a statement of account, and that it is not dependent on the specific grounds of appeal in any given case. For that reason, I do not accept the Respondent’s submissions regarding how this case is distinguishable from the Board’s decision in LaPointe.
56I also find that the two Divisional Court decisions in Windrift relied upon by the Respondent do not stand for the proposition that invoices attached to an inspector’s affidavit or will-say statement are presumptively reasonable. Instead, the analysis regarding whether charges on a statement of account are reasonable depends on the facts of the specific case.
57In Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272, the Divisional Court held at paragraph 36 that the inspector’s affidavit in that case “provided a factual foundation for the Board’s conclusion that the Respondent had met its initial evidentiary burden”.
58That case involved two statements of account, which the appellants separately appealed. In the appeal of the first statement of account, the Board varied the boarding costs to $20.00 per day, finding it to be the most reasonable daily boarding rate (see Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 at para. 71).
59The appeal of the second statement of account (Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 40) is the appeal underlying Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272. That statement of account involved boarding costs for the animals in question over a nearly one-year period.
60The inspector in that case outlined in an affidavit that she decided to only include boarding costs at the rate of $20.00 per day, being the rate approved by the Board in the appeal of the first statement of account. Her affidavit contained hundreds of pages of itemized boarding facility invoices that were addressed to AWS and showed the actual costs incurred by AWS for the period in question; none of the actual boarding rates charged to AWS were as low as the $20.00 listed on the second statement of account (see Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 40 at para. 27).
61The inspector’s affidavit also outlined that she had inquired into the costs of other dog boarding facilities used by AWS in the past years and that she believed that the boarding costs charged in the case were consistent with the range of fees rendered for housing of domestic dogs in Ontario (see Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 40 at para. 35).
62The factual foundation provided by the inspector in the appeal underlying Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272, can be distinguished from this case because the inspector’s affidavit addressed both parts of the two part-test, not just the first. Specifically, the inspector’s affidavit addressed the actual charges incurred by attaching the underlying invoices to her affidavit, and explicitly addressed the reasonableness of those charges having regard to a past Board decision about what constituted a reasonable boarding rate and in referencing and providing information about the “range of fees rendered for housing of domestic dogs in Ontario”. I find no support for the Respondent’s position that the Court held that the invoices in that case were presumptively reasonable in isolation from the full factual context provided in the inspector’s affidavit.
63Nor do I find that the Divisional Court held that invoices were presumptively reasonable in Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501, and note that the Respondent did not direct the Board to any paragraphs in that decision that would support its position.
iii. Applying the two-part test in the present case
Step 1: The Respondent’s evidence establishes that the charges on the statements of account reflect the actual costs incurred
64Applying the two-part test to this case, I find that the Respondent has established that the charges on the statements of account reflect the actual/incurred costs of the care provided to Louie.
65Both the Capital City invoice and the Downtown Animal Hospital invoice were issued to AWS and are detailed and itemized, and reflect the actual costs passed on to the Appellant in SOA #1 and SOA #2.
66I find that these costs are the types of costs that an owner of an animal is liable to pay on a statement of account under sections 35(1) and 35(2) of the PAWS Act.
67Accordingly, I find the Respondent has met its initial evidentiary burden on the first part of the two-part test.
Step 2: The Respondent’s evidence does not establish that the costs provided are reasonable
68I find that the Respondent has not established that the costs underlying the statements of account are reasonable.
69In this case, the Respondent chose not to call any veterinary experts or other witnesses, nor enter any documentary evidence that might establish that it meets the second part of the two-part test.
70Inspector Boudreau did not provide any details regarding whether the costs incurred were within the typical or industry standard range of fees for the services provided to Louie. In response to the Board’s questioning, Inspector Boudreau testified that she expected that the costs on the statements of account in this matter would be higher than usual given the specialty nature of the procedures performed. No further details regarding the amount of the costs charged were provided.
71The fact that the costs on the statements of account may have been higher in this case is not, in and of itself, a barrier to the Board finding that those costs were reasonable, but due to a lack of evidence the Board has no way of determining, on a balance of probabilities, that the costs underlying the accounts were reasonable.
72In my view, to confirm the statements of account in the manner proposed by the Respondent in this case would be tantamount to the Board rubberstamping them.
73The fact that there is no evidence from the Appellant to support that the charges were unreasonable or excessive in the circumstances is not equivalent to the Respondent proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the costs were reasonable. In any event, the onus does not shift to the Appellant until the Respondent has satisfied its initial evidentiary burden, which, in this case, it has not.
74Accordingly, because I have no way of meaningfully assessing the reasonableness of the costs underlying the statements of account at issue, I decline to confirm the statements of account, and instead vary them to $0.00.
ORDER
75Pursuant to the powers of the Board under section 38(9)3.1 of the PAWS Act, the Board varies SOA #1 and SOA #2, respectively, to $0.00.
Released: July 17, 2025
___________________________
Tassia Poynter, Member