Mitchell K. Kitagawa

The defendant subcontractor brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the third-party general contractor for defence costs.

The general contractor had breached its contractual obligation to obtain a wrap-up insurance policy for the construction project.

The court found that had the policy been obtained, there was a mere possibility that the claims against the subcontractor for property damage would have been covered, triggering a duty to defend.

The court ordered the general contractor to reimburse past defence costs and to retain an independent lawyer to act as an adjuster to approve future defence costs.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff mortgagee's action for negligent distribution of insurance proceeds, arguing the claim was barred by a one-year limitation period in the policy and that the plaintiff suffered no damages.

The defendant alternatively sought to transfer the proceeding from Ottawa to Kingston.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the insurer's conduct created a separate cause of action subject to the discoverability rule and whether the plaintiff suffered damages due to loss of control over the proceeds.

The court also dismissed the transfer motion, as the defendant failed to show Kingston was a significantly better venue.

The insured sought summary judgment declaring that an all‑risk property and business interruption insurance policy covered losses arising from the preventive shutdown and repair of a hydroelectric penstock after a similar penstock failed due to defective welding.

The insurer had indemnified losses from the failed penstock but denied coverage for preventive repairs and business interruption relating to the second penstock.

The court held that the policy excluded the cost of rectifying defects in workmanship and that no insured loss had yet occurred because the second penstock had not suffered physical damage.

The court also rejected reliance on statutory mitigation obligations and the doctrine of imminent peril, finding the risk of failure was foreseeable but not inevitable.

The insurer’s cross‑motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The defendant moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration that his motor vehicle insurance policy with the third-party insurer was in full force and effect when he struck the plaintiff pedestrian.

The insurer brought a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing the policy was validly terminated for non-payment of premiums prior to the accident.

The court found that the defendant had implicitly agreed to the premium amount by paying it for three months before defaulting.

The court also accepted the insurer's calculation of the 30-day notice period required by the Statutory Conditions.

The insurer's cross-motion was granted, and the defendant's motion was dismissed.