No one appearing for the Respondent or Added Respondent

The applicant, Lily Ror, sought to be removed as a director of Rovimat Group Inc. effective August 11, 2019, under the oppression remedy provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court found that the conduct of the respondent, Rolando Pires, in dissolving and reviving the corporation without her knowledge, diluting her shareholding, and exposing her to personal liability, amounted to unfair prejudice and disregard of her interests as a director.

The court ordered her removal as director effective the requested date and awarded her costs.

The appellant sought to vary a spousal support order and set aside a cost order from a 2018 judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower court had no jurisdiction to vary the cost order (as the appellant had abandoned a previous appeal of that order) and that the correctness of the 2018 arrears could not be attacked by a subsequent motion to vary, but only by appeal, which the appellant had also abandoned.

This motion concerned an application for court approval of a full and final settlement of statutory accident benefit claims for an adult under disability.

The applicant, who sustained catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident, sought approval of a $735,000 settlement and the legal fees of his counsel.

The court approved the settlement and its proposed structured payment, finding it fair and reasonable and in the best interest of the person under disability.

However, the court declined to enforce the contingency fee agreement for accident benefits and instead approved a significantly reduced legal fee based on quantum meruit, citing the distinct nature of accident benefit claims compared to tort claims and the minimal legal work required.

A self-represented appellant appealed his conviction for speeding (107 km/h in a 70 km/h zone) after two trials and an unsuccessful appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two substantive grounds: (1) the trial justice misapplied the W.(D.) principles by choosing between competing versions of evidence rather than determining whether guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the trial justice erred in restricting the appellant's cross-examination of the officer on prior inconsistent statements without requiring a transcript.

The court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, noting that the prosecutor should consider whether subjecting the appellant to a third trial on a speeding ticket serves the interests of justice.